Congressional Record Weekly Update

Return to the Congressional Report Weekly.

1) Iraq
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, we face no more serious decision in our democracy than whether or not to go to war. The American people deserve to fully understand all of the implications of such a decision.

   The question of whether our Nation should attack Iraq is playing out in the context of a more fundamental debate that is only just beginning--an all-important debate about how, when and where in the years ahead our country will use its unsurpassed military might.

   On September 20, the administration unveiled its new National Security Strategy. This document addresses the new realities of our age, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist networks armed with the agendas of fanatics. The Strategy claims that these new threats are so novel and so dangerous that we should ``not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively.''

   In the discussion over the past few months about Iraq, the administration, often uses the terms ``pre-emptive'' and ``preventive'' interchangeably. In the realm of international relations, these two terms have long had very different meanings.

   Traditionally, ``pre-emptive'' action refers to times when states react to an imminent threat of attack. For example, when Egyptian and Syrian forces mobilized on Israel's borders in 1967, the threat was obvious and immediate, and Israel felt justified in pre-emptively attacking those forces. The global community is generally tolerant of such actions, since no nation should have to suffer a certain first strike before it has the legitimacy to respond.

   By contrast, ``preventive'' military action refers to strikes that target a country before it has developed a capability that could someday become threatening. Preventive attacks have generally been condemned. For example, the 1941 sneak attack on Pearl Harbor was regarded as a preventive strike by Japan, because the Japanese were seeking to block a planned military buildup by the United States in the Pacific.

   The coldly premeditated nature of preventive attacks and preventive wars makes them anathema to well-established international principles against aggression. Pearl Harbor has been rightfully recorded in history as an act of dishonorable treachery.

   Historically, the United States has condemned the idea of preventive war, because it violates basic international rules against aggression. But at times in our history, preventive war has been seriously advocated as a policy option.

   In the early days of the cold war, some U.S. military and civilian experts advocated a preventive war against the Soviet Union. They proposed a devastating first strike to prevent the Soviet Union from developing a threatening nuclear capability. At the time, they said the uniquely destructive power of nuclear weapons required us to rethink traditional international rules.

   The first round of that debate ended in 1950, when President Truman ruled out a preventive strike, stating that such actions were not consistent with our American tradition. He said, ``You don't `prevent' anything by war ..... except peace.'' Instead of a surprise first strike, the nation dedicated itself to the strategy of deterrence and containment, which successfully kept the peace during the long and frequently difficult years of the Cold War.

   Arguments for preventive war resurfaced again when the Eisenhower administration took power in 1953, but President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles soon decided firmly against it. President Eisenhower emphasized that even if we were to win such a war, we would face the vast burdens of occupation and reconstruction that would come with it.

   The argument that the United States should take preventive military action, in the absence of an imminent attack, resurfaced in 1962, when we learned that the Soviet Union would soon have the ability to launch missiles from Cuba against our country. Many military officers urged President Kennedy to approve a preventive attack to destroy this capability before it became operational. Robert Kennedy, like Harry Truman, felt that this kind of first strike was not consistent with American values. He said that a proposed surprise first strike against Cuba would be a ``Pearl Harbor in reverse.''

   For 175 years, [he said] we have not been that kind of country.

   That view prevailed. A middle ground was found and peace was preserved.

   Yet another round of debate followed the Cuban Missile Crisis when American strategists and voices in and out of the administration advocated preventive war against China to forestall its acquisition of nuclear weapons. Many arguments heard today about Iraq were made then about the Chinese communist government: that its leadership was irrational and that it was therefore undeterrable. And once again, those arguments were rejected.

   As these earlier cases show, American strategic thinkers have long debated the relative merits of preventive and pre-emptive war. Although nobody would deny our right to pre-emptively block an imminent attack on our territory, there is disagreement about our right to preventively engage in war.

   In each of these cases a way was found to deter other nations, without waging war.

   Now, the Bush Administration says we must take pre-emptive action against Iraq. But what the Administration is really calling for is preventive war, which flies in the face of international rules of acceptable behavior.

   There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is a despicable dictator and that he must be disarmed. But the Administration has not made a persuasive case that the threat is so imminent that we should risk going it alone. We should resort to war only as a last resort. If we work through the United Nations for free, unfettered inspections, we strengthen our hand with our allies, our hand against Saddam Hussein and our ability to disarm him.

   The Administration's new National Security Strategy states ``As a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.''

   The circumstances of today's world require us to rethink this concept. The world changed on September 11, and all of us have learned that it can be a drastically more dangerous place. The Bush administration's new National Security Strategy asserts that global realities now legitimize preventive war and make it a strategic necessity.

   The document openly contemplates preventive attacks against groups or states, even absent the threat of imminent attack. It legitimizes this kind of first strike option, and it elevates it to the status of a core security doctrine. Disregarding norms of international behavior, the Bush strategy asserts that the United States should be exempt from the rules we expect other nations to obey.

   I strongly oppose any such extreme doctrine and I'm sure that many others do as well. Earlier generations of Americans rejected preventive war on the grounds of both morality and practicality, and our generation must do so as well. We can deal with Iraq without resorting to this extreme.

   It is impossible to justify any such double standard under international law. Might does not make right. America cannot write its own rules for the modern world. To attempt to do so would be unilateralism run amok. It would antagonize our closest allies, whose support we need to fight terrorism, prevent global warming, and deal with many other dangers that affect all nations and require international cooperation. It would deprive America of the moral legitimacy necessary to promote our values abroad. And it would give other nations--from Russia to India to Pakistan--an excuse to violate fundamental principles of civilized international behavior.

   The administration's doctrine is a call for 21st century American imperialism that no other nation can or should accept. It is the antithesis of all that America has worked so hard to achieve in international relations since the end of World War II.

   This is not just an academic debate. There are important real world consequences. A shift in our policy toward preventive war would reinforce the perception of America as a ``bully' in the Middle East and would fuel anti-American sentiment throughout the Islamic world and beyond.

   It would also send a signal to governments the world over that the rules of aggression have changed for them too, which could increase the risk of conflict between countries such as Russia and Georgia, India and Pakistan, and China and Taiwan.

   Obviously, this debate is only just beginning on the administration's new strategy for national security. But the debate is solidly grounded in American values and history.

   It will also be a debate among vast numbers of well-meaning Americans who have honest differences of opinion about the best way to use United States military might. The debate will be contentious, but the stakes, in terms of both our national security and our allegiance to our core beliefs, are too high to ignore.

   I look forward to working closely with my colleagues in Congress to develop an effective, principled policy that will enable us to protect our national security, and respect the basic principles that are essential for the world to be at peace.

   I yield the floor.

   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oregon.

   (The remarks of Mr. WYDEN and Mr. HATCH pertaining to the introduction of S. 3063 are located in today's RECORD under ``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')

   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

   Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition, as noted, to discuss the pending resolution. At the outset, I commend the President for coming to Congress. Originally the position had been articulated by the White House that congressional authority was not necessary. The President, as Commander in Chief, has the authority under the Constitution to act in cases of emergency. But if there is time for discussion, deliberation, and debate, then in my view it is a matter for the Congress.

   Senator Harkin and I introduced a resolution on July 18 of this year calling for the President to come to Congress before using military force.

   When the President made his State of the Union speech and identified the axis of evil as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, followed by the testimony of Secretary of State Powell that there was no intention to go to war against either North Korea or Iran, it left the obvious inference that war might be in the offing as to Iraq.

   I spoke extensively on the subject back on February 13, 2002, raising a number of issues: What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control over weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the consequence in Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was toppled?

   What would happen in the region, the impact on the Arab world, and the impact on Israel? I believe it is vastly preferable on our resolution to focus on the question of weapons of mass destruction as opposed to the issue of regime change. When we talk about regime change, there is a sense in many other nations that the United States is seeking to exert its will on another sovereign nation. Much as Saddam Hussein deserves to be toppled, when we move away from the focus of containing weapons of mass destruction, it is my view we lose a great deal of our moral authority.

   There is no doubt Saddam Hussein has been ruthless in the use of weapons of mass destruction with the use of chemicals on his own people, the Kurds, and in the Iran-Iraq war. There is very substantial evidence Saddam Hussein has storehouses of biological weapons, and there is significant evidence he is moving as fast as he can toward nuclear weapons. So when we talk about self-defense, when we talk about ridding the world of the scourge, that is a very high moral ground. When we talk about regime change, it raises the concern of many leaders of many nations as to who is next--maybe they are next.

   I suggest it is possible to achieve regime change in a way superior to articulating or planning an attack with the view to toppling Saddam Hussein. I believe the way to achieve regime change, consistent with international principles, is to try Saddam Hussein as a war criminal. I introduced a resolution on March 2, 1998, which was passed by the U.S. Senate on March 13, 1998, calling for the creation of a military tribunal, similar to the war crimes tribunal at The Hague, similar to the war crimes tribunal in Rwanda, so that Saddam Hussein could be tried as a war criminal. There is no doubt on the evidence available that Saddam Hussein has committed war crimes. Without going into all of the details set forth in the resolution, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (See exhibit 1.)

   Mr. SPECTER. Herein, there is a very ample statement for the basis for trying Saddam Hussein and trying him successfully as a war criminal. In doing that, we would be following the precedent of trying former Yugoslavian President Milosevic as a war criminal. I have made some seven visits to The Hague and have participated in marshaling U.S. resources from the Department of Justice, also specifically from the FBI, also from the CIA during the 104th Congress back in 1995 and 1996, when I was chairman of the Intelligence Committee; and we now see the head of state, Slobodan Milosevic, on trial.

   We had the experience of the war crimes tribunal in Rwanda, which achieved an international precedent in convicting former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda of Rwanda, the first head of state to be convicted. He is now serving a life sentence.

   So it is my suggestion that the objective of regime change can be accomplished in accordance with existing international standards, on a multilateral basis, without having other nations in the world saying the superpower United States is trying to throw its weight around. It might take a little longer, but as is evidenced from the proceedings in Rwanda as to the former Prime Minister of Rwanda, and as evidenced from the proceedings of Milosevic, that is an ordinary successful progress of the law. The most difficult issue pending on the resolutions as to the use of force on Iraq, the most difficult issue, in my opinion, is the question of whether the United Nations authorizes the use of force.

   I commend the President for his efforts to organize an international coalition. President George Herbert Walker Bush did organize an international coalition in 1991, and prosecuted the war against Iraq with great success, enlisting the aid of the Arab nations, including Egypt, Syria, and other countries. That is the preferable way to proceed, if it can be accomplished.

   The obvious difficulty in conditioning the President's authority to use force on a United Nations resolution is the United States would be subjecting itself to the veto by either China, or Russia, or even France, and we prize our sovereignty very highly--justifiably so. The conundrum, then, is whether we will get that kind of an international coalition that would have the weight of world public opinion, would have the weight of the U.N. behind them.

   The difficulties of having the United States act alone would be the precedent that would be set. It could be a reference point for China, for example, looking at Taiwan, where China has made many bellicose warlike statements as to its disagreements with Taiwan. If the United States can act unilaterally, or without United Nations sanction, there would be a potential argument for a country like China proceeding as to Taiwan. There would be a potential argument for a nation like India proceeding as to Pakistan, or vice versa, Pakistan proceeding as to India, which could be a nuclear incident. Both of those countries have nuclear power.

   This is a question I believe has to be debated on the floor of the U.S. Senate. I have not made up my mind as to whether it is preferable to condition the use of force on a United Nations resolution, and I am cognizant of the difficulties of giving up sovereignty and being subject to the veto of China, which I don't like at all, or being subject to the veto of Russia, which I don't like at all, or being subject to the veto of France, again something I do not like. But I think we have to recognize when we are authorizing the use of force, and if the President takes the authorization and is not successful going to the U.N. to get a coalition, we will be establishing a precedent that may have ramifications far into the future, at some point in time when the United States may not be the superpower significantly in control of the destiny of the world with our great military power.

   I am glad to see the President is moving ahead with an effort to get inspections in the United Nations, and Secretary of State Powell met last Friday with the U.N. inspection chief, who agreed there ought to be broader authority for the U.N. inspection than that which was in place in 1998 when Iraq ousted the U.N. inspectors. Hans Blix supported the position the United States has taken. Yesterday, on a Sunday talk show, the Iraqi Ambassador to the U.N. made a comment to the effect there was no huge problem on having U.N. inspectors come, even to the Presidential compounds.

   That is probably a typical Iraqi statement: holding out an offer one day and revoking it the next. I do believe it is important that we exhaust every possible alternative before resorting to the use of our armed forces, and to have the inspectors go back into Iraq is obviously desirable. We must have the inspectors, though, go into Iraq in a context where there are no holds barred.

   In August, Senator Shelby and I visited the Sudan. The Sudan is now interested in becoming friendly with the United States. Our former colleague, Senator Jack Danforth, has brokered the basic peace treaty which still has to be implemented in many respects. But as a part of the new Sudanese approach, the Government of Sudan has allowed U.S. intelligence personnel to go to Sudanese factories, munitions plants, and laboratories with no announcement or minimal announcement of just an hour, break locks, go in, and conduct inspections. That would be a good model for the inspection of Iraq. If, in fact, the Iraqis will allow unfettered, unlimited inspections, it is conceivable that would solve the problem with respect to the issue of weapons of mass destruction.

   Certainly that ought to be pursued to the maximum extent possible. If, and/or when the Iraqis oust the U.N. inspectors or limit the U.N. inspectors, raising again the unmistakable inference that Saddam Hussein has something to hide, then I think there is more reason to resort to force as a last alternative and, in that context, a better chance to get other countries, perhaps countries even in the Arab world, to be supportive of the use of force against Iraq at the present time as they were in the gulf war in 1991.

   Extensive consideration has to be given, in my judgment, to the impact on the Arab world. Egyptian President Mubarak has been emphatic in his concern as to what the impact will be there. So we ought to make every effort we can to enlist the aid of as many of the nations in the Arab world as possible.

   If Saddam Hussein rebuffs the United Nations, again raising the unmistakable inference that he has something to hide, then I think the chances of getting additional allies there would be improved.

   With respect to the situation with Israel, there is, again, grave concern that a war with Iraq will result in Scud missiles being directed toward Israel. Some 39 of those Scud missiles were directed toward Israel during the gulf war. Their missile defense system was not very good. Now we know that Israel has the Arrow system, but still all of Israel is not protected. The Arrow system has not been adequately tested.

   In the gulf war in 1991, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir honored the request of President Bush not to retaliate. It is a different situation at the present time with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon having announced if Israel is attacked, Israel will not sit back again.

   When former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft published a very erudite op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal in August, he raised the grave concern that with Israeli nuclear power, there could be an Armageddon in the Mideast. Former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft was advising caution; that we ought not proceed without exhausting every other alternative.

   A similar position was taken by former Secretary of State James Baker in an op-ed piece, again in August, in the New York Times urging that inspections be pursued as a way of possibly avoiding a war.

2) Authorization of Use of Armed Forces against Iraq
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of S.J. Res. 45, which the clerk will report.

   The bill clerk read as follows:

   A resolution (S.J. Res. 45) to authorize the United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time until 4 p.m. shall be equally divided and controlled between the two leaders or their designees with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 15 minutes each.

   Mr. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent I may have an additional 5 minutes over the 15.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, tonight at 8:00 p.m., President Bush will make a televised address to speak to the Nation about the threat of Iraq. According to press reports from this weekend, the President is expected to lay out, in detail, his case against Saddam Hussein, including the repressive dictator's long history of violence and aggression.

   There is no disagreement about the character of Saddam Hussein, neither on Capitol Hill nor in the minds of every American. But while the President continues to make his case against Saddam Hussein, the issue on the minds of Senators and our constituents is, what exactly is the United States planning to do?

   Rather than hearing more about Saddam Hussein--we know enough about him--what we need to hear from the President are answers to our questions about what he plans to do in Iraq. We need to know why the President is demanding that we act now. We need to have some idea of what we are getting ourselves into, what the costs and consequences may be, and what the President is planning to do after the fighting has stopped. After Iraq. After Saddam Hussein. It is not unpatriotic to ask these questions, especially when they are already on the minds of all Americans.

   Why now? Those two little words: Why now?

   Why now? What has changed in the last year, 6 months, or 2 weeks that would compel us to attack now?

   Is Iraq on the verge of attacking the United States? If so, should our homeland security alert be elevated? Shouldn't the President be spending more time with his military advisors in Washington, instead of making campaign speeches all over the country?

   The media reports suggest that the administration does not plan to act

[Page: S10007]

   What are we signing up for?

   We are about to give the President a blank check to deal with Iraq however he sees fit. What exactly is he planning to do with this power?

   Does the President have clear objectives for this war? Does he want to disarm Saddam Hussein, or remove him from power?

   When might the fighting end? What conditions must be met before the President would determine that the war is over?

   The President has said several times that he wants to use force in order to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations. Why is he then demanding that Congress go even further and give him a blank check that would give him the power to commit our country to years or even decades of bloody war without the support of our allies?

   We have already given the President a blank check to deal with al-Qaida, which he used to invade and occupy Afghanistan. Does the President plan to fight these two wars separately, or will the President combine them into a broader regional campaign?

   What will be the costs of this war?

   How many troops will be involved? Will we exercise the heavy ground option or will we exercise the heavy air option? Or might we exercise both options? How many reservists will have to leave their jobs to serve in uniform?

   Will they be fighting door-to-door combat in downtown Bagdad?

   Do our troops have adequate protection against the chemical and biological weapons that Saddam Hussein might employ?

   How many American casualties is the Department of Defense anticipating in case the heavy ground option is utilized? How many American casualties is the Department of Defense anticipating. ?

   In addition to the cost in blood, war is also a drain on the national treasury. How much will it cost to fight this war and to maintain an occupation force? Larry Lindsey said it would cost $100 billion to $200 billion, talking about this war and what it would cost. One hundred to two hundred billion dollars, and he said: That's nothing. During the Gulf War, our allies contributed $54 billion of the $61 billion cost of the war. Leaving the United States holding the bag for roughly $7 billion, a little over $7 billion out of the $61.1 billion total. Will our allies give us financial assistance in this war? Has anyone been asking them to divvy it up, to help pay the financial cost, or do we plan to shoulder it all?

   Do we have the resources to care for our injured and sick veterans when they return from Iraq? Are our hospitals in this country prepared for that event?

   Will there be other consequences to a war with Iraq?

   How will the war against Iraq affect the fight against terrorism? How many of us will feel safer here in this country at night, when the shades of evening fall? How many of us will feel safer, once an attack against Iraq is launched? Will National Guard troops be removed from important homeland security missions in the United States?

   If we act without the approval of the international community, what happens to the international cooperation in the war on terror we worked so hard to foster after 9/11?

   How will a war between the United States and Iraq affect regional stability in the Middle East?

   What will we do if Iraq attacks Israel? Can we persuade Israel to stay out of the war, or will we just stand by and watch them join in the fighting?

   Are we putting more moderate regimes in the Middle East at risk, like Jordan, or Pakistan, which already has nuclear weapons. If a more radical government takes over in Pakistan, are we prepared to act there as well?

   What happens after the war?

   Who will govern a defeated Iraq?

   How long will our troops be expected to occupy Iraq?

   Do we expect Iraqis to rise up against Saddam Hussein, or take arms against us?

   What plans do we have to prevent Iraq from breaking up and descending into civil war?

   How can we contain the instability that will likely result in the north of Iraq that may threaten Turkey, our friend and NATO ally? Are we giving any thought to this? Is anybody in the administration giving thoughts to this question?

   In his weekend radio address, the president told us that:

   should force be required to bring Saddam to account, the United States will work with other nations to help the Iraqi people rebuild and form a just government.

   What does he mean by that? Is the President advocating a new Marshall Plan for the Middle East? Are the American people ready to make that kind of long-term regional commitment?

   How much will the American taxpayer pay to rebuild Iraq?

   How much will our allies pay? If the United States should act alone in attacking Iraq, can we really expect the rest of the world to help rebuild Iraq after the war? Have any other countries committed to assisting in these peacekeeping duties? If so, how many? Can we afford to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time? We may have to rebuild Israel as well.

   I have a lot of questions. The American people have a lot of questions. But apparently the American people are not going to be asked. They are not going to be given the opportunity to ask their questions.

   We are going to be stampeded and rushed pellmell into a showdown right here in the Senate and in the House, and in the next few days. Why all the hurry? Why are we in such a hurry? Election day is 4 weeks away from tomorrow. Wouldn't it be better to go home and listen to the people, hear what they have to say, and answer their questions before voting on this far-reaching, grave, and troubling question?

   Every one of the questions the American people have is important. Without better answers from the President, we will only be getting part of the story, which is a dangerous position for Congress to be in as we prepare to vote on a war resolution this week or next week.

   It is a sad thing that the elected representatives of the American people are being asked to vote on this troubling question before the election.

   But the administration is not giving us meaningful answers to these questions. All we are getting are vague threats and political pressure from the White House. The President has not backed up his case against Iraq with a consistent justification based on clear reason and evidence. When the President and his advisers are pressed for clarity, they have responded with evasive and confusing references to the dangers of terrorism which they now seem to think has more to do with Saddam Hussein than Osama bin Laden. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld revealed that recently when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee:

   I suggest that any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the 20th century and still thinking in pre-9-11 terms.

   In other words, it is just too hard for them to answer all of these questions, so Congress should just hand everything over to the President, and he will determine by himself what is ``necessary and appropriate'' when the time comes. Until then, the administration will provide Congress and the American people with very little information.

   We need to know this information, and we need to know it now, before we are pressured into making a hasty decision about whether to send the sons and daughters of Americans to war in a foreign land; namely, Iraq.

   The President's military doctrine will give him a free hand to justify almost any military action with unsubstantiated allegations and arbitrary risk assessments, and Congress is about to rubberstamp that doctrine and simply step out of the way.

   I cannot understand why much of the leadership of this Congress has bought into the administration's political pressure. Congress will be out of the business of making any decisions about war, and the voice of the people will quickly be drowned out by the White House beating the drums of war.

   There is no need for Congress to underwrite the President's new military doctrine. If the United States uses force against Iraq, then Congress can provide the President with enough authority to act decisively in Iraq. Any

[Page: S10008]

   Some say that the process laid out in the Constitution will be satisfied once Congress votes on whether to authorize war. But Congress must not grant the use of force authorization without a full understanding of the consequences. We will be voting to decide whether we will allow the President to declare war at his convenience for an unlimited period of time. That does not satisfy the Constitution. After all, the President has repeatedly said he has not decided whether we must go to war.

   Do we want to just give the President and all future Presidents an authorization for war that they can put in their hip pockets, to be pulled out whenever it is convenient? That is not the course of action worthy of the greatness the Founding Fathers expected when they created the legislative branch.

   We should not have this vote on the issue for war or for peace before the Congress has answers to these questions. The President, when he speaks to the Nation tonight, must provide real answers to these questions that the American people are asking.

   Madam President, I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

   Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I say to my valued friend and colleague on the Senate Armed Services Committee that I thought we had an excellent debate on Friday afternoon, at which time a number of the points the Senator from West Virginia raised today were discussed. But I believe the administration has worked diligently in consultation with the Congress--most particularly the appropriate committees--the Senate Armed Services Committee, on which my colleague from West Virginia and I are privileged to serve, and also our colleague from Georgia, as well as the Foreign Relations Committee.

   These questions, I believe, and the information that can be made available are and perhaps will again in the next day or so be made available to the Congress. I know I have, I say to my good friend from West Virginia, pressed the administration to see whether or not further information that now has classification can be given.

   I and other Members of the Senate were back with our constituencies this weekend. I had about five meetings with my constituents at various places, and foremost in their minds is the seriousness of this situation we face with Saddam Hussein and his regime which possesses these weapons of mass destruction.

   I believe this debate is evolving. I believe the Congress is in possession of those facts to justify a vote on the resolution, which Senator Lieberman, Senator Bayh, Senator McCain, and I have drawn up in accordance with consultations with the White House and the leadership.

   I thought we got off to a good start on Friday. I thank my colleague for the opportunity to debate him--and we do very vigorously, and undoubtedly we will continue. But I believe, if I might say respectfully to my colleague from West Virginia, it is a good, strong record for the Congress and the American people. And there may be additional facts forthcoming. Certainly, we should await the President's message to the Nation and to the world with great respect because he has time and time again said war is the last option, the use of force is the last option. He pursued diligently diplomatic means before, not only with the United Nations but in one-to-one meetings himself, and the Secretary of State with the heads of state and governments in a great many nations.

   I believe progress has been made in all directions.

   I thank the Chair. I thank my colleague. I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

   Mr. CLELAND. Madam President, we as Members of the Senate, are now being asked by the Commander in Chief to make the most serious decision we can make: the decision to authorize him potentially to send our young American men and women in the American military into harm's way. When I was a young man in the mid-1960s, the U.S. Congress authorized the use of force against North Vietnam, and I volunteered to fight in that war. Three times since I came to the Senate--on Iraq in 1998, on Kosovo in 1999, and then last year on al-Qaida and international terrorism--I have been asked by the Commander in Chief to authorize the use of military force to achieve our Nation's objectives, and all three times I voted to authorize the use of force. This is now the fourth occasion I have been asked to give my consent to such action, and each time I have thought back to the words of one who occupied the same seat in the Senate I now have the privilege to hold, Dick Russell. Senator Russell said:

   While it is a sound policy to have limited objectives, we should not expose our men to unnecessary hazards to life and limb in pursuing them. As for me, my fellow Americans, I shall never knowingly support a policy of sending even a single American boy overseas to risk his life in combat unless the entire civilian population and wealth of our country--all that we have and all that we are--is to bear a commensurate responsibility in giving him the fullest support and protection of which we are capable.

   That was a marvelous quote by Senator Russell in the 1960s.

   While we need to update Senator Russell's statement to encompass the young women who now also put themselves into harm's way when we go to war, I think it stands the test of time very well and speaks to us all now as we contemplate our second declaration of war in the last 12 months. I believe its counsel of limited ends but sufficient means is sage advice now, as it was when first uttered under the shadow of the Vietnam war.

   The leading military analyst of the Vietnam War, the late Col. Harry Summers, wrote in his excellent book, ``On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context'':

   The first principle of war is the principle of The Objective. It is the first principle because all else flows from it ..... How to determine military objectives that will achieve or assist in achieving the political objectives of the United States is the primary task of the military strategist, thus the relationship between military and political objectives is critical. Prior to any future commitment of U.S. military forces our military leaders must insist that the civilian leadership provide tangible, obtainable political goals. The political objective cannot merely be a platitude but must be stated in concrete terms. While such objectives may very well change during the course of the war, it is essential that we begin with an understanding of where we intend to go. As Clausewitz said, we should not ``take the first step without considering the last.'' In other words, we (and perhaps, more important, the American people) need to have a definition of ``victory.''

   Colonel Summers continues:

   There is an inherent contradiction between the military and its civilian leaders on this issue. For both domestic and international political purposes the civilian leaders want maximum flexibility and maneuverability and are hesitant to fix on firm objectives. The military on the other hand need just such a firm objective as early as possible in order to plan and conduct military operations.

   Since we are indeed being asked to authorize the commitment of U.S. military forces, it is our responsibility--I would say it is our obligation--as the civilian leadership to provide our Armed Forces with ``tangible, obtainable political goals.'' In other words, we have to define now, before the fighting starts, what the objective is.

   It is crystal clear to me what the appropriate, achievable, internationally supported and sanctioned objective is at the present time and in the present case: not simply the admission of weapons inspectors but the verified destruction of Saddam Hussein's store of weapons of mass destruction. This is the matter which makes the Iraqi regime a danger requiring international attention beyond that which is afforded to the all too numerous other regimes which oppress their own people, or threaten regional peace, or fail to fulfill their international obligations. It is the objective which President Bush has been increasingly centered on in his calls for action by the UN. For example, in his September 26 meeting with congressional leaders, the President put it very well. He said:

[Page: S10009]

   We are engaged in a deliberate and civil and thorough discussion. We are moving toward a strong resolution ..... And by passing this resolution we'll send a clear message to the world and to the Iraqi regime: the demands of the U.N. Security Council must be followed. The Iraqi dictator must be disarmed. These requirements will be met, or they will be enforced.

   And this objective, the disarming of Saddam Hussein, is the objective which this Senate, this Congress is prepared to overwhelmingly endorse as we close ranks behind the President.

   Adoption of the force resolution authorization will satisfy our obligations to make it clear to the international community that America stands united in its determination to rid the world of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. And it will fulfill our responsibility to our military and our service men and women to provide a tangible, militarily obtainable objective. But it will not discharge this Congress of all responsibility with respect to our policy on Iraq.

   In retrospect, it seems to me that the real failure of Congress in the Vietnam war was not so much passage of the open-ended Gulf of Tonkin resolution by near unanimous margins in both Houses--based as it was on what we now regard as very dubious information supplied by the executive branch and what those Senators and Representatives had to take at face value--but its subsequent failure for too many years to exercise its constitutional responsibilities as that authorization lead to a cost and level of commitment that few, if any, foresaw at the time. I would note that Senator Russell actually got the following language added to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution itself:

   This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations, or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

   Our duty, and the duty of this Congress and its successors, to our Nation's security and to our service men and women with respect to Iraq will not end merely with the passage of the pending resolution. We have a constitutional and moral responsibility to continue to review the evolving situation and to ask the hard questions. I did so on each of the three previous occasions when I have supported an authorization of the use of military force. I asked those questions on Iraq in 1998, on Kosovo in 1999, and then last year on al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden and the international terrorism war. And I will do so again with respect to Iraq.

   After the 1990-1991 gulf war and after the final end of the cold war, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, propounded a list of six questions which he believed must be addressed before we commit to a military intervention:

   Is the political objective important, clearly defined, and well understood?

   Second, have all nonviolent means been tried and failed?

   Additionally, will military force actually achieve the objective?

   What will be the cost?

   Have the gains and risks been thoroughly analyzed?

   And finally, after the intervention, how will the situation likely evolve and what will the consequences be?

   I have already discussed the first question, the mission, and to the extent we focus on disarmament, I believe we satisfy Colin Powell's first criterion. The second, as to nonmilitary means, is being asked right now, at the United Nations, at Vienna, and in other world capitals. And while what the President calls a ``decade of deception'' by Iraq must make one very skeptical about the possibility for a satisfactory diplomatic resolution, I believe we should and must give it one final chance before considering the military option. As to the effectiveness of military force, since the President has not made any final decisions, he says, as to what kind of military operation, if any, will be undertaken, it is premature to make a firm determination, but in principle, given the outstanding capabilities of our Armed Forces, and what will hopefully be a well-defined mission, I believe we can answer in the affirmative. So far, so good.

   But when we turn to the final three of General Powell's questions that he asked years ago, we see the need for some serious and sustained attention not only by the administration but by the Congress as well.

   What will be the cost? And here we need to factor in not only the cost in terms of the immediate military operation, but also potential costs of what could be a very long-term occupation and nation-building phase. Among the many reasons we need to actively seek to build as large an international coalition as possible behind whatever we eventually undertake in Iraq is to help with the aftermath. I want to single out the leadership of my friends and colleagues from across the aisle, Senators LUGAR and HAGEL, in calling the country's and the Senate's attention to the importance of this aspect of our Iraq policy.

   And what about the cost for our economy? The mere threat of war has sent oil prices upward and caused shudders on Wall Street. What will a full blown war do?

   Have the gains and risks been thoroughly analyzed? And after the intervention, how will the situation likely evolve and what will be the consequences? These two are closely related in that, in my view, the long-term consequences have been the least discussed part of the equation thus far. If, as some believe, the consequence of a U.S. invasion of Iraq will be a united, democratic Iraq which can serve as a ``role model'' for the rest of the Arab world. Maybe, but such an outcome would not only fly in the face of Iraq's entire history since being created out of a British mandate at the end of the First World War but would appear to be contrary to much of what we have seen in the aftermath of other recent U.S. interventions, including most recently in Afghanistan. Perhaps, most importantly, we need to make absolutely certain that whatever we do in Iraq does not distract or detract from the war we authorized 12 months ago, our war on terrorism, which remains, in my view, job No. 1, mission No. 1, objective No. 1, one for our national security policy.

   So these are the kinds of questions I will be asking, and I hope I will be joined by colleagues from both sides of the aisle in asking, as we move forward.

   It now appears the Senate may have at least three alternatives to consider as we move forward on authorizing force against Saddam Hussein: the Biden-Lugar-Hagel resolution; a Levin resolution; and the resolution endorsed by the President, the House leadership and a bipartisan group of Senators. I certainly wish to pay tribute to all of the Senators involved in crafting all of these alternatives. Without exception, they are acting out of conscience and conviction in promoting our national security. And I believe most Senators share the views that diplomacy is preferential to force, and that proceeding with the input and support of the international community, including the United Nations, is far better and more effective than going it alone.

   I will be supporting the resolution backed by the President and opposing the alternatives because I believe it is imperative that we now speak with one voice to Saddam Hussein, to the entire international community and, most importantly, to our servicemen and women. A strong, bipartisan vote for the pending resolution will strengthen the President's hand in his efforts to get the international community to step up to the plate and deal effectively with the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and give the diplomats one last chance to secure Saddam Hussein's final, unconditional surrender of those weapons, as he has pledged since 1991.

   The objective of our policy against Saddam Hussein should be a regime of unfettered inspections leading to full disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. If diplomacy fails, the military objective must be the complete destruction of such weapons. Regime change may come but, because of the large costs and massive uncertainties this will inevitably produce, this should be the last resort, not the first.

   We must not repeat the most disturbing display of partisanship with respect to national security to have occurred in the time I have served in the Congress. I am referring to the extremely disturbing spectacle of disunity and irresolution displayed by the House of Representatives on April 28, 1999 when, with American servicemen and women already in combat against Milosevic and Serbia, the House cast a series of votes that: prohibited the deployment of ground forces, which the

[Page:
S10010]

   I implore the Senate to pull together behind the one resolution endorsed by the President, by the bipartisan House leadership and by a bipartisan group of Senators. That resolution affirms the importance of working in concert with other nations, gives preference to a diplomatic over military solution, focuses attention where it should be on disarming Saddam Hussein, seeks to ensure that we not be diverted from fighting the war on terrorism, and provides for the ongoing and Constitutional role of the Congress as events unfold in our policy toward Iraq. I urge a strong and bipartisan vote in favor of the resolution.

   God Bless our country and the young men and women who serve in uniform.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROCKEFELLER). The Senator from Virginia.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I might ask my very valued friend and colleague a question or two.

   With his indulgence, I would like to make a few preliminary comments. First and foremost is that we have shared for some years now a strong friendship and strong working relationship, primarily through his service on the Senate Armed Services Committee. There has been no Senator who has been more mindful of the needs of the men and women of the Armed Forces than our colleague from Georgia. I felt his remarks today were exceedingly well taken, and in particular the need for a strengthened resolution here in the Congress, House and Senate together, acting on a resolution which is clear in its terms, in such a way that there be no daylight, no perceived or actual difference between the legislative bodies of our Government--the Congress, the Senate and the House, and the Executive, the Commander in Chief, the President. I commend him on that point and share it.

   In previous days on this floor, most particularly on Friday, I have said that repeatedly. That is the key, the arch of this whole debate is the need to have unity of the two branches of Government.

   I was also drawn to his excellent analysis of what we call the Powell doctrine, enunciated by General Powell during his period as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It is interesting today, of course, in his role as Secretary of State and in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee here in the Senate, those criteria he set down are basically the criteria he follows today as he represents this Nation on behalf of the President and all others in the United Nations and in his constant series of meetings with heads of state and government in an effort to build a coalition much like that which was built by the first President Bush in 1991.

   The Senator from Georgia hit on the key part of the formula of Secretary Powell: What is the cost? And he quite properly enunciated some concerns and areas in there.

   The question I ask is the question that has to be asked: What is the cost if we don't act now, act as we are doing; namely, through the United Nations, trying to exhaust all diplomatic means, act as we are now acting in consultation with the heads of state and government in order to build a coalition, and, as I understand it, supporting in some way the writing of a new resolution to be considered by the Security Council which would enable a new inspection regime, this time with clear absolute authority, no equivocation whatsoever about the authority of those going in to perform it and the consequences? Hopefully that resolution would be forthcoming, spelling out the consequences of the failure of Saddam Hussein to accept the resolution and indicate cooperation.

   As my colleague knows, cooperation is essential in discharging any inspection regime. So that is where we are now.

   What would be the cost, had our President not taken the initiative here in the past months to bring to the very forefront of the entire world the problem facing liberty and freedom with the potential of weapons of mass destruction being made night and day by Saddam Hussein in amounts far exceeding anything he would ever need to defend a sovereign nation?

   What is the cost, had we not elevated this debate, had we not gone to the U.N., had not the Congress been asked by the President to have a resolution? What is your estimate of the cost? What would be the course of action for the world to take?

   Mr. CLELAND. I thank the Senator for those kind words. In terms of the Powell doctrine, I had a chance to listen to it up front and close when I encountered him as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. We had a long discussion about being fellow Vietnam veterans, about what we learned out of that war, and how he approached the world now as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

   I can remember two elements to the Powell doctrine. The first is sometimes overlooked. The first should be how to use the American military to stay out of war and, if we do get in it, win quickly. The second part of the Powell doctrine is the doctrine of superior force, what Nimitz called in the Second World War in the Pacific ``superior upon the point of contact.''

   I am delighted we have a Secretary of State who understands the power of the first, which is using the American military to stay out of war. I think that is step one for me in the Powell doctrine. Step two is obviously if diplomacy fails, use superior force to accomplish your objective. In many ways, we have been acting since 1991. We have had Iraq under Operation Northern Watch and Southern Watch. We are covering 40 percent of Iraqi territory as we speak, we have a naval blockade, and we have sanctions, so we have not been inactive since 1991.

   What is the status of his weapons of mass destruction, which is the focus of this entire debate? We really don't know, since the U.N. inspectors were kicked out about 4 years ago, where we stand in that regard. That poses a question and a threat. We know he has biological and chemical weapons, and he is working on a nuclear weapon. So that poses great danger to the Middle East, our allies, Western Europe, and potentially to us. Therefore, I think it is appropriate for the U.S. Senate to support, and the Congress to support, a resolution authorizing the President to take all necessary means, including to use force, to back up the original 1991 U.N. resolution authorizing disarmament of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. For me, that is the political objective and the military objective.

   Mr. WARNER. The Senator also made reference to the period of the Clinton administration when President Clinton, again, in consultation with the Congress, acted on the seriousness of the issues of Saddam Hussein after he kicked out the inspectors and defied all 16 resolutions. We in the Senate acted, and I am going to read the resolution we adopted in the Senate:

   Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations, and therefore the President is urged to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.

   Both the Senator from Georgia and I supported it, am I not correct?

   Mr. CLELAND. That is correct. I voted for that resolution in 1998. At one point, the resolution did not authorize the American forces to involve themselves in a regime change. In this resolution we are considering now, we are considering using American forces to not only order Saddam Hussein to comply with the 1991 resolution in terms of disarmament, there is an ``or else'' clause that says the President can use force as well.

   Mr. WARNER. As my colleague, I assume, agrees with me, whoever is President of the United States--be it President Clinton or now President George Bush--has the inherent power to utilize the Armed Forces of our Nation when he deems there is a threat to our security. That, of course, is the essence of the debate we are undertaking now. So when I read the clause where

[Page: S10011]

   I wonder if the Senator would agree with this Senator one thing that has changed since this resolution is the situation in Iraq has worsened in the sense Saddam Hussein has had these years to proceed with his scheme of building weapons of mass destruction, and I think the open evidence shows he has achieved it in terms of the biological, and he has achieved it in terms of the chemical. With respect to the nuclear weapons, I believe the agreed-upon set of facts is he is doing everything he can to complete a program. There is a difference of opinion as to the time within which he can complete a program to give him a nuclear weapon.

   So, in my judgment, what has changed since 1998 is the situation has gotten worse and more threatening from Saddam Hussein. Does my colleague have a view in concurrence with the Senator from Virginia?

   Mr. CLELAND. Two points. First, the 1998 resolution, which I supported, the Senator from Virginia supported, and most of us supported, called for regime change but did not authorize the use of American military force. This resolution is different because I believe the situation is different, as the Senator pointed out. The situation is we really don't know the exact status of the biological and chemical capability of Saddam Hussein to wage warfare on his neighbors, our allies, our friends in the Middle East, and on us. Therefore, the 4 years the inspectors have not been there gives us great pause and great concern.

   Therefore, our first step should be access to those military sites, those weapons of mass destruction sites, and the destruction of those weapons of mass destruction and complete disarmament according to the 1991 resolution. It is worth, in my opinion, authorizing the use of military force to accomplish that objective.

   Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague very much. I have enjoyed his observations. I respect him very much, as he bears the scars of a brave soldier on behalf of freedom while defending this country.

   Mr. President, to conclude our colloquy, I want to read a brief statement that was given by President Clinton at the time of this resolution:

   In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed. If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity--even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program.

   Mr. President, I see others on the floor.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.

   Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, all I know is what I read in the newspapers. Based on what I do know about public policy and what I read in the newspapers, I would be very frightened if all I knew was what I read in the newspapers because newspapers often get things wrong. It has been interesting to me, as we have had the buildup to this discussion in the Senate about Iraq, there have been a number of very thoughtful pieces written that have appeared in the newspapers, and I wish to draw on some of those and quote from some of them at length here today.

   It so happens that both of the pieces I will use today appeared in the Washington Post, but there have also been useful pieces in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal.

   Before I get to that, I want to describe a conversation I had once as a younger man that has been an absolute paradigm conversation in my understanding of politics.

   I was having lunch with an old friend, a very experienced political hand, a man who had once served President Eisenhower as a close member of his staff. We were discussing a certain candidate for President.

   I said, somewhat improperly, because it was rather arrogant for me to do this: Is this candidate smart enough to be President of the United States?

   My old friend answered immediately. He said: Of course not. Nobody is. Then he went on to explain.

   As I say, he was a man who had been at Eisenhower's elbow during some of the most significant decisions of our time, and he made this point. He said: Every truly Presidential decision is so loaded down with unknowable consequences, with unforeseen possibilities, and unforeseeable challenges that no truly Presidential decision is ever made on the basis of intellect. It is made on the basis of instinct.

   He mentioned this same candidate, and he said: He has good instincts, and you can back him with a clear conscience.

   I have thought about that ever since that conversation, and I have realized the wisdom of it. If difficult decisions could be made by smart people and resolved, they would be resolved before they got to the President of the United States because any President in either party has plenty of smart people around him who can figure things out and come to a neat, tidy, absolutely defensible conclusion. But those decisions that do not lend themselves to neat and tidy and absolutely defensible conclusions are the ones that ultimately end up on the President's desk and are ultimately made, as my old friend said, on instinct, out of the gut, rather than intellect out of the analysis.

   I remember a President who many people thought was lacking in intellectual candle power, who made a very momentous decision. His name was Harry Truman. He described how he was at his mother-in-law's home for Sunday dinner back in Missouri when the phone rang. He went to the entry hall of that old home where the phone was kept--showing how long ago this really was. There was no black box following him around. There was no communications apparatus with instant ties to the White House, just a phone in the entry hall where the phone used to be put in the days when there was only one phone per house, and that would be in a central location.

   He answered the phone. It was Dean Acheson, who told him the North Koreans had just started across the border into South Korea. President Truman said: We have to stop the--expletives deleted.

   In later years, he was asked to outline his decisionmaking analysis of the decision to hold the line in North Korea, and he told of the phone call and said: My decisionmaking analysis was that one sentence when I told Dean Acheson: We have to stop the--expletives deleted. He did not think about it any more than that. That came straight out of his gut. And it was Harry Truman's gut that made him one of the Presidents we now revere as one of the greatest of the past century.

   This decision is about going to war in Iraq or about, putting it more properly, giving the President authorization to

   move ahead with force if at some point it becomes clear to him that is what we should do. It is in the category of those truly Presidential decisions.

   As I listen to the debate on the floor, the questions being asked, the analysis being demanded, the effort being made to come up with a clear set of tidy pros and cons that can then be weighed on a balance sheet or an accounting statement and then a carefully crisp decision made on the basis of all of that evidence, I go back to my conversation with my friend. We do not know. No one knows what will be the situation in Iraq if we attack after it is over. We do not know whether the Middle East will be a more beneficent place or a more malevolent place if that attack takes place, and no one does.

   I can find experts who will tell us this would be the very best thing we could possibly do, and that the Middle East will be much more peaceful, and that liberty will be on the march if we just stand firm. Out of the newspapers we can find plenty of columnists who will tell us that.

   I can find other experts who will say this is the greatest disaster we would possibly bring upon the Middle East, and that if we attack Iraq, we will unleash a whole Pandora's box of problems. The Arab street will rise up, and

[Page: S10012]

   I can find experts who will say: Weapons of mass destruction will be used against Israel if we move ahead against Iraq; that there will be biological and chemical attacks not only against Israel but against American installations everywhere; that American multinational companies will become the targets of biological and chemical attacks; and that all of this can be averted if we just continue the discussions. I can find plenty of columnists and people in the newspapers who will tell us that.

   Then there are those who say: If we do not act, we will so embolden Saddam Hussein and all the other dictators of the area that they will never move in a peaceful direction; we will have inevitable war, and it will be many times worse than anything that would be triggered by action taken now. Again, in the newspapers, I can find plenty of columnists who will tell us that.

   So this is a truly Presidential decision, and it will be made not in George Bush's head or in the heads of those around him--DICK CHENEY, Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, brilliant people all; they stack up their degrees, they stack up their accomplishments in the world, and this is as glittering an array of talent as any President has ever assembled to advise him on foreign policy matters--but the ultimate decision will be made in the President's gut because this is a truly Presidential decision fraught with so many unknowable consequences and possible side effects that no one, no matter how smart, can accurately analyze them in advance and come to a neat and tidy and firm conclusion.

   I take some comfort in an analysis that has been made of what I would call the long-term and big-picture question, a big-picture question that perhaps can be analyzed a little better than the specifics of whether or not we move ahead with force in Iraq.

   I refer first to a piece that appeared in the Washington Post written by Jackson Diehl entitled ``Bush's Foreign Policy First--But no one seems to notice--even at the White House.'' That is the subhead.

   The ``foreign policy first'' that Mr. Diehl is talking about is the fact that the Bush administration, for the first time since the cold war, has laid down a coherent doctrine and strategy with respect to America's role in the post-cold war world.

   We all sat in the House Chamber 10 days after the attack, perhaps a week or so after the attack, on September 11, and we heard President Bush deliver a fabulous speech. It had some of the most dramatic rhetoric I expect to ever hear in my lifetime, and it was the finest Presidential speech I have ever heard in my lifetime. As I stepped away from that speech and the emotion of the moment and analyzed it, realized President Bush had, in fact, for the first time in the post-cold war world, laid down a vision of that world and America's role in it. That speech was more than a rhetorical masterpiece. It was a serious policy statement of where America should be.

   That has been fleshed out in a 34-page statement of foreign policy issued by the White House. That is what Jackson Diehl is referring to when he says Bush's foreign policy first--the first statement of the situation post-cold war as seen by an American administration looking at it in toto.

   Quoting from Mr. Diehl's presentation, he says:

   For a decade U.S. internationalists bemoaned the absence of any coherent policy for engaging the world after the fall of Communism. The Clinton administration, like the Bush team before it, was excoriated for stumbling from crisis to crisis and for consistently making bad judgments about where and how to use America's sole-superpower strength. Now, at last, the internationalists have gotten what they wanted, and the reaction of too many of them is to be aghast.

   Continuing the quote:

   The national security doctrine issued this month by the White House packs into just 34 pages everything the foreign policy of the 1990s lacked. It begins by embracing two facts that have been observed since 1991, but hard for a democratic and sometimes insular society to accept: that America has unmatched and unprecedented power in the world and therefore no choice but to shape the international order; and that it faces threats that are utterly different but in some ways more dangerous than the threats from the old Soviet Union.

   I think that is exactly what the President was saying in his statement to the Joint Session of Congress. We must face the fact that we have power unmatched in history and, therefore, cannot abdicate our responsibility to shape the international order and, two, we must face the fact that we still live in a dangerous world and we are ironically more vulnerable now than we were before.

   Mr. Diehl goes on, after talking about the situation surrounding the word ``unilateral,'' or ``presumptive action,'' and he makes this point:

   American presidents have been engaging in unilateral and preemptive military actions all along--most recently in Panama, Grenada and Haiti, and in Iraq following the 1998 expulsion of the inspectors. And what the new policy actually says is this: Because terrorists and rogue dictators now have the potential to do enormous harm to Americans with weapons of mass destruction and are not easily deterred, it may be necessary to strike at some before they can act. Should we again sit still if a future al-Qaida operates large terrorist training camps in a future Afghanistan? Rice's document treats this question as a matter of common sense, which it is. It also says, sensibly, that preemption is not the answer to all threats--and so far, at least, it hasn't been the legal basis for the White House campaign against Iraq.

   I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to continue for an additional 5 minutes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator may proceed.

   Mr. BENNETT. Jackson Diehl summarizes this way:

   The real heart of the doctrine, the proposition that U.S. strength be wielded to spread liberty throughout the world, has been barely acknowledged by a policy apparatus that continues to cultivate old and new autocratic allies in the Middle East and Asia.

   I ask unanimous consent that the entire article appear at the conclusion of my remarks.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (See Exhibit 1.)

   Mr. BENNETT. Turning to a piece which also appeared in the Washington Post written by Bernard Lewis, who is considered by some to be the ultimate authority on conflicts in the Middle East, it is entitled: ``Targeted By a History of Hatred--The United States Is Now the Unquestioned Leader of the Free World, Also Known as the Infidels.'' That is an interesting tie: We are the unquestioned leader of the free world, also known in many parts of the world as the infidels.

   Put that headline against the statement contained in Jackson Diehl's summary of the Bush position paper authored primarily by Condoleezza Rice, and once again you see the big picture. We do live in a world where we are the only superpower. We have the responsibility to do something with that, and President Bush and his advisers have now come to the conclusion that the ultimate test of how we use our power should be how will it ultimately spread liberty throughout the world. That is the kind of flag to which I can repair. That is the kind of standard I can follow.

   If we were the British in the 1700s and 1800s presiding over the world, the grand scheme would be: How can we enhance and increase British Imperial power? If we were the Romans when they were the only superpower in that portion of the world they cared about, the only big picture item would be: How can we secure and extend the power of the Roman legions? But as President Bush makes this truly Presidential decision out of his gut, he has made it clear that the ultimate question he is asking, and we must ask with him, is, How will this expand the role of liberty throughout the world? That, as I say, is a standard I can follow.

   So I will be voting in favor of the resolution, not because I have figured out all of the unknowables and imponderables relating to it and not because I am absolutely sure that the Presidential power will be used in the right possible way in every possible circumstance. I will be doing it because I trust George W. Bush's instincts as outlined as clearly as any post-war President has ever outlined America's role in the post-war world.

   He will use his power to expand and defend liberty throughout the world. He may use it by mistake. He may do things that do not produce that result. But that will be his polestar; that

[Page: S10013]

   I yield the floor.

   Exhibit No. 1

   Bush's Foreign Policy First

   For a decade U.S. internationalists bemoaned the absence of any coherent policy for engaging the world after the fall of communism. The Clinton administration, like the Bush team before it, was excoriated for stumbling from crisis to crisis and for consistently making bad judgments about where and how to use America's sole-superpower strength. Now, at last, the internationalists have gotten what they wanted--and the reaction of too many of them is to be aghast.

   The national security doctrine issued this month by the White House packs into just 34 pages everything the foreign policy of the 1990s lacked. It begins by embracing two facts that have been obvious since 1991, but hard for a democratic and sometimes insular society to accept: that America has unmatched and unprecedented power in the world and therefore no choice but to shape the international order; and that it faces threats that are utterly different but in some ways more dangerous than the threats from the old Soviet Union.

   The Bush doctrine commits the United States to act aggressively, with others or alone, ``to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.'' The phobias about engaging abroad that paralyzed policy in the '90s, and infuriated the internationalists, are banished. This isn't just the Jacksonian assertion of American interests, though that is surely part of it. There is also a Wilsonian promise to ``bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the world''--and a Kissingerian strategy of maintaining a ``great power balance'' that decisively favors the United States. the ambition is breathtaking; ``We will work to translate this moment of influence,'' declares the doctrine, ``into decades of peace, prosperity and liberty.'' It is, in short, a bold--and mostly brilliant--synthesis, one that conceivably could cause national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, who executed it, to be remembered as the policymaker who defined a new era.

   The first proof that Rice and her team are on to something is the alarmist reactions that have greeted her paper. Scandalized members of the foreign policy establishment are calling its treatment of preemptive action an unprecedented policy departure that endorses blitzkrieg as the remedy for anti-Americanism. In a chat with National Public Radio, historian Douglas Brinkley claimed that it ``is simply saying, `We do what we want when we feel like it, and we will declare war on anybody if we think they might be declaring war on us.' ''

   Policy perestroika usually provokes such first responses. But American presidents have been engaging in unilateral and preemptive military actions all along--most recently in Panama, Grenada and Haiti, and in Iraq following the 1998 expulsion of the inspectors. And what the new policy actually says is this: Because terrorists and rogue dictators now have the potential to do enormous harm to Americans with weapons of mass destruction and are not easily deterred, it may be necessary to strike at some before they can act. Should we again sit still if a future al Qaeda operates large terrorist training camps in a future Afghanistan? Rice's document treats this question as ``a matter of common sense,'' which it is. It also says, sensibly, that preemption is not the answer to all threats--and so far, at least, it hasn't been the legal basis for the White House campaign against Iraq.

   That Colin Powell now is negotiating the text of another Security Council resolution on U.N. inspections with Russia, Syria and France points to the real weakness of the Bush doctrine--not that it is too radical but that it lacks the political momentum needed to overcome decades of encrusted old thinking and bureaucratic inertia. It's not just that liberal academics haven't signed on to the new doctrine. Inside the administration, it's hard to find anyone--other than Rice--who subscribes to every part of it. Instead, some push the unilateral offense, some the democratic nation-building--and no one quite gets his or her way. In practice, despite all the alarms, the administration's foreign policy, when not entirely paralyzed by internal infighting, mostly follows the old norms.

   George Kannan's theory of containment eventually won over challengers from the right and left, and thus became the consensus doctrine of the Cold War. Will Rice have the same luck? So far preemption is no more than a scary word used to motivate the United Nations--which, at least in the case of Iraq, is perhaps its best use. Meanwhile, the real heart of the doctrine--the proposition that U.S. strength be wielded to spread liberty through the world--has been barely acknowledged by a policy apparatus that continues to cultivate old and new autocratic allies in the Middle East and Asia. Does George Bush really subscribe to the doctrine issued in his name? Ask Hosni Mubarak, or Pervez Musharraf.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

   Mr. WARNER. I thank our distinguished colleague for an excellent contribution to this debate. He has a remarkable way of tying it to the reality of the present day and the present time and also looking toward the future. So, again, I thank him for his participation and hope he can perhaps return to the floor in the future.

   I ask unanimous consent that following my remarks, an op-ed piece that appears today, Monday, October 7, in the Wall Street Journal, authored by our distinguished colleague JOE LIEBERMAN, whose name appears in the first place on the resolution that is before the Senate, be printed in the RECORD.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (See Exhibit 1.)

   Mr. WARNER. I read the following excerpt:

   It is time to authorize the use of our military might to enforce the United Nations resolutions, disarm Iraq, and eliminate the ongoing threat to our security, and the world's, posed by Saddam Hussein's rabid regime.

   Later he asks the question, Why now? He replies:

   For more than a decade we have tried everything--diplomacy, sanctions, inspections, limited military action--except war to convince Saddam Hussein to keep the promises he made, and the U.N. endorsed, to end the Gulf War. Those steps have not worked .....

   So my answer to ``why now?'' is, ``Why not earlier?'' And, of course, that question has new urgency since September 11, 2001.

   Further, he quotes from former Secretary of Defense Jim Schlesinger, under whom I was privileged to serve as Secretary of the Navy. Senator Lieberman states:

   As former secretary of defense Schlesinger recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``Vigorous action in the course of an ongoing conflict hardly constitutes preventive war.''

   Exhibit 1

   Our Resolution

   The most fateful and difficult responsibility the Constitution gives to members of Congress is to decide when the president should be authorized to lead the men and women of the U.S. military into war. We are now engaged in such a debate regarding Saddam Hussein's belligerent dictatorship in Iraq.

   Although I disagree with many other aspects of President Bush's foreign and domestic policy, I believe deeply that he is right about Iraq, and that our national security will be strengthened if members of both parties come together now to support the commander-in-chief and our military. That's why I have cosponsored the Senate resolution that was negotiated with the White House. It is time to authorize the use of our military might to enforce U.N. resolution, disarm Iraq, and eliminate the ongoing threat to our security, and the world's posed by Saddam Hussein's rabid regime.

   RESPONSIBILITY

   Making the case for such action is a responsibility to be shouldered by those of us who have reached these conclusions. If we do so convincingly, not long will the American people and our allies better understand our standards for engagement, but governments around the world who defy the dictates of the U.N. to make weapons of mass destruction or to support terrorists will appreciate how painful the consequences of their brutality and lawlessness can be.

   In that spirit, let me now address a few of the most critical questions my Senate colleagues and many American are asking.

   Why has military action against Saddam become so urgent? Why not give diplomacy and inspections another chance? Why now?

   For more than a decade we have tried everything--diplomacy sanctions, inspections, limited military action--except war to convince Saddam to keep the promises he made, and the U.N. endorsed, to end the Gulf War. Those steps have not worked.

   In 1998, Bob Kerry, John McCain, and I sponsored the Iraq Liberation Act declaring it national policy to change the regime in Baghdad. The act became law, but until recently little has been done to implement it. In the meantime, Saddam has not wavered from his ambition for hegemonic control over the Persian Gulf and the Arab world: He has invested vast amounts of his national treasure in building inventories of biological and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them to targets near and far. Saddam once told his Republican Guard that its national honor would not be achieved until Iraq's arm reached out beyond its borders to ``every point in the Arab homeland.''

   So, my answer to ``Why now?'' is, ``Why not earlier?'' And, of course, that question has new urgency since Sept. 11, 2001.

   Won't a war against Iraq slow or stop our more urgent war against terrorism?

   To me, the two are inextricably linked. First, remember that Iraq under Saddam is

[Page: S10014]

   Saddam's is the only regime that combines growing stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and a record of using them with regional hegemonic ambitions and a record of supporting terrorists. If we remove his influence from the Middle East and free the Iraqi people to determine their own destiny, we will transform the politics of the region. That will only advance the war against terrorism, not set it back.

   Why should we launch a strike against a sovereign nation that has not struck us first?

   We should and will soon have a larger debate about the president's new doctrine of pre-emption, but not here and now, because the term is not apt for our current situation. We have been engaged in an ongoing conflict with Saddam's regime ever since the Gulf War began. Every day, British and American aircraft and personnel are enforcing no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq; the ongoing force of about 7,500 American men and women in uniform costs our taxpayers more than $1 billion a year. And this is not casual duty. Saddam's air defense forces have shot at U.S. and British planes 406 times (and counting) in 2002 alone.

   As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``Vigorous action in the course of an ongoing conflict hardly constitutes preventive war.''

   Why not have two congressional resolutions, one now encouraging the U.N. to respond to President Bush's call for inspections without limits, and another one later authorizing U.S. military action if the U.N. refuses to act?

   This is sometimes described as the way to stop ``go-it-alone'' action by the U.S. unless and until absolutely necessary. But I believe that the best way to encourage forceful U.N. action, so that we never have to ``go it alone,'' is for Congress to unite now in authorizing the president to take military action, if necessary. I am convinced that if we lead decisively, others will come to our side, in the U.N. and after. If we are steadfast in pursuit of our principles, allies in Europe and the Middle East will be with us.

   Why not just authorize the president to take military action to disarm the Iraqis instead of giving him a ``blank check''?

   Our resolution does not give the president a blank check. It authorizes the use of U.S. military power only to ``defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq'' and to ``enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.''

   There are 535 members of Congress who have the constitutional responsibility to authorize American military action, but there is only one commander-in-chief who can carry it out. Having reached the conclusion I have about the clear and present danger Saddam represents to the U.S., I want to give the president a limited but strong mandate to act against Saddam. Five hundred and thirty-five members of Congress cannot wage war; we can only authorize it. The rest is up to the president and our military.

   A RECORD OF STRENGTH

   We in Congress have now begun a very serious debate on these questions and others. Each member must act on values, conscience, sense of history and national security. When it is over, I believe there will be a strong majority of senators who will vote for the bipartisan resolution that John Warner, John McCain, Evan Bayh and I have introduced. I am equally confident that a strong majority of Democrats in the Senate will support it. In doing so, they will embrace the better parts of our party's national security legacy of the last half century. From Truman's doctrine to prevent communist expansion to Kennedy's ``quarantine'' of Cuba to prevent Soviet missiles from remaining there, to Bill Clinton's deployment of American forces to the Balkans to stop genocide and prevent a wider war in Europe, Democrats should be proud of our record of strength when it counted the most.

   Each of the Democratic presidents above tried diplomacy, but when it failed, they unleashed America's military forces across the globe to confront tyranny, to stop aggression, and to prevent any more damage to America or Americans. That is precisely what our resolution would empower President Bush to do now.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, I will use my 15 minutes to speak on the Iraq resolution at a subsequent time. I will speak today on something I think is extremely important to what we are doing militarily around the world; that is, as a result of an article I saw in today's Washington Post, and I am sure it is running all over the world.

   Mr. WARNER. Could I ask my colleague, could your very important colloquy which I will have with you on this subject appear in a place elsewhere in the RECORD?

   Mr. REID. I want it at this point. Sorry, but I really do. I think this is important to what we are doing today, I say to my friend, the distinguished Senator and my good friend from Virginia.

   This headline reads: ``Bush Threatens Veto of Defense Bill.''

   I cannot believe the President is involved in this--maybe some of the people around him--I cannot believe the President would do this. I cannot accept that. I cannot accept George W. Bush, a person I have found to be very sensitive to people--I hope my feelings are warranted.

   We have statements from the same article:

   David S.C. Chu, Undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, said VA disability compensation is intended not to supplement military pensions.

   ``We're going to rob Peter to pay Paul.''

   He was speaking for the President of the United States on this very important issue, saying:

   ``We're going to rob Peter to pay Paul''--``and the question is, should Peter really lose here?''

   This is legislation I authored and others have supported over the years to allow military retirees to receive not only their retirement benefits from the military but also their disability benefits. That is all this is. Somebody who is in the U.S. military, who is disabled, can receive that pension in addition to their retirement benefits. The law now says you can't. I say that is wrong.

   If you retire from the Department of Energy or Sears & Roebuck and have a disability pension from the military, you can draw both pensions. Why shouldn't you be able to if you retire from the military?

   I am troubled with this administration's opposition of concurrent receipt of retirement pay and disability pay for disabled military retirees.

   America's veterans have long been denied concurrent receipt

   based on an antiquated law that in effect says if you have 20 years in uniform you cannot draw your disability.

   This ``robbing Peter to pay Paul'' troubles me. As we speak today, starting at 2:45 today until 2:45 tomorrow, 1,000 World War II veterans will die. A number of those have disabilities, and they are entitled to receive those disability benefits as a result of their service in the military. They are entitled to that. But not legally.

   This law which has passed the Senate on two separate occasions--passed the House this year--is being threatened by the President. He is not going to OK this bill.

   I held a press conference with Senator Warner and Senator Levin last year saying they fought a good fight, and we were sorry we could not get it done. I will not accept that this year; neither are the veterans of this country. I know how dedicated Senator Warner and Senator Levin are to the military of this country. Don't let them be bamboozled by this administration saying he will veto the bill.

   I dare them to veto the bill based on disability benefits to veterans, 1,000 of whom are dying every day, World War II veterans. Not all 1,000 will draw benefit. They have exaggerated how man people will draw these benefits. But there are some.

   And now I see a proposal in the same article, the distinguished Senator from Arizona saying maybe we will compromise and say those who have a service-connected disability can draw their benefits.

   If you are in battle--at most, there are 10 percent during a conflict with military people on the front lines in combat--if someone gets shot and their shoulder is ruined, they should be entitled to the benefits. If someone is not in the front lines, but in the back lines, or even in America, not over in a foreign country, and they fall off a truck and ruin their shoulder, they are entitled to those benefits just like someone who was shot. They are doing their best to represent our country, and they are just as important. If you did not have those people behind the lines, you would not have the people on the front lines able to fight.

   Career military retired veterans are the only group of Federal retirees required to waive their retirement pay to

[Page: S10015]

   Some officials have been quoted in recent newspaper articles stating that retirement pay is two pays for the same event. Come on, get real, Mr. President. These people say this is doubledipping. These statements are simply untrue--or people do not know what they are talking about. Military retirement pay and disability compensation are earned from entirely different purposes. Therefore, a disabled veteran should be allowed to receive both.

   Current law ignores the distinction. Military retired pay is earned compensation for the extraordinary demands and sacrifices inherent in a military career. It is a reward promised for serving two decades or more under conditions that most Americans would find intolerable. When a person goes into the military, they are expecting to draw retirement pay. When they go in the military, they are not expecting to come out disabled. But it happens. Veterans disability compensation is recompense for pain, suffering, and loss of earning power caused by a service-connected illness or injury. Few retirees can afford to live on their retired pay alone, and a severe disability makes the problem worse, limiting or denying postservice working life.

   The Presiding Officer of this body is the chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, and on a daily basis he deals with the problems, the burdens of veterans in our country. No group of people have more problems than veterans. Whether you are a World War II veteran, Korean war veteran, or a Vietnam veteran, you have problems. We have people from all those conflicts, plus others who have served in recent years who have disabilities. They are entitled to this. It has passed the Senate. It is the will of the people of this country.

   It is the will of the Senate. For, now, the President--his representative, a Mr. Chu--to come in and say:

   The President is not going to support this legislation. It would be robbing Peter to pay Paul.

   What is that supposed to mean? We are not going to be able to buy a tank or airplane? Instead, we are going to have to give the money to somebody like Senator Inouye, who has lost an arm, or Senator Cleland, who has lost three limbs?

   A retiree should not have to forfeit part or all of his or her earned retired pay as a result of having suffered a service-connected disability. There are those who have suggested a compromise for limited concurrent receipt to only combat-injured military retirees. I don't accept that. Many of our veterans have not been injured in combat, but they are no less injured or any less deserving of fair compensation. This is simply bowing to the administration's threat of a veto.

   Likewise, the administration's assertion that if the concurrent receipt passes, ``1.2 million veterans could qualify'' for extra benefits is simply not credible. The Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs previously informed Congress about 550,000 disabled retirees would qualify if the Senate concurrent receipt plan were approved. So where do they come up with another 700,000 people?

   The administration's argument that funding benefits for America's disabled veterans would hurt current military personnel is misleading. Congress is not cutting funding for those who are now serving our country in order to provide benefits for those from previous generations who served loyally and made tremendous sacrifices. Congress will appropriate the money to pay for that.

   Enacting this concurrent receipt legislation will not cause current service members to live in substandard quarters, as some say, in a misguided attempt to turn one generation of patriots against another. Moreover, at a time when our Nation is calling upon our Armed Forces to defend democracy and freedom, we must be careful not to send the wrong signal to those in uniform. All who have selected to make their careers in the United States military are now facing an additional unknown risk in our fight against terrorism. If they were injured, they would be forced to forego their earned retired pay in order to receive their VA benefits. In effect, they would be paying for their own disability benefits from their retirement checks unless this legislation is passed overwhelmingly.

   If the President vetoes this bill because of this, how many Senators are going to come here and vote to sustain that veto? I don't think very many. Who would they rather have on their backs? The President or the veterans of this country? I know from Nevada, I would rather have the President on my back than those veterans--and they are right.

   At a time when our Nation is calling on our Armed Forces, we need to do this. We must send a signal to these brave men and women the American people and Government take care of those who make sacrifices for our Nation. We have a unique opportunity this year to redress the unfair practice of requiring disabled military retirees to fund their own disability compensation. It is time for us to show our appreciation to these people.

   Finally, the assertion the veterans who would benefit from concurrent receipt are already doing well financially is ridiculous. NBC, the National Broadcasting System, recently aired three news stories in which they documented the dire situation veterans are facing today. The Pentagon has

   acknowledged its studies of retiree income included extremely few seriously disabled retirees.

   For too long America's disabled military retirees have been unjustly penalized by concurrent offset, and they are demanding action be taken now, not in the future. With such strong bipartisan support on both sides of the Congress, these men and women do not understand the opposition of the administration. As I say, I hope the President doesn't know what is going on.

   Let me say again to my friend, the Senator from Virginia, who is on the floor--I have spoken to him today. I have spoken to Senator Levin today. I think this is so important we do this. At a time when our country finds itself in crisis, what could be wrong with a veteran getting retirement pay and disability pay at the same time? They are two separate earnings, one for being hurt, one for spending a lot of time in the military.

   I have worked hard on this. I appreciate the support of the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Michigan. But I am saying here we can't let this opportunity pass. We would be letting down people whom we should not be letting down.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to commend my distinguished colleague and friend on this particular issue. Among the group of us, you have been primarily the leader. My recollection is this is about the fourth year we have brought this up for attention and really asked the Senate to focus upon it. This year it was a direct focus upon it by the Senate and the House, and both Chambers put a provision in their bill.

   Mr. REID. I would also say to my friend from Virginia, not only that, but the House--we don't have a budget here, but the House budget includes this. They didn't include----

   Mr. WARNER. Yes.

   Mr. REID. They included it to 60 percent disabled. They have the dollars budgeted in the House. They did that. So the answer is absolutely correct.

   I vote for these defense budgets. I am for a strong military. I remind everyone here in this Iraq season we are in, I was the first Democrat to announce publicly to support the first President Bush. I had no problem doing that. I want a good, strong military. But I think part of that is rewarding these people for having been injured. Why should we take their retirement away from them because they have been injured? There is no reason.

   Mr. WARNER. I say to my colleague, we are now, as you know, in conference. Senator Levin and I work daily on this with our two colleagues from the House, Chairman STUMP and IKE SKELTON. This has not been resolved as yet.

   We, of course, have to take notice of what is stated here. Presumably the statement in the Pentagon, by Mr. Chu, would not have been made had there not been some consultation with the staff of the President. I don't know the extent this has been

   brought to his attention. After all, he has been among

[Page: S10016]

   So I say to my friend, I will join him and others and continue to try to work this issue in our conference. But I believe your statement at this time, I say to my colleague, comes at a critical moment. Because that decision could be made, indeed, today, tomorrow, the next day, as to how, finally, to constitute the provisions of the House-Senate conference document which would then be brought back to both Chambers for vote.

   So I take to heart your comments. I will share them with our conferees. I express again my appreciation to you for your staunch--staunch defense of our veterans. I humbly say, modestly: I am a veteran. As a matter of fact, I would not be here had it not been for what the military did for me. I have often said they did a lot more for me than I ever did for them in my modest service. But I assure you, I am contemporary with the World War II generation, and you are absolutely right. One thousand a day are departing.

   I have met with them. They have been among the more vigorous, to try and bring forth congressional action on this, as have any number of veterans' groups and groups associated with our military.

   I say to my friend, your message is timely. We should take it to heart and do our very best.

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, I can say to my friend, the ``gentleman'' from Virginia--and certainly he is the epitome of a gentleman--I appreciate very much his remarks.

   Mr. DORGAN. Will the Senator from Nevada yield for 2 brief questions?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield?

   Mr. WARNER. I have no objection, of course, but we are proceeding on the Iraq resolution. Following colleagues' comments and questions to our distinguished Democratic whip, we will return to, I believe, Senator Kyl to be recognized.

   Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am mindful there are others waiting to speak. But when I learned Senator Reid was going to speak today, I was going to ask him a couple of questions on this issue. I will just be 2 to 3 minutes, if I can ask the indulgence of my colleagues.

   Mr. DOMENICI. If the Senator will yield, can I ask for the record that I follow Senator Kyl?

   Mr. WARNER. Certainly I have no objection. I think that is very helpful.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is ordered without objection.

   Mr. REID. And following Senator Dorgan, Senator Kyl be recognized for 15 minutes and Senator Domenici for 15 minutes.

   Mr. DORGAN. I wanted to say to the Senator from Nevada, he has raised a very important issue at this point. Twenty-three of us in the Senate sent a letter to the authorizing committee on this subject, saying those soldiers who have earned a retirement should receive it, and those same soldiers who are entitled to a disability payment should receive that as well. It is that simple. Senator Reid of Nevada has made the case. It is just a very simple issue of equity.

   What I wanted to do is point out that NBC News did a story recently. I don't know whether the Senator mentioned this on the floor of the Senate. Hank Nix, from Ozark, AL, 52 years ago was shot in the chest. He took a bullet leading his platoon. He earned a Silver Star. He is now talking about having to move from their home because of what is called a broken promise. The Government is reducing his retirement pay because he is not allowed to collect both his disability--he is 100 percent disabled, he took a bullet in the chest leading his platoon in the Korean war,

   but he is not allowed to collect the retirement he earned and a disability payment he is due. Why? Because there is a quirk in the law that applies only to disabled soldiers and no other Federal worker. About half a million soldiers are in this circumstance.

   It is, in my judgment, totally unforgivable that we don't fix this. It has been around for a long while. Many of us have talked about it on the floor of the Senate. I know the Senator from Virginia is in support of fixing it, as are, I think, most of our colleagues.

   I appreciate the fact that the Senator from Nevada brought this to the floor today because this is critically important. If we are going to get it fixed, now is the time to get it fixed. A military career is filled with hardships, family separations, and sacrifices, and all too often being put in harm's way. There are promises made to those folks who wear America's uniform, and then we are not keeping the promise with respect to this issue.

   Finally, let me say this: I have, as many of my colleagues have since September 11, 2002, visited military bases in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. You can see the pride in the eyes of those soldiers--men and women--who are fighting terrorism on behalf of our country. You know and they know we have an obligation to keep our promise to our veterans.

   George Washington said it 200 years ago. I will not repeat the quote that has been repeated many times on the floor of this Senate. But when we send young men and women to war to defend freedom, we have an obligation to keep our promises to them. One of those promises is to say: If you earn a retirement, we will pay you that retirement. If you are disabled because of your service to our country, you are entitled to that disability payment. It is just that simple.

   I appreciate the Senator from Nevada bringing it to the floor.

   Mr. REID. I appreciate very much having worked with the Senator from North Dakota on this most important issue as we have on a number of issues.

   My point is, the conferees must not cave in on this. Let them veto this issue. We will override the veto. This isn't something that is, oh, well, we will see. As I said, let everyone here in the Senate decide whom they want to support--the President's people or the veterans of their States. This is an issue on which conferees cannot let us down.

   Mr. DORGAN. The President threatened a veto today--or the White House did, apparently. They said they cannot afford this. We can't afford not to do this. You just have to keep the promises here. I am talking about our country. We must keep our promise to veterans. I hope he will not veto. If he does, it will be overridden, I believe, by a very large margin here in the Senate.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. FEINSTEIN). The Senator from Arizona.

   Mr. KYL. Madam President, I support S.J. Res. 45 authorizing the use of force against Iraq.

   Perhaps the most difficult decision one can make as a Member of this body is to vote to send American troops into harm's way. It forces one to consider every question, every possibility, and every option short of war. But this does not mean we should eschew action simply because we have not yet tried every other option. Some threats must be dealt with before implausible alternatives are allowed to play out because of the consequences of delay. Preemption may be the only logical course of action in some situations. A nation need not allow itself to be struck to be justified in acting to protect itself.

   With these principles in mind, we can evaluate the need to authorize the use of force against Iraq. Actually, use of force against Iraq has already been authorized by both the United States and the United Nations. And the United States and Great Britain are already using force on a weekly basis.

   Notwithstanding his obligations to allow aerial inspections in the no-fly zones, Saddam Hussein regularly attempts to shoot down our unarmed reconnaissance planes, and we either react by destroying the offending anti-aircraft site or seek to discover and destroy it before it can fire--preemption. No one questions our right to do this.

   Two facts can, therefore, be established: No. 1, Saddam Hussein is not willing to allow unconditional inspections as he claims. He is not doing it now. No. 2, his continued violation of the United Nations resolutions requires a military response. That is assuming the resolutions were intended to be enforced when they were adopted. Delay in doing so only degrades our claim of authority to act and makes more difficult the task.

   No one can argue that the United States and the international community have not exhausted the full range of legal, diplomatic, and other alternatives to try to compel Saddam Hussein to obey all of the terms of the cease-fire to which he agreed at the end

[Page: S10017]

   Those who oppose the authorization of force usually define the test as whether there is an immediate threat, asking, Why do we have to act now? But I submit this is the wrong question. Our intelligence will never be good enough to allow us to calibrate our action to a threat just a few days or a few weeks away. We simply do not know enough to do that. We cannot wait until we are sure that Iraq has a nuclear weapon and is about to use it because it is unlikely we will ever have that evidence, and it will be too late when we do.

   I find it ironic that some of the people insisting on this standard are also some of the loudest critics of our intelligence failures before September 11, arguing that we should have known an attack was imminent and we should have taken action to prevent it. If September 11 had not happened, my guess is that these same people would be urging caution, arguing that since we haven't yet ``connected all the dots,'' any

   preemptive action at that time would be too risky and premature.

   Moreover, action is warranted now because there is no realistic hope that the United Nations resolutions and Saddam's promises to us at the end of the gulf war will otherwise be enforced, and each month that passes increases the danger.

   Finally, Iraq is another front in this war on terror. Eliminating Saddam's threat will give us greater latitude in other actions we will have to take, and it will create a more willing group of allies in the region. For some of these countries to throw in with us, they need to know that we are absolutely committed to winning and that they are better off joining the winning side than continuing to pay tribute to terrorists in order to protect their regimes from terrorists.

   While there is much about Iraq's capabilities we do not know, there are also some things we do know. No one, for example, can doubt the extent of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The only question is when and how he will use them and how long it will be before he can add nuclear weapons to his existing chemical and biological capabilities.

   In recounting Iraq's nasty capabilities, it is useful to remind ourselves that Baghdad has continued to pursue the development of these weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them in violation of numerous U.N. resolutions. There are 13 such resolutions.

   During the 7 years that the United Nations Special Commission--UNSCOM--inspectors were present in Iraq, Saddam Hussein went to great lengths to obstruct inspections to conceal his stockpiles and continue his programs under cloak of secrecy. It has now been 4 years since United Nations inspection teams last set foot in Iraq. We have evidence that Saddam has used that time to enhance his weapons and his development programs. I need not detail that evidence here. It has been amply discussed in a variety of open and closed sources of information provided by the administration, and it includes everything banned by the United Nations--chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the means of delivering them.

   In addition, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated proclivity to use force to achieve his objectives--twice against his neighbors. And his aggressive ambitions have already led him to deploy the devastating weapons if his stockpiles. He used chemical weapons against Iran. He again used them against his own Kurdish population. And he has launched ballistic missiles against four neighbors. He is devoting enormous resources of his country to upgrade his threat, which is not an action of one who only wants to survive.

   There should be little doubt that Saddam Hussein will use his weapons of mass destruction again either to back up a threat to harm us if we stand in the way of some future aggression or in actual attack against us or our allies, including, potentially a terrorist type attack on our homeland. A recent article by Kenneth Pollack in the Arizona Republic amplifies this point. In the article, Pollack concludes, ``..... there is every reason to believe that the question is not one of war or no war, but rather of war now or war later--a war without nuclear weapons or a war with them.''

   Saddam Hussein's abuse of the Iraqi people is also deplorable, not to mention a violation of a U.N. resolution passed just after the Gulf War, resolution 688. His hideous treatment of Iraqi men, women, and children is documented. A report published by Human Rights Watch in 1990 described the shocking brutality of the Iraqi regime:

   Large numbers of persons have unquestionably died under torture in Iraq over the past two decades. Each year there have been reports of dozens--sometimes hundreds--of deaths, with bodies of victims left in the street or returned to families bearing marks of torture. ..... The brazenness of Iraqi authorities in returning bodies bearing clear evidence of torture is remarkable. Governments that engage in torture often go to great lengths to hide what they have done. ..... A government so savage as to flaunt its crimes obviously wants to strike terror in the hearts of its citizens. .....

   And, as Iraqi citizens starve, Saddam has illegally used oil revenues from the U.N. oil-for-food program to rebuild his military capabilities, including his weapons of mass destruction. Then, of course, Saddam blames the United States and the United Nations for the suffering of the Iraqi people.

   Finally, there is Saddam Hussein's support for international terrorism. In his address to the Nation following the September 11 attacks, President Bush presented the countries of the world with two unambiguous options. He said: ``Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.'' Saddam Hussein made his decision.

   Iraq was the only Arab-Muslim country that failed to condemn the September 11 attack. In fact, the official Iraqi media stated on that day that America was ``reaping the fruits of [its]

   crimes against humanity.'' We know that Iraq has hosted members of al-Qaeda. And National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has commented specifically on Iraq-al-Qaeda ties.

   ``We clearly know,'' she said, ``that there ..... have been contacts between senior Iraqi officials and members of al Qaeda. We know too that several of the [al Qaeda] detainees, in particular some high-ranking detainees, have said that Iraq provided some training to al Qaeda in chemical weapons.''

   And Iraq has supported other terrorists. For example, Abu Abbas, the mastermind of the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking and murderer of American Leon Klinghoffer, lives in Baghdad. The