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8) Continued Debate of the Authorization of Military Force in Iraq

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   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I take the floor at this time to urge the joint leadership of the Senate to delay the vote on cloture which is set this moment for 10:15 tomorrow morning. I urge the leadership of this body to consider and to help bring about an order that will vitiate that vote on cloture tomorrow morning at 10:15.

   I make my plea on behalf of the mothers, fathers, grandmothers, and grandfathers of this country, the fate of whose sons, daughters and grandchildren hinges upon the outcome of the vote on cloture; shutting off the debate of this Senate, shutting it down to 30 hours, with each Senator to have only 1 hour unless other Senators can be prevailed upon to seek unanimous consent to yield that Senator additional time, with the exception of the managers, the majority leader, and the minority leader, who have an additional 2 hours automatically.

   What is involved is the fate of the service men and women in this country who may have to go to Iraq, the fate of the reserves, the fate of our National Guardsmen and Guardswomen in this country who may have to go to Iraq.

   This decision is going to be made no later than 10:15 tomorrow morning unless it is changed. This is a fateful decision. It involves the treasure of this country. It involves the blood of our fighting men and women. It is too momentous and too far reaching a decision to be signed, sealed, and delivered by 10:15 tomorrow morning.

   I know it is in accordance with the rules of the Senate. Nobody knows the rules of the Senate more than I do, and nobody has used the rules of the Senate more than I have in past years. But I say that this rule, which is perfectly within order, should be set aside because of the fateful, momentous, and far-reaching implications and ramifications of this vote.

   If we go through with this vote, Senators are going to have 1 hour each, up to 30 hours, and only amendments which are germane can be offered. This is too much, and I appeal to the sense of justice, the sense of right, and the sense of our duties to our people. I appeal to all Senators and to the leadership that we seek to get unanimous consent to put off that vote, to delay it.

   Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

   Mr. BYRD. Yes, I yield.

   Mr. SARBANES. I ask the very able and distinguished Senator from West Virginia--it is my understanding that the motion to proceed to this resolution took place a week ago. Is that the Senator's understanding?

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator for such a parliamentary inquiry.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. SARBANES. Parliamentary inquiry. When did the Senate proceed to this resolution?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. It appears from the Journal, the Senate proceeded to this measure on October 4.

   Mr. SARBANES. October 4, and today is October 9. October 4, I am told by the Chair. Today is October the 9th, on a resolution that may take the Nation into war.

   Mr. BYRD. That includes Saturday and Sunday.

   Mr. SARBANES. The distinguished Senator, I think I am correct in recalling, was the leader of the Senate at the time we did the Panama Canal treaties.

   Mr. BYRD. The Senator is correct.

   Mr. SARBANES. Did the Senator recall there were two treaties, the neutrality treaty and the canal treaty itself? We went to the neutrality treaty. Floor debate began on February 6 of 1978. We voted on March 16 of 1978. So we had a period from February the 6th until March 16 to consider that treaty.

   We then went to the Panama Canal treaty. We began debate on March 17 of 1978 and we voted on that treaty on April 18 of 1978. In other words, roughly 6 weeks on one treaty and a month on the other treaty.

   Mr. BYRD. Yes.

   Mr. SARBANES. Neither of which involved the prospect of going to war.

   Mr. BYRD. Exactly.

   Mr. SARBANES. Now, as I understand it, we are facing the prospect of, in effect, terminating all debate, precluding a lot of potential amendments, and ending this matter in about one week's time, a matter of this grave import. I ask the Senator if that is correct.

   Mr. BYRD. Absolutely correct. Absolutely correct.

   Mr. SARBANES. I make this observation to my colleague. It seems to me it is a sad commentary.

   Mr. WARNER. Might I make an observation along the lines of the distinguished colleague now debating this?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor.

   Mr. BYRD. Then I will be glad to yield.

   Mr. SARBANES. The distinguished Senator from Virginia, I have been watching him. He is marshaling the war forces on the floor of the Senate.

   Mr. McCAIN. Is this regular order?

   Mr. SARBANES. I see as part of that process, any time anyone speaks, he wants to make an observation. I would be happy to hear it so I get an opportunity to respond.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is the Senator from Maryland may ask a question of the Senator from West Virginia.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I share that feeling, and in due time we will get that explanation.

   At this moment I appeal, I appeal to the Members of the Senate to find a way to give unanimous consent to put aside this vote on tomorrow and delay it so as to give this Senate more time to debate and to act upon this resolution, which is so weighty, involving, as it does, the most serious, the most solemn question that can ever face this Senate, the question of peace or war. We are being hurried by the rules of the Senate, we are being hurried into reaching a decision that is premature.

   I appeal to my colleagues. I appeal to my colleagues. The people out there in the country deserve better than this. They deserve a decision taken after due time, due consideration, ample consideration, ample opportunities to offer amendments and to have them decided.

   As it is under the rules of the Senate, we will be forced tomorrow at 10:15 a.m. to vote on cloture. If enough Senators voted against cloture, that would be one thing. If 41 Senators opposed it--or put it this way: If those who support this resolution cannot get 60 votes tomorrow, then we would automatically have additional time.

   I am concerned the way this Senate is being stampeded, stampeded. I don't blame any Senator in particular. Every Senator here is acting in accordance with the rules. I am asking that in this peculiar, unique situation involving so much of the country's treasury, in blood and in dollars, I am asking the Senators join with me in putting off this decision. It can be done. It can be done by unanimous consent. That is not asking too much. That is not asking too much.

   We are talking about people who are in the military of this country who may have to go to war in a foreign country, depending on this vote tomorrow.

   Mrs. BOXER. Will the Senator yield?

   Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield?

   Mr. BYRD. Let me first yield to the distinguished Senator from Virginia for a question, without losing my right to the floor.

   Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague and dear friend from West Virginia.

   To both of my colleagues, the Senator from Maryland and the Senator from West Virginia, this debate, as stated, started on the 4th, which was last Friday.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Maryland that on further review of the Journal,

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   Mr. WARNER. Fine.

   I had the privilege of being on the floor last Friday afternoon for over 5 hours with this debate on that side of that aisle, led by my distinguished colleague from West Virginia. The Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kennedy, participated. The Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, participated. We had 5 1/2 hours. I returned to the floor on Monday. We had another roughly 6 hours of debate. Tuesday is fresh in the minds of all. And here we are.

   This is the point I wish to make. I share with my distinguished colleague the seriousness of this vote. It is a vote, hopefully, to ensure a resolution which will act as a deterrent, I say most respectfully, a deterrent, to the use of force, a resolution that will support the United Nations that is this very hour working to possibly craft a 17th resolution which would call for inspections. It is timely that the United Nations hear from not only our President, who gave a brilliant speech, but a unified Congress with these resolutions.

   I can conclude my remarks by saying in 1990/1991, I and all of the Members here--most of us were involved in that debate--the record shows the debate began on January 10, 1991, on the Persian Gulf resolution. There were two resolutions, one submitted by myself and the distinguished Senator, Mr. Lieberman, the other by the then-majority leader, Mr. Mitchell. That debate started on the 10th. It concluded 2 days later, just 2 days later, on January 12, 1991, concluding with 2 votes on both resolutions.

   So that ended up sending men and women of the Armed Forces, ours and other nations', into harm's way. Let us hope we have had adequate time, having begun on the 3rd, as stated by the Chair, and now we are here today with 13 amendments which have just been submitted, which will be respectfully treated by this body in due course, I hope expeditiously.

   The rule is being complied with. This is clear. But it is 13 amendments.

   Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?

   Mr. BYRD. I yield.

   Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator agree with me the timetables which the Senator from Virginia just set out, both in 1991 and now, show a deterioration in the Senate's level of commitment in terms of debate on important matters of State?

   Now, we do not have to go back that far. The time period I cited was 24 years ago, just shy of a quarter of a century. We took up an important matter of foreign policy, the Panama Canal treaty--two

   of them, 4 weeks on one and 4 weeks on the other. Now we are here with a resolution to take us to war, and we are told, Well, you know, we have been on it not quite a week. As the Senator pointed out, there was an intervening weekend. Then we are cited as a precedent, Well, in 1991 we did it in a few days.

   Not only, it seems to me, does it make my point in terms of the willingness of the Senate to carry on the great national debate that ought to take place on important issues of war and peace, but this is a matter of most fundamental importance.

   I ask the Senator. It seems to me it would require the kind of attention and debate that is warranted by an issue of that magnitude.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator is indubitably correct. There can be no more solemn, no more serious, no more far-reaching a decision than the one which the Senate is approaching.

   All of the talk about how many hours or how many days we spent on some previous resolution or subject is entirely aside the point; entirely aside the point.

   What I am saying here--and every Senator here knows it--is tomorrow morning at 10:15, we will follow the rules of the Senate. We are going to vote on cloture on the Lieberman resolution, as modified. It has been modified. I don't know how many Senators know that. This resolution has been modified. I only learned about it today. It has been modified in such a way that there is no longer a preamble, or what is considered a preamble. The words ``whereas''--I would like to discuss each of these whereas clauses. The whereas clauses have all been changed to ``since,'' which means the preamble is now a part and parcel of the resolution. There is no separate preamble here.

   So the wheels have been greased. The wheels of legislative action of debate have been greased.

   So here we are now faced with a vote tomorrow morning at 10:15. How many of us are going to be here beyond 6:00 today? It is only 5 minutes to 3 now. How many of us will be here beyond 6:00 today? Then tomorrow, what time are we coming in? 9:00, 10:00?

   So we see how little time this Senate is going to be able to focus its full attention on this far-reaching resolution which carries within its pages the fate, the possible fate of this Nation; the fate of hundreds or thousands, or tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of servicemen and our National Guardsmen throughout this country. We are holding their fate in our hands.

   I say that the rules of the Senate in this instance are being utilized so strictly they are made more demanding.

   Why do we have to rush these cloture motions on a matter of this great moment? Why couldn't we have waited and debated this? What is all the hurry?

   I say to Senators, and I appeal to the people out there who are watching through those lenses, I appeal to the people in the 50 States and the territory and possessions of this country to rise up and to let themselves be heard. Don't vote for cloture. Let us put off this cloture vote. That is not asking too much. That is not asking too much.

   I hope Senators will consider this seriously. Let's not vote on this tomorrow morning at 10:15.

   Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

   Mr. BYRD. Yes. I yield for a question.

   Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator for putting

   this debate in the proper context and for pointing out what the solemn duty really is in the Senate.

   I want to ask my friend a couple of questions.

   Has my friend heard, as I have, the President himself and many of his representatives, including Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Ari Fleischer, repeat over and over again that the President has not yet made a decision to go to war? Has my friend heard that?

   Mr. BYRD. There is no question. No farther back than August 21, I read in the newspapers that the President was concerned about the agitation, about all of the commotion--these are my words--that is taking place here concerning his--the President's--plan. Secretary Rumsfeld on that occasion referred to this agitation as a ``frenzy''. That is my recollection. Go back and check; no farther than August 23.

   Here we were being told there were no such plans. As we approach it, the drive is on. We are being stampeded. They are saying, Oh, the vote will take place this week.

   Why all the hurry?

   I hope we will have an opportunity to debate this resolution. We haven't had a full opportunity to debate this resolution. It has just been modified overnight. Nobody has really had an opportunity to debate each whereas clause.

   There are amendments that are going to be offered. We are not going to have a chance to debate those amendments. The distinguished Senator from Michigan has an important amendment.

   Mrs. BOXER. If I might ask just a couple of questions--I wanted to say to my friend that not only did they say in August this was a frenzy, and the press was paying so much attention to it, and chastising the press for talking about Iraq--no. They were in a frenzy. But just two nights ago, our President said he has not made a decision to go to war. Colin Powell said that before the Foreign Relations Committee, on which I proudly serve. Condoleezza Rice repeated it. Ari Fleischer repeated it. I tried to check out the history where the President has not made the decision to go to war--over and over again through his operatives, and he himself said it--yet he is coming to this Congress and quickly wants to have a resolution, not just backing a new United Nations resolution, which I think we all feel is very important, and with tough inspections. In fact, most of us believe there should be enforcement

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   But our President is asking us to give him the authority to go to war alone--alone, with no one else. Other Senators will say that is silly, Senator Boxer. We are not going it alone. Read the resolution of Senator McCain. He can go it alone. That is the deal.

   Some say we are doing it because we want to force the U.N. to act. I agree with Senator Levin. I think it takes the heat off the United Nations.

   But the question I ask of my friend is this: In closing, here we are being asked to give the President authority to take this country to war without any help, without any other nation, without any of our allies, before he has made a decision to do so. And I want to ask my friend this because I know he has been here a very long time. He is an Officer of the Senate.

   Has my friend been briefed on how many of our military people, men and women, it will take to go to this war?

   What will the casualties be? How much will it cost? How long will we have to stay there? What happens afterward? What is the impact in the region? Will Saddam Hussein use his weapons of mass destruction on the battlefield against our people? And what protections do they have?

   Those are just a few questions. I want to ask my friend, have those questions been answered? I have asked them. They have not been answered. Perhaps my friend, having so many more years here, might have the privilege of a response to that before we are asked to take our people to war.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there are many questions the American people want answered. There are many questions the American people are entitled to have answers to.

   I am only pleading here that the Senate give itself time to explore these questions on behalf of the people whom we serve. Give ourselves time. We haven't had time. We have been rushed through this thing. Now, because of the rules of the Senate, we are going to have to vote tomorrow morning at 10:15 on a question that involves peace or war,

   a question that involves great sacrifices for this country.

   Nobody knows how great those sacrifices may be. And there are many questions that need to be answered. What will we do once Iraq is defeated? What will we do with Iraq? Will our service men and women be required to go there? Will they have to stay there 2 months after the defeat of Iraq? 6 months? 1 year? 2 years? 5 years? 10 years?

   Who is going to pay for reviving the economy of Iraq? Where are the moneys coming from to pay the costs of what may be a war of short duration? of what may be a war of long duration? What is the President's plan? What is the administration's plan? Are we going to use the heavy ground option or the heavy air option, or both the heavy ground option and the heavy air option?

   Go over to the hospitals surrounding this Capitol and take a look at the emergency rooms. See how many people are in those emergency rooms. See how short on personnel those hospitals are. I know. I have had my wife in a hospital just recently with an appendectomy. Those hospitals are short on beds.

   What about the veterans hospitals? What about an upsurge, if it comes, in casualties of Americans? Are we prepared for this? Are we prepared?

   What is going to happen on the war here at home, homeland security, the security of our country? Look around us here. Just look at the morning papers. The television is full of it. The people of this area are concerned about their children, about the public schools, and they are being asked not to come to school, not to have recesses.

   Here we are talking about war in Iraq, when the focus is being taken off the war here at home. The people's eyes are on home, what is happening around us. Here is a sniper in this area. He has already killed six people at least, and they don't know what he looks like, where he lives, nothing about him, except he is a marksman. He is sure a marksman.

   Here we are being told: Tomorrow morning at 10:15 we are going to come to the moment of decision. I say it is not right to the American people that we do that.

   Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield for a question?

   Mr. BYRD. I do not intend to hold the floor too much longer. I yield to this Senator, and then I will yield to my friend.

   Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I have been listening to the Senator over several days. One of the points he makes so effectively is the fact that even if we have been on the resolution a few days, we were, I was reminded, on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 21 days, the energy bill 23 days, the trade bill 19 days, and the farm bill 18 days.

   But even if we have been on this bill, would the Senator not agree with me that the principal debate has been on the resolutions, not the real impact of the war and what would happen to American troops who would be involved--the numbers of American troops who would be involved--what the impact is going to be on our battle with al-Qaida, what is going to be the impact in terms of the region, in terms of what Saddam may do?

   I would be interested in the Senator's comments on that.

   Secondly, I would be interested in the Senator's comments on the report this morning in the Washington Post--I am so glad it was declassified--in which the Central Intelligence Agency effectively has agreed that--quoting the paper----

   Unprovoked by a U.S. military campaign, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate a chemical or biological attack against the United States, intelligence agencies concluded in a classified report. .....

   That is the first time we have seen that public. That has been classified. Those of us who have been briefed on it have been unable to use that or to say that. That is a major kind of factor, I think, if we are being asked to vote on a resolution of war: to find out, in our Intelligence Estimate, that the possibility of American troops being affected by the use of chemical warfare increases dramatically--dramatically--when we are putting Saddam Hussein's back against a wall.

   This was a question that--I see in the Chamber the chairman of the committee, who was there at the time. I remember very clearly that moment.

   But does not the Senator believe that this kind of statement is worth the opportunity for discussion and explanation, that we ought to hear at least what the reality is, that the American people ought to understand, and the parents of those servicemen ought to understand what their children are going to be faced with?

   Does the Senator not agree with me that we have been talking about resolutions, and we ought to be talking about the whole issue of terror, the impact it is going to have on our society--whether we go to war--what the impact is going to be on our servicemen, on the region, and on our future?

   I welcome the Senator's response to the general question about what this debate, to date, has been about, and then the specific issue that has been raised in the newspapers that has to be of central concern to people in relation to authorizing the President to engage in war and the chances of the use of chemical and biological weapons being increased dramatically if Saddam's back is up against a wall in a conflict.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. He has put his finger on several important points, one of which is this: The American people are just now awakening to the fact that the Senate and the House are about to pass a resolution that turns the power of the people, as measured by their elected representatives in Congress, over to a Commander in Chief--the power to determine when to go to war, the power to declare war. They are just now becoming awake to that fact.

   The American people are just now beginning to focus on this. They have not been focused on this. They have not been focused on this. And they are just now beginning to.

   Also, the article that the Senator raises, from today's newspaper, indicates there are many things that have a bearing upon this question that are just now coming to the surface. Organizations, persons, people with expertise, scientists, and so on, are just now beginning to focus, and their story is just now beginning to get through.

   I think we owe it to ourselves. Why would we want to deny ourselves here

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   Here we are faced, under rule XXII, with having to offer our amendments by 1 o'clock today, in the first-degree amendments. Now, I had to rush to get two amendments ready. I have many other matters that are demanding my time. And other Senators are in the same situation, or even worse situations.

   So I plead with the Nation's representatives here in the Senate, with the leadership in the Senate, with the leadership in the other body. I plead with Senators to make every effort to try to get a unanimous consent request to waive this cloture vote on tomorrow.

   We are shortchanging the American people. We are shortchanging ourselves as representatives of the American people. We are shutting ourselves out of the opportunity. And it is no fault of any particular Senator. It is the rule that we are up against here, and only by unanimous consent can we waive it.

   But I plead in the name of the people of this country, in the name of the young men and women whose lives may be put on the line by the decision that this Senate will make tomorrow morning at 10:15. It is too weighty. It is too far-reaching. It is only fair to the people of America, who are going to be asked to give, in some instances, everything they have, if a war ensues.

   I tell you my friends, I don't want that on my conscience, not I. I apologize to Senators who have been standing here waiting.

   I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

   Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield for no more than 5 minutes?

   Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

   Mr. BYRD. Of course, I am entitled to yield for a question, but I would like to yield to the Senator from South Carolina. He has been on his feet.

   Mr. LEVIN. Is the Senator yielding his right to the floor? If so, I would ask that before he does that, he open himself to a question.

   Mr. BYRD. I have no intention of holding the floor. I do intend to offer an amendment, however, before I yield the floor.

   Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator intends to yield the floor before Senator Helms speaks, would the Senator yield for a question first?

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield for a question.

   Mr. LEVIN. My question is this: In addition to the fact that cloture, if invoked, will close off debate and have the effect which has been described here, it has another effect, does it not, which is that amendments following cloture must be strictly germane?

   In preparation for the answer to that question, I want to say the following: The alternative amendment which I intend to offer is an amendment which says we should seek the U.N. to authorize force-to-force inspections, to authorize member states to use force-to-force inspections--in other words, to go multilaterally with force--but does not at this time authorize a go-it-alone approach. That is my alternative.

   My alternative also specifically provides--this is the question----

   Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield, please? Can there be an understanding, when you have completed, that I be recognized for 5 minutes? I won't take that long. Would that be agreeable with the Senator?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CARPER). Is there objection to the unanimous consent request?

   Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object, I would simply request that after the Senator from North Carolina has spoken, I be recognized.

   Mr. McCAIN. I object.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

   Mr. LEVIN. The rest of my question is this----

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent request of the Senator from North Carolina?

   Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. LEVIN. The alternative resolution which I intend to offer has a provision in it which will be prohibited from being included if cloture is invoked because even though it is obviously relevant to this debate, it is not strictly germane under our rules. I want to ask the Senator about this.

   Part of my alternative resolution says: Let us go to the U.N. Let us go together. Let us go multilaterally. Let's have the strength of the world community behind us because it avoids a lot of negative consequences and gives us great strength in proceeding against Saddam to go with the world. But part of my resolution is that Congress would not adjourn sine die so that the Congress could resume session, if necessary, to promptly consider proposals relative to Iraq if,

   in the judgment of the President, the U.N. Security Council does not promptly act on a resolution to enforce inspections. That is an important part of the resolution that I intend to offer.

   But is it not true, I ask my good friend from West Virginia, if that part of the resolution is ruled not strictly germane, although it is obviously relevant, that means I would not be able to offer the resolution in that form? And is that also not a very negative result of cloture being invoked? Does that not deny us an opportunity to vote on something which is so important to this debate?

   Mr. BYRD. It is, indeed, most unfortunate.

   Mr. LEVIN. I will be offering the resolution in two forms: One that contains this important language which would fall if cloture is invoked; one that does not contain it, which it seems to me would then be denying the Senate an opportunity to consider, debate, deliberate a full alternative to the President's go-it-alone approach.

   Mr. BYRD. That is one of the penalties this Chamber will pay, that the Senator will pay, that the American people will pay as a result of a rule, a rule which I support and have supported. But here we are, caught in a situation where without adequate debate, we have been pushed to a cloture vote in the drive--and I don't mean to criticize any person, it is a stampede--in the drive to have this decision made before the Members of Congress go home for the November elections.

   Mr. WARNER. Could I reply to the Senator from Michigan?

   Mr. BYRD. That is less than 4 weeks away. It is most unfortunate.

   Mr. WARNER. May I ask the Senator from Michigan a simple question?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor.

   Mr. WARNER. Could I just ask the Senator from Michigan a simple question? Did you not have the right to offer an amendment on Friday, Monday, Tuesday? That question has been open to the Senator.

   Mr. BYRD. I am going to give up the floor very shortly.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous consent request earlier, the Senator from North Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes, once the Senator from West Virginia has concluded.

   Mr. LEVIN. I believe there was only debate on Friday and Monday, no amendments. I am informed, debate only.

   Mr. McCAIN. I would ask my colleagues, please, let's observe the rules of the Senate.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor.

   AMENDMENT NO. 4868 TO AMENDMENT NO. 4856, AS MODIFIED

   Mr. BYRD. Before I yield the floor, I call up amendment No. 4868 and ask that it be stated by the clerk.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

   The legislative clerk read as follows:

   The Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Byrd] proposes an amendment numbered 4868 to amendment No. 4856, as modified:

    At the appropriate place, insert the following:

   SEC. 5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

    Nothing in this joint resolution--

    (1) is intended to alter the constitutional authorities of the Congress to declare war, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, or other authorities invested in Congress by Section 8, Article I of the Constitution; or

    (2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President to use the United States Armed Forces for any purpose not directly related to a clear threat of imminent, sudden, and direct attack upon the United States, its possessions or territories, or the Armed Forces of the United States, unless the Congress of the United States otherwise authorizes.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

   Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, point of inquiry?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from North Carolina yield?

   Mr. HELMS. I yield for that purpose.

   Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from North Carolina, I be recognized, following the----

   Mr. McCAIN. I object. I will seek and obtain recognition after the Senator from North Carolina.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

   Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Arizona be recognized, after which I be recognized following the Senator from Nebraska, and I think the Senator from Connecticut.

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would like to know what the request is. What is the request?

   Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, who has the floor?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has the floor and he yielded to the Senator from Massachusetts for an inquiry.

   Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I used to be a sports writer. I know what freezing the ball is doing.

   I ask that it be in order for me to make my short statement seated at my desk.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the most fundamental and painful of decisions--whether to authorize the President to send U.S. military personnel to war--is being confronted by the Senate today, previous days, and maybe more days. I believe the decision is in good hands.

   I have had the privilege of serving in this body for nearly 30 years. The men and women in this chamber are the respected servants of the American people. I have faith in my fellow Senators.

   For 3 days in August and 2 days in September, the Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony on the possibility of American military action against Iraq. We heard 23 witnesses, including current and former Secretaries of State, former National Security Advisors, a number of experts on Iraq from academia and from prominent research institutes, an important defector from Iraq's nuclear weapons program, retired senior level military officers, and former members of U.N. inspections teams in Iraq.

   The chairman of the committee, Senator BIDEN, deserves our thanks for conducting these hearings in a fair and comprehensive manner.

   The hearings established some fundamental points that deserve repeating here on the floor.

   First, the threat posed by the Iraqi regime to American national security is serious and growing. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified that after U.N. inspectors were banished by Iraq in 1998, ``..... the risk that Saddam Hussein will succeed in reconstituting deliverable weapons of mass destruction has increased. It is in the interest not only of the United States but also of the entire international community to act.''

   Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nationals Richard Holbrooke similarly stated: ``in my view, Saddam is even more dangerous than [former Serbian leader Slobodan] Milosevic, given his continuing quest for weapons of mass destruction. Left alone, he will only seek to become stronger.''

   Now, neither of these two eminent individuals share all of President Bush's foreign policy priorities. But both concede that the threat is real, and growing.

   Second, three former high-ranking members of the U.N. Special Commission agreed that inspections will fail to stop Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction. Charles Deulfer stated that, in his opinion, inspections ``are only a short term palliative and do not address the fundamental problem. Saddam knows this.''

   Ambassador Robert Gallucci noted that ``We can assume that any regime that appeared as though it would be effective in blocking Iraqi WMD acquisition would also be resisted by Iraq.

   Therefore, the only way to impose such a regime short of war would be to pose to Iraq the credible alternative of a prompt invasion and regime change if the inspection regime change if the inspection regime resisted.''

   Lastly, Ambassador Richard Butler, the former head of the inspections team, warned that inspections were doomed to fail if Saddam succeeds once again in what Butler calls the ``shell game--phony inspections, more deceit, more concealment.'' ``That would,'' he concluded, ``be deeply dangerous, providing an illusion of security.''

   Third, a variety of witnesses, including Secretary Powell, agreed that containment of the Iraq threat, our policy since the end of Operation Desert Storm, is no longer suitable.

   Secretary Powell told the committee that the box that contains Saddam Hussein's murderous ambitions cannot last much longer. Secretary Powell, said, ``[Saddam] continues to bounce against the walls of that box. And one of these days he'll have a box cutter and he'll be out. And we don't want to wait and see that day.''

   Ambassador Butler also suggested that containment no longer works. He told the committee, ``we also need a specific solution to the specific problems posed by this particular and, I suggest, unique outlaw.'' Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, and Dr. Khidir Hamza, former Iraqi nuclear weapons designer, all noted Saddam's absolute commitment to the development of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.

   Secretary Weinberger also noted that Saddam's ability to smuggle goods in and out of Iraq, despite U.N. sanctions, earns him billions of dollars per year--money that goes to develop weapons of mass destruction.

   In hearings before other committees, our able Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has pointed out that the problem is not inspections but disarmament. Saddam has succeeded in circumventing sanctions and containment to the point where we no longer have the luxury of waiting idly by while he continues to develop the means to threaten us and our allies.

   The President's policy is the only way to deal with Iraq today, and we are obliged to give him maximum flexibility to carry it out. Even as the President develops a coalition, we cannot yield to a few countries like China or Russia that would allow Saddam to evade full disarmament.

   We can no longer countenance Saddam's delays and obfuscations. The President, in his speech to the Nation Monday night, articulated a series of options to deal with the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He displayed the essence of leadership, moving forward in the face of evil. Diplomacy absent demonstrated resolve--which was our policy too often in the past--will continue to prove absolutely ineffectual.

   I do hope Senators will stand with the President today. He has shown the leadership necessary to rid the world of Saddam Hussein. We should demonstrate that same leadership and authorize the President to do what is now so clearly necessary.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada is recognized.

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, we are trying to set up a couple of speakers on that side, and we are not going to go any more in advance of that. We should tell everybody that, after cloture is invoked, people still will have an opportunity to speak. It is not as if this is the last train out of the station. If people feel inclined to speak, they can do so.

   The leader will stay in session as long as people want to speak tonight. I ask unanimous consent that Senator McCain be recognized for 20 minutes; Senator Kerry, up to 45 minutes--he said he may not use all of that time--Senator Hagel, for 25 minutes; Senator Dodd, for 20 minutes.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could we entertain the desire of the Senator from Kansas to speak?

   Mr. REID. The Democrats have used 20 minutes more during this time than the Republicans, so how long would Senator Roberts speak?

   Mr. ROBERTS. About 20 minutes.

   Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Roberts may speak after Senator Dodd for 20 minutes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The Senator from Arizona is recognized.

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   Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, a lot of ground was covered in the time between the last vote and the time that I have been recognized, not necessarily in a structured fashion. I want to respond to some of the questions and comments that were made.

   First of all, very importantly, the Senator from West Virginia made an impassioned plea that we not vote for cloture, not move forward with the disposition of this resolution supporting the President of the United States of America to take action, if necessary, to bring about an elimination of the threat to the U.S. national security.

   I think it is worthy of a couple of observations, Mr. President. One is, in the recent past the Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous hearings and the Armed Services Committee has held numerous hearings. In reality, though, this issue has been with us for 11 years, and it is not possible to turn on your television set without seeing a discussion and debate over this issue. The night before last, the President of the United States spoke to the people of this country on this issue. Debate is taking place in the U.N. There are discussions in the U.N. Security Council as we speak. This issue, more than any other today, is known to the American people. As we, their representatives, debate and discuss it, it is to further inform them; but they are clearly aware of the major aspects of this issue.

   Since the year 1992, we have begun to be aware that Saddam Hussein would not be overthrown.

   We became even more aware over time that he was not going to comply with the cease-fire agreements he entered into and the Security Council resolutions requiring him to allow intrusive and comprehensive weapons inspections throughout his country.

   His obfuscation, his delay, his outright refusal to allow these inspections culminated in 1998 in ejecting those inspectors, and that resulted in the passage of legislation on August 14, 1998, which President Clinton signed into law, S.J. Res. 54, which declared that the Government of Iraq was in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations, and urged the President:

   to take appropriate action in accordance with the Constitution and relative laws of the United States to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.

   On October 31, 1998, then-President Clinton signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act, which stated:

   It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a domestic government to replace that regime.

   That was October 31, 1998, the Iraq Liberation Act, signed into law by the President of the United States.

   I have to say allegations or assertions that somehow the American people are not aware of this issue just do not ring true. Anyone who believes this issue is not being debated around kitchen tables and in restaurants and other social gathering places throughout America is simply not aware of what is going on in America.

   Yes, they pay attention to this debate, but the issue is well known, and there is no reason why we should not invoke cloture.

   It was interesting to me that my colleague from Virginia mentioned we really only spent 2 days of formal debate on the floor of the Senate in 1991. The Senator from Connecticut and I were heavily involved in that debate. But the fact is, that issue was debated far and wide. By the time that vote was taken, the American people and the Members of this body were very well aware--very well aware--as to what was at stake and what, at that time, was a far more controversial issue than this one is, if you accept our predictions of an overwhelming vote.

   The Senator from Massachusetts asked the Senator from West Virginia if he knew about the stories carried in this morning's papers about Saddam Hussein being likely to use weapons of mass destruction if he is attacked.

   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement by George Tenet be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   Statement by DCI George Tenet

   There is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam's growing threat and the view as expressed by the President in his speech. Although we think the chances of Saddam initiating a WMD attack at this moment are low--in part because it would constitute an admission that the possesses WMD--there is no question that the likelihood of Saddam using WMD against the United States or our allies in the region for blackmail, deterrence, or otherwise grows as his arsenal continues to build. His past use of WMD against civilian and military targets shows that he produces those weapons to use not just to deter.

   Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I do not want to go through the whole debate again, but here is the point. Saddam Hussein continues to acquire, amass, and improve on his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. He continues to attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon. These are all well-known facts. So if you believe that Saddam Hussein, after we go through this expression of approval, national debate, Security Council resolutions, is not going to abandon his request for his weapons, then the longer we wait, the more dangerous he becomes. In other words, if we attack Iraq tomorrow--and that is not clear yet; we have Security Council resolutions to go through--perhaps Saddam Hussein in his desperation may want to use a weapon of mass destruction, but if Saddam Hussein does not comply and continues the clear record of violations he has amassed over the last 11 years, then if we have to remove these weapons of mass destruction, each day that goes by he becomes more dangerous, his capabilities become better, and, in the case of nuclear weapons, it is not a question of whether, it is a question of when.

   Experts will debate whether it is 2 years when he acquires these weapons, whether it is 5 years, 7 years, 10 years, but there is no doubt over time he will acquire a nuclear weapon.

   Why do I mention a nuclear weapon? We have equipment that can protect our men and women in the military against biological and chemical attack. It is tough to fight, it is bulky equipment, but we do have that equipment. We have not invented any equipment yet that can protect our troops from a nuclear weapon.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

   Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments the Senator has made. I think they are right on target. Is there any reason from history or evidence to believe Saddam Hussein is developing these weapons of mass destruction for defensive purposes? Isn't the thought he might use them against someone else if attacked indication he would use them offensively as soon as he feels the opportunity to do so?

   Mr. McCAIN. I say to my friend, it is very clear he is not developing these weapons for defensive purposes. He has used them twice--once against his own people, once against troops of a neighboring country in a conflict.

   The fundamental point that seems to be lost in this debate sometimes is at any time in the last 11 years, Saddam Hussein could have avoided any threat to Saddam Hussein's illegitimate, terrible regime. It is a terrible and odious regime, but there are lots of bad guys around the world. He could have eliminated any threat if he had just come clean, taken out

   these weapons of mass destruction, taken out the laboratories, stopped, allowed the inspectors in, so he must have some other agenda. The longer we delay when he is in noncompliance, the more dangerous that threat becomes.

   There was no contradiction, in my view, of the comments of the Director of the CIA that were widely quoted in the media this morning. I can understand, by the way, without knowledge of Saddam Hussein, without the background we have of his record, without the knowledge of what he has tried to do over the last 11 years, why those comments might be misconstrued. But taken in the context of the history of this despot, I think it is very clear that if he fails to comply--and we are going to the United Nations and there will be a Security Council resolution or resolutions--then obviously the longer we delay, if he continues on this reckless path, the more dangerous it becomes and, frankly, the more casualties accrue, in response to the Senator from West Virginia.

   I wish to make another comment about this debate. There is no Member of this body who has any priority or

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   I think it is important for the Senator from West Virginia to appreciate that I and others will object to any unanimous consent agreement that would delay a cloture vote tomorrow morning. We believe the American people have been informed, and the Members of this body have been informed.

   As the Senator from Virginia said, Friday we had debate, and we will, according to the majority leader, stay as late or as long as anybody in this body wants to talk or debate or discuss.

   With all due respect to the Senator from West Virginia, we will object.

   Mr. President, we are trying to dispose of 13 amendments. Obviously, people want to speak. I respect that, but I do feel compelled to comment on the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia briefly.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could I ask a brief question before the Senator proceeds to the amendment?

   Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to yield to the Senator.

   Mr. WARNER. Our colleague from Connecticut raises a very valuable question: Is he manufacturing these weapons of mass destruction for the defense of his sovereign nation? The clearest evidence this Senator finds to show that he is not doing that is the excessive amounts.

   During the inspection regime, while it was somewhat functional in the early 1990s, they discovered records of clearly documented biological and chemical weaponry that had been made. To this day, it has never been unearthed, never been discovered, never been acknowledged by Saddam Hussein.

   So the question is important, and the Senator from Arizona answered it very carefully. I suggest that those who have any doubt address the excess quantities of all of these weapons. And for what reason would he need a nuclear weapon? That is a question to which none of us have an answer.

   Mr. McCAIN. I thank my friend from Virginia.

   Mr. President, now I will make a few brief comments about the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia.

   The amendment is to provide constitutional authorities to the President of the United States. In the heart of the amendment, it says the President of the United States cannot use the Armed Forces for any purposes not directly related to a clear threat of imminent, sudden, and direct attack upon the United States, its possessions or territories.

   If this were 100 years ago, at the time of my hero, Theodore Roosevelt, who was ready to send the Great White Fleet around the world, I would vote for this amendment in a New York minute because 100 years ago we had two oceans to protect us. One hundred years ago, we did not have in this world weapons of mass destruction that could strike continents away, travel thousands of miles and strike with incredible accuracy. We did not have a threat from a group of people who are yet somewhat unknown to us, who want to destroy our culture, who want to destroy our values, and indeed everything about Western civilization. They travel sometimes in secret without us being able to detect them, in the case of September 11, until too late.

   One hundred years ago, we had two oceans to protect us. We knew who our enemies might be, either real or potential, and we could afford to wait until there was an imminent, sudden, or direct attack upon the United States, its possessions or territories. Then I would have supported this amendment.

   The fact is, we all know if we wait until there is a direct attack on the United States of America, we pay a very heavy price. I hope the Senator from West Virginia, who I am sorry is not in the Chamber, would have appreciated that lesson from September 11; that we cannot wait until there is a direct, imminent, or sudden attack upon the United States of America. That is why if this amendment were to pass, it would completely prevent the President of the United States of America from addressing a clear and present danger to the United States of America in the form of Saddam Hussein's inventory of weapons of mass destruction.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

   Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator makes a good series of points about the pending amendment introduced by the Senator from West Virginia.

   We have language in our resolution that authorizes the President to take action to protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat from Iraq. I must say that in my opinion, and I ask the Senator for his reaction, the terms that the Senator from West Virginia has stated are literally being met now for this reason: As my friend from Arizona well knows, the Armed Forces of the United States are under direct attack from Iraq as they fly along with their British colleagues to enforce the no-fly zone.

   Approximately 7,500 American men and women in uniform are dispatched there, costing the American taxpayer a billion or more dollars a year. This year alone, there have been more than 400 occasions on which Iraqi forces have fired at the Armed Forces of the United States.

   Of course, I am opposed to this amendment, but I ask the Senator from Arizona if he would agree with me that there is a direct attack by Iraq going on right now, not on the United States or its possessions or territories but on the Armed Forces of our country?

   Mr. McCAIN. I respond to my friend and say that, yes, if this amendment said a clear threat of imminent, sudden, or direct attack upon the Armed Forces of the United States, clearly that is the case. We saw it in the USS Cole. We saw it in the attacks on our embassies. We have seen it in many places.

   If there has to be a clear threat of imminent, sudden, and direct attack upon the United States, its possessions, or territories, in all due respect, I think Saddam Hussein would be very pleased if we passed this kind of resolution because that would allow him to continue to build up his inventory, to build his weapons of mass destruction, perhaps acquire a missile with sufficient range to reach the United States, and only then could we respond. That is not what I think our responsibilities and duties are to the American people.

   I am enjoying this debate. I think it is a good one. I look forward to hearing the next two speakers because both of them have played a very important and informative role, not only on the floor of the Senate but on talk shows and great programs throughout America, both written and in public.

   In fact, some of them have been accused of what I have been accused of from time to time, and that is seeking a camera, which is, of course, never true of me or my two colleagues.

   I certainly look forward to listening to their arguments. I think these next two speakers will contribute enormously to the debate. I think the American people, as well as our colleagues, will be better informed at the completion of their remarks.

   I yield back the remainder of my time.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for up to 45 minutes.

   Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Arizona for his introduction and for his generous comments about the role that Senator Hagel and I have played.

   My colleague, Senator Hagel, and I share seats on the Foreign Relations Committee. We have both followed this issue for a long period of time.

   Obviously, with respect to an issue that might take Americans to war, we deserve time, and there is no more important debate to be had on the floor of the Senate. It is in the greatest traditions of this institution, and I am proud to take part in that debate now.

   This is a debate that should be conducted without regard to parties, to politics, to labels. It is a debate that has to come from the gut of each and every Member, and I am confident that it does. I know for Senator Hagel, Senator McCain, and myself, when we pick up the newspapers and read about the residuals of the Vietnam war, there is a particular sensitivity because I do not think any of us feel a residual with respect to the choices we are making now.

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   I know for myself back in that period of time, even as I protested the war, I wrote that if my Nation was again threatened and Americans made the decision we needed to defend ourselves, I would be among the first to put on a uniform again and go and do that.

   We are facing a very different world today than we have ever faced before. September 11 changed a lot, but other things have changed: Globalization, technology, a smaller planet, the difficulties of radical fundamentalism, the crosscurrents of religion and politics. We are living in an age where the dangers are different and they require a different response, different thinking, and different approaches than we have applied in the past.

   Most importantly, it is a time when international institutions must rise to the occasion and seek new authority and a new measure of respect.

   In approaching the question of this resolution, I wish the timing were different. I wish for the sake of the country we were not here now at this moment. There are legitimate questions about that timing. But none of the underlying realities of the threat, none of the underlying realities of the choices we face are altered because they are, in fact, the same as they were in 1991 when we discovered those weapons when the teams went in, and in 1998 when the teams were kicked out.

   With respect to Saddam Hussein and the threat he presents, we must ask ourselves a simple question: Why? Why is Saddam Hussein pursuing weapons that most nations have agreed to limit or give up? Why is Saddam Hussein guilty of breaking his own cease-fire agreement with the international community? Why is Saddam Hussein attempting to develop nuclear weapons when most nations don't even try, and responsible nations that have them attempt to limit their potential for disaster? Why did Saddam Hussein threaten and provoke? Why does he develop missiles that exceed allowable limits? Why did Saddam Hussein lie and deceive the inspection teams previously? Why did Saddam Hussein not account for all of the weapons of mass destruction which UNSCOM identified? Why is he seeking to develop unmanned airborne vehicles for delivery of biological agents?

   Does he do all of these things because he wants to live by international standards of behavior? Because he respects international law? Because he is a nice guy underneath it all and the world should trust him?

   It would be naive to the point of grave danger not to believe that, left to his own devices, Saddam Hussein will provoke, misjudge, or stumble into a future, more dangerous confrontation with the civilized world. He has as much as promised it. He has already created a stunning track record of miscalculation. He miscalculated an 8-year war with Iran. He miscalculated the invasion of Kuwait. He miscalculated America's responses to it. He miscalculated the result of setting oil rigs on fire. He miscalculated the impact of sending Scuds into Israel. He miscalculated his own military might. He miscalculated the Arab world's response to his plight. He miscalculated in attempting an assassination of a former President of the United States. And he is miscalculating now America's judgments about his miscalculations.

   All those miscalculations are compounded by the rest of history. A brutal, oppressive dictator, guilty of personally murdering and condoning murder and torture, grotesque violence against women, execution of political opponents, a war criminal who used chemical weapons against another nation and, of course, as we know, against his own people, the Kurds. He has diverted funds from the Oil-for-Food program, intended by the international community to go to his own people. He has supported and harbored terrorist groups, particularly radical Palestinian groups such as Abu Nidal, and he has given money to families of suicide murderers in Israel.

   I mention these not because they are a cause to go to war in and of themselves, as the President previously suggested, but because they tell a lot about the threat of the weapons of mass destruction and the nature of this man. We should not go to war because these things are in his past, but we should be prepared to go to war because of what they tell us about the future. It is the total of all of these acts that provided the foundation for the world's determination in 1991 at the end of the gulf war that Saddam Hussein must:

   ..... unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless underinternational supervision of his chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems ..... [and] unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon-usable material.

   Saddam Hussein signed that agreement. Saddam Hussein is in office today because of that agreement. It is the only reason he survived in 1991. In 1991, the world collectively made a judgment that this man should not have weapons of mass destruction. And we are here today in the year 2002 with an uninspected 4-year interval during which time we know through intelligence he not only has kept them, but he continues to grow them.

   I believe the record of Saddam Hussein's ruthless, reckless breach of international values and standards of behavior which is at the core of the cease-fire agreement, with no reach, no stretch, is cause enough for the world community to hold him accountable by use of force, if necessary. The threat of Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction is real, but as I said, it is not new. It has been with us since the end of that war, and particularly in the last 4 years we know after Operation Desert Fox failed to force him to reaccept them, that he has continued to build those weapons.

   He has had a free hand for 4 years to reconstitute these weapons, allowing the world, during the interval, to lose the focus we had on weapons of mass destruction and the issue of proliferation.

   The Senate worked to urge action in early 1998. I joined with Senator McCain, Senator Hagel, and other Senators, in a resolution urging the President to ``take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end his weapons of mass destruction program.'' That was 1998 that we thought we needed a more serious response.

   Later in the year, Congress enacted legislation declaring Iraq in material, unacceptable breach of its disarmament obligations and urging the President to take appropriate action to bring Iraq into compliance. In fact, had we done so, President Bush could well have taken his office, backed by our sense of urgency about holding Saddam Hussein accountable and, with an international United Nations, backed a multilateral stamp of approval record on a clear demand for the disarmament of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. We could have had that and we would not be here debating this today. But the administration missed an opportunity 2 years ago and particularly a year ago after September 11. They regrettably, and even clumsily, complicated their own case. The events of September 11 created new understanding of the terrorist threat and the degree to which every nation is vulnerable.

   That understanding enabled the administration to form a broad and impressive coalition against terrorism. Had the administration tried then to capitalize on this unity of spirit to build a coalition to disarm Iraq, we would not be here in the pressing days before an election, late in this year, debating this now. The administration's decision to engage on this issue now, rather than a year ago or earlier, and the manner in which it has engaged, has politicized and complicated the national debate and raised questions about the credibility of their case.

   By beginning its public discourse with talk of invasion and regime change, the administration raised doubts about their bona fides on the most legitimate justification for war--that in the post-September 11 world the unrestrained threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein is unacceptable, and his refusal to allow U.N. inspectors to return was in blatant violation of the 1991 cease-fire agreement that left him in power. By casting about in an unfocused, undisciplined, overly public, internal debate for a rationale for war, the administration complicated their case, confused the American public, and compromised America's credibility in the eyes of the world community. By engaging in hasty war talk rather than focusing on the central issue of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, the administration placed doubts in the

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   Against this disarray, it is not surprising that tough questions began to be asked and critics began to emerge.

   Indeed over the course of the last 6 weeks some of the strongest and most thoughtful questioning of our Nation's Iraq policy has come from what some observers would say are unlikely sources: Senators like CHUCK HAGEL and DICK LUGAR, former Bush Administration national security experts including Brent Scowcroft and James Baker, and distinguished military voices including General Shalikashvili. They are asking the tough questions which must be answered before--and not after--you commit a nation to a course that may well lead to war. They know from their years of experience, whether on the battlefield as soldiers, in the Senate, or at the highest levels of public diplomacy, that you build the consent of the American people to sustain military confrontation by asking questions, not avoiding them. Criticism and questions do not reflect a lack of patriotism--they demonstrate the strength and core values of our American democracy.

   It is love of country, and it is defined by defense of those policies that protect and defend our country.

   Writing in the New York Times in early September, I argued that the American people would never accept the legitimacy of this war or give their consent to it unless the administration first presented detailed evidence of the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and proved that it had exhausted all other options to protect our national security. I laid out a series of steps that the administration must take for the legitimacy of our cause and our ultimate success in Iraq--seek the advice and approval of Congress after laying out the evidence and making the case, and work with our allies to seek full enforcement of the existing cease-fire agreement while simultaneously offering Iraq a clear ultimatum: accept rigorous inspections without negotiation or compromise and without condition.

   Those of us who have offered questions and criticisms--and there are many in this body and beyond--can take heart in the fact that those questions and those criticisms have had an impact on the debate. They have changed how we may or may not deal with Iraq. The Bush administration began talking about Iraq by suggesting that congressional consultation and authorization for the use of force were not needed. Now they are consulting with Congress and seeking our authorization. The administration began this process walking down a path of unilateralism. Today they acknowledge that while we reserve the right to act alone, it is better to act with allies. The administration which once seemed entirely disengaged from the United Nations ultimately went to the United Nations and began building international consensus to hold Saddam Hussein accountable. The administration began this process suggesting that the United States might well go to war over Saddam Hussein's failure to return Kuwaiti property. Last week the Secretary of State and on Monday night the President made clear we would go to war only to disarm Iraq.

   The administration began discussion of Iraq by almost belittling the importance of arms inspections. Today the administration has refocused their aim and made clear we are not in an arbitrary conflict with one of the world's many dictators, but a conflict with a dictator whom the international community left in power only because he agreed not to pursue weapons of mass destruction. That is why arms inspections--and I believe ultimately Saddam's unwillingness to submit to fail-safe inspections--is absolutely critical in building international support for our case to the world.

   That is the way in which you make it clear to the world that we are contemplating war not for war's sake, and not to accomplish goals that don't meet international standards or muster with respect to national security, but because weapons inspections may be the ultimate enforcement mechanism, and that may be the way in which we ultimately protect ourselves.

   I am pleased that the Bush administration has recognized the wisdom of shifting its approach on Iraq. That shift has made it possible, in my judgment, for the Senate to move forward with greater unity, having asked and begun to answer the questions that best defend our troops and protect our national security. The Senate can now make a determination about this resolution and, in this historic vote, help put our country and the world on a course to begin to answer one fundamental question--not whether to hold Saddam Hussein accountable, but how.

   I have said publicly for years that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein pose a real and grave threat to our security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. Saddam Hussein's record bears this out.

   I have talked about that record. Iraq never fully accounted for the major gaps and inconsistencies in declarations provided to the inspectors of the pre-Gulf war weapons of mass destruction program, nor did the Iraq regime provide credible proof that it had completely destroyed its weapons and production infrastructure.

   He has continually failed to meet the obligations imposed by the international community on Iraq at the end of the Persian Gulf the Iraqi regime provide credible proof war to declare and destroy its weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems and to forego the development of nuclear weapons. during the 7 years of weapons inspections, the Iraqi regime repeatedly frustrated the work of the UNSCOM--Special Commission--inspectors, culminating in 1998 in their ouster. Even during the period of inspections, Iraq never fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in declarations provided to the inspectors of its pre-gulf war WMD programs, nor did the Iraqi regime provide credible proof that it had completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.

   It is clear that in the 4 years since the UNSCOM inspectors were forced out, Saddam Hussein has continued his quest for weapons of mass destruction. According to intelligence, Iraq has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of the

   150 kilometer restriction imposed by the United Nations in the ceasefire resolution. Although Iraq's chemical weapons capability was reduced during the UNSCOM inspections, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort over the last 4 years. Evidence suggests that it has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard gas, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Intelligence reports show that Iraq has invested more heavily in its biological weapons programs over the 4 years, with the result that all key aspects of this program--R&D, production and weaponization--are active. Most elements of the program are larger and more advanced than they were before the gulf war. Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery on a range of vehicles such as bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives which could bring them to the United States homeland. Since inspectors left, the Iraqi regime has energized its missile program, probably now consisting of a few dozen Scud-type missiles with ranges of 650 to 900 kilometers that could hit Israel, Saudi Arabia and other U.S. allies in the region. In addition, Iraq is developing unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs, capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare agents, which could threaten Iraq's neighbors as well as American forces in the Persian Gulf.

   Prior to the gulf war, Iraq had an advance nuclear weapons development program. Although UNSCOM and IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors learned much about Iraq's efforts in this area, Iraq has failed to provide complete information on all aspects of its program. Iraq has maintained its nuclear scientists and technicians as well as sufficient dual-use manufacturing capability to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi defectors who once worked for Iraq's nuclear weapons establishment have reportedly told American officials that acquiring nuclear weapons is a top priority for Saddam Hussein's regime.

   According to the CIA's report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There

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   Absent a foreign supplier, it might be longer. There is no question that Saddam Hussein represents a threat. I have heard even my colleagues who oppose the President's resolution say we have to hold Saddam Hussein accountable. They also say we have to force the inspections. And to force the inspections, you have to be prepared to use force.

   So the issue is not over the question of whether or not the threat is real, or whether or not people agree there is a threat. It is over what means we will take, and when, in order to try to eliminate it.

   The reason for going to war, if we must fight, is not because Saddam Hussein has failed to deliver gulf war prisoners or Kuwaiti property. As much as we decry the way he has treated his people, regime change alone is not a sufficient reason for going to war, as desirable as it is to change the regime.

   Regime change has been an American policy under the Clinton administration, and it is the current policy. I support the policy. But regime change in and of itself is not sufficient justification for going to war--particularly unilaterally--unless regime change is the only way to disarm Iraq of the weapons of mass destruction pursuant to the United Nations resolution.

   As bad as he is, Saddam Hussein, the dictator, is not the cause of war. Saddam Hussein sitting in Baghdad with an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction is a different matter.

   In the wake of September 11, who among us can say, with any certainty, to anybody, that those weapons might not be used against our troops or against allies in the region? Who can say that this master of miscalculation will not develop a weapon of mass destruction even greater--a nuclear weapon--then reinvade Kuwait, push the Kurds out, attack Israel, any number of scenarios to try to further his ambitions to be the pan-Arab leader or simply to confront in the region, and once again miscalculate the response, to believe he is stronger because he has those weapons?

   And while the administration has failed to provide any direct link between Iraq and the events of September 11, can we afford to ignore the possibility that Saddam Hussein might accidentally, as well as purposely, allow those weapons to slide off to one group or other in a region where weapons are the currency of trade? How do we leave that to chance?

   That is why the enforcement mechanism through the United Nations and the reality of the potential of the use of force is so critical to achieve the protection of long-term interests, not just of the United States but of the world, to understand that the dynamic has changed, that we are living in a different status today, that we cannot sit by and be as complacent or even negligent about weapons of mass destruction and proliferation as we have been in the past.

   The Iraqi regime's record over the decade leaves little doubt that Saddam Hussein wants to retain his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and, obviously, as we have said, grow it. These weapons represent an unacceptable threat.

   I want to underscore that this administration began this debate with a resolution that granted exceedingly broad authority to the President to use force. I regret that some in the Congress rushed so quickly to support it. I would have opposed it. It gave the President the authority to use force not only to enforce all of the U.N. resolutions as a cause of war, but also to produce regime change in Iraq, and to restore international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region. It made no mention of the President's efforts at the United Nations or the need to build multilateral support for whatever course of action we ultimately would take.

   I am pleased that our pressure, and the questions we have asked, and the criticisms that have been raised publicly, the debate in our democracy has pushed this administration to adopt important changes, both in language as well as in the promises that they make.

   The revised White House text, which we will vote on, limits the grant of authority to the President to the use of force only with respect to Iraq. It does not empower him to use force throughout the Persian Gulf region. It authorizes the President to use Armed Forces to defend the ``national security'' of the United States--a power most of us believe he already has under the Constitution as Commander in Chief. And it empowers him to enforce all ``relevant'' Security Council resolutions related to Iraq. None of those resolutions or, for that matter, any of the other Security Council resolutions demanding Iraqi compliance with its international obligations, calls for a regime change.

   In recent days, the administration has gone further. They are defining what ``relevant'' U.N. Security Council resolutions mean. When Secretary Powell testified before our committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, on September 26, he was asked what specific U.N. Security Council resolutions the United States would go to war to enforce. His response was clear: the

   resolutions dealing with weapons of mass destruction and the disarmament of Iraq. In fact, when asked about compliance with other U.N. resolutions which do not deal with weapons of mass destruction, the Secretary said:

   The President has not linked authority to go to war to any of those elements.

   When asked why the resolution sent by the President to Congress requested authority to enforce all the resolutions with which Iraq had not complied, the Secretary told the committee:

   That's the way the resolution is currently worded, but we all know, I think, that the major problem, the offense, what the President is focused on and the danger to us and to the world are the weapons of mass destruction.

   In his speech on Monday night, President Bush confirmed what Secretary Powell told the committee. In the clearest presentation to date, the President laid out a strong, comprehensive, and compelling argument why Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs are a threat to the United States and the international community. The President said:

   Saddam Hussein must disarm himself, or, for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.

   This statement left no doubt that the casus belli for the United States will be Iraq's failure to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction.

   I would have preferred that the President agree to the approach drafted by Senators Biden and Lugar because that resolution would authorize the use of force for the explicit purpose of disarming Iraq and countering the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

   The Biden-Lugar resolution also acknowledges the importance of the President's efforts at the United Nations. It would require the President, before exercising the authority granted in the resolution, to send a determination to Congress that the United States tried to seek a new Security Council resolution or that the threat posed by Iraq's WMD is so great he must act absent a new resolution--a power, incidentally, that the President of the United States always has.

   I believe this approach would have provided greater clarity to the American people about the reason for going to war and the specific grant of authority. I think it would have been a better way to do this. But it does not change the bottom line of what we are voting for.

   The administration, unwisely, in my view, rejected the Biden-Lugar approach. But, perhaps as a nod to the sponsors, it did agree to a determination requirement on the status of its efforts at the United Nations. That is now embodied in the White House text.

   The President has challenged the United Nations, as he should, and as all of us in the Senate should, to enforce its own resolutions vis-a-vis Iraq. And his administration is now working aggressively with the Perm 5 members on the Security Council to reach a consensus. As he told the American people Monday night:

   America wants the U.N. to be an effective organization that helps keep the peace. And that is why we are urging the Security Council to adopt a new resolution setting out tough, immediate requirements.

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   Because of my concerns, and because of the need to understand, with clarity, what this resolution meant, I traveled to New York a week ago. I met with members of the Security Council and came away with a conviction that they will indeed move to enforce, that they understand the need to enforce, if Saddam Hussein does not fulfill his obligation to disarm.

   And I believe they made it clear that if the United States operates through the U.N., and through the Security Council, they--all of them--will also bear responsibility for the aftermath of rebuilding Iraq and for the joint efforts to do what we need to do as a consequence of that enforcement.

   I talked to Secretary General Kofi Annan at the end of last week and again felt a reiteration of the seriousness with which the United Nations takes this and that they will respond.

   If the President arbitrarily walks away from this course of action--without good cause or reason--the legitimacy of any subsequent action by the United States against Iraq will be challenged by the American people and the international community. And I would vigorously oppose the President doing so.

   When I vote to give the President of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein, it is because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat, to our security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. I will vote yes because I believe it is the best way to hold Saddam Hussein accountable. And the administration, I believe, is now committed to a recognition that war must be the last option to address this threat, not the first, and that we must act in concert with allies around the globe to make the world's case against Saddam Hussein.

   As the President made clear earlier this week, ``Approving this resolution does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable.'' It means ``America speaks with one voice.''

   Let me be clear, the vote I will give to the President is for one reason and one reason only: To disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, if we cannot accomplish that objective through new, tough weapons inspections in joint concert with our allies.

   In giving the President this authority, I expect him to fulfill the commitments he has made to the American people in recent days--to work with the United Nations Security Council to adopt a new resolution setting out tough and immediate inspection requirements, and to act with our allies at our side if we have to disarm Saddam Hussein by force. If he fails to do so, I will be among the first to speak out.

   If we do wind up going to war with Iraq, it is imperative that we do so with others in the international community, unless there is a showing of a grave, imminent--and I emphasize ``imminent''--threat to this country which requires the President to respond in a way that protects our immediate national security needs.

   Prime Minister Tony Blair has recognized a similar need to distinguish how we approach this. He has said that he believes we should move in concert with allies, and he has promised his own party that he will not do so otherwise. The administration may not be in the habit of building coalitions, but that is what they need to do. And it is what can be done. If we go it alone without reason, we risk inflaming an entire region, breeding a new generation of terrorists, a new cadre of anti-American zealots, and we will be less secure, not more secure, at the end of the day, even with Saddam Hussein disarmed.

   Let there be no doubt or confusion about where we stand on this. I will support a multilateral effort to disarm him by force, if we ever exhaust those other options, as the President has promised, but I will not support a unilateral U.S. war against Iraq unless that threat is imminent and the multilateral effort has not proven possible under any circumstances.

   In voting to grant the President the authority, I am not giving him carte blanche to run roughshod over every country that poses or may pose some kind of potential threat to the United States. Every nation has the right to act preemptively, if it faces an imminent and grave threat, for its self-defense under the standards of law. The threat we face today with Iraq does not meet that test yet. I emphasize ``yet.'' Yes, it is grave because of the deadliness of Saddam Hussein's arsenal and the very high probability that he might use these weapons one day if not disarmed. But it is not imminent, and no one in the CIA, no intelligence briefing we have had suggests it is imminent. None of our intelligence reports suggest that he is about to launch an attack.

   The argument for going to war against Iraq is rooted in enforcement of the international community's demand that he disarm. It is not rooted in the doctrine of preemption. Nor is the grant of authority in this resolution an acknowledgment that Congress accepts or agrees with the President's new strategic doctrine of preemption. Just the opposite. This resolution clearly limits the authority given to the President to use force in Iraq, and Iraq only, and for the specific purpose of defending the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and enforcing relevant Security Council resolutions.

   The definition of purpose circumscribes the authority given to the President to the use of force to disarm Iraq because only Iraq's weapons of mass destruction meet the two criteria

   laid out in this resolution.

   Congressional action on this resolution is not the end of our national debate on how best to disarm Iraq. Nor does it mean we have exhausted all of our peaceful options to achieve this goal. There is much more to be done. The administration must continue its efforts to build support at the United Nations for a new, unfettered, unconditional weapons inspection regime. If we can eliminate the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction through inspections, whenever, wherever, and however we want them, including in palaces--and I am highly skeptical, given the full record, given their past practices, that we can necessarily achieve that--then we have an obligation to try that as the first course of action before we expend American lives in any further effort.

   American success in the Persian Gulf war was enhanced by the creation of an international coalition. Our coalition partners picked up the overwhelming burden of the cost of that war. It is imperative that the administration continue to work to multilateralize the current effort against Iraq. If the administration's initiatives at the United Nations are real and sincere, other nations are more likely to invest, to stand behind our efforts to force Iraq to disarm, be it through a new, rigorous, no-nonsense program of inspection, or if necessary, through the use of force. That is the best way to proceed.

   The United States, without question, has the military power to enter this conflict unilaterally. But we do need friends. We need logistical support such as bases, command and control centers, overflight rights from allies in the region. And most importantly, we need to be able to successfully wage the war on terror simultaneously. That war on terror depends more than anything else on the sharing of intelligence. That sharing of intelligence depends more than anything else on the cooperation of countries in the region. If we disrupt that, we could disrupt the possibilities of the capacity of that war to be most effectively waged.

   I believe the support from the region will come only if they are convinced of the credibility of our arguments and the legitimacy of our mission. The United Nations never has veto power over any measure the United States needs to take to protect our national security. But it is in our interest to try to act with our allies, if at all possible. And that should be because the burden of eliminating the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction should not be ours alone. It should not be the American people's alone.

   If in the end these efforts fail, and if in the end we are at war, we will have an obligation, ultimately, to the Iraqi people with whom we are not at war. This is a war against a regime, mostly one man. So other nations in the region and all of us will need to help create an Iraq that is a place and a force for stability and openness in the region. That effort is going to be long term, costly, and not without difficulty, given Iraq's ethnic and religious divisions and history of domestic turbulence. In Afghanistan, the administration has given more lipservice

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   The challenge is great: An administration which made nation building a dirty word needs to develop a comprehensive, Marshall-type plan, if it will meet the challenge. The President needs to give the American people a fairer and fuller, clearer understanding of the magnitude and long-term financial cost of that effort.

   The international community's support will be critical because we will not be able to rebuild Iraq singlehandedly. We will lack the credibility and the expertise and the capacity.

   It is clear the Senate is about to give the President the authority he has requested sometime in the next days. Whether the President will have to use that authority depends ultimately on Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein has a choice: He can continue to defy the international community, or he can fulfill his longstanding obligations to disarm. He is the person who has brought the world to this brink of confrontation.

   He is the dictator who can end the stalemate simply by following the terms of the agreement which left him in power.

   By standing with the President, Congress would demonstrate our Nation is united in its determination to take away that arsenal, and we are affirming the President's right and responsibility to keep the American people safe. One of the lessons I learned from fighting in a very different war, at a different time, is we need the consent of the American people for our mission to be legitimate and sustainable. I do know what it means, as does Senator Hagel, to fight in a war where that consent is lost, where allies are in short supply, where conditions are hostile, and the mission is ill-defined.

   That is why I believe so strongly before one American soldier steps foot on Iraqi soil, the American people must understand completely its urgency. They need to know we put our country in the position of ultimate strength and that we have no options, short of war, to eliminate a threat we could not tolerate.

   I believe the work we have begun in this Senate, by offering questions, and not blind acquiescence, has helped put our Nation on a responsible course. It has succeeded, certainly, in putting Saddam Hussein on notice that he will be held accountable; but it also has put the administration on notice we will hold them accountable for the means by which we do this.

   It is through constant questioning we will stay the course, and that is a course that will ultimately defend our troops and protect our national security.

   President Kennedy faced a similar difficult challenge in the days of the Cuban missile crisis. He decided not to proceed, I might add, preemptively. He decided to show the evidence and proceeded through the international institutions. He said at the time:

   The path we have chosen is full of hazards, as all paths are ..... The cost of freedom is always high, but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender, or submission.

   So I believe the Senate will make it clear, and the country will make it clear, that we will not be blackmailed or extorted by these weapons, and we will not permit the United Nations--an institution we have worked hard to nurture and create--to simply be ignored by this dictator.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. CANTWELL). Under the previous order, the Senator from Nebraska is recognized.

   Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, the Senate is, by design, a deliberative institution. Over this past week, we have witnessed thoughtful debate and commentary on how to meet the challenge of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Ours is not an academic exercise; debate informs our decision whether to authorize the President to use force if necessary to enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions dealing with Iraqi disarmament.

   There are no easy answers in Iraq. The decision to commit our troops to war is the most difficult decision Members of Congress make. Each course of action we consider in Iraq leads us into imperfect, dangerous, and unknown situations. But we cannot avoid decision on Iraq. The President cannot avoid decision on Iraq. The risks of inaction are too high. We are elected to solve problems, not just debate them. The time has come to chart a new course in Iraq and in the Middle East.

   History informs our debate and our decisions. We know tyranny cannot be appeased. We also know our power and influence are enhanced by both a nobility of purpose and the support of allies and institutions that reinforce an international commitment to peace and prosperity. We know war has its own dynamic, that it favors neither ideology, nor democracy, nor tyranny, that men and women die, and that nations and individuals who know war are never again the same.

   President Bush has rightly brought the case against Iraq back before the United Nations. Our problems with Iraq, as well as terrorism and the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are not America's alone. Israel, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq's own Kurdish population, and other nations and peoples are on the front lines of Saddam Hussein's ambitions for weapons of mass death.

   The United Nations, with American leadership, must act decisively to end Saddam Hussein's decade-long violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions.

   America's best case for the possible use of force against Iraq rests with the American and international commitment to enforcing Iraq's disarmament. The diplomatic process is not easy, and we face the competing interests and demands of Russia, France, China, and others, whose interests in Iraq may not always be the same as ours. A regional and international coalition is essential for creating the political environment that will be required for any action we take in Iraq, and especially for how we sustain a democratic transition in a post-Saddam Iraq. We cannot do it alone.

   America--including the Congress--and the world, must speak with one voice about Iraqi disarmament, as it must continue to do so in the war on terrorism.

   Because the stakes are so high, America must be careful with her rhetoric and mindful of how others perceive her intentions. Actions in Iraq must come in the context of an American-led, multilateral approach to disarmament, not as the first case for a new American doctrine involving the preemptive use of force. America's challenge in this new century will be to strengthen its relationships around the world while leading the world in our war on terrorism, for it is the success of the first challenge that will determine the success of the second. We should not mistake our foreign policy priorities for ideology in a rush to proclaim a new doctrine in world affairs. America must understand it cannot alone win a war against terrorism. It will require allies, friends, and partners.

   American leadership in the world will be further defined by our actions in Iraq and the Middle East. What begins in Iraq will not end in Iraq. There will be other ``Iraqs.'' There will be continued acts of terrorism, proliferating powers, and regional conflicts. If we do it right and lead through the U.N., in concert with our allies, we can set a new standard for American leadership and international cooperation. The perception of American power is power, and how our power is perceived can either magnify or diminish our influence in the world. The Senate has a constitutional responsibility and an institutional obligation in this effort.

   Federalist Paper No. 63 specifically notes the responsibilities of the Senate in foreign affairs as follows:

   An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: The one is that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is that, in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can always be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?

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   Remarkable words. The resolution before us today should be tried in that same light as the Federalist Papers points out. The original resolution proposed by the Bush administration, S.J. Res. 45, would have been a setback for this institution. It did not reflect the best democratic traditions of either Congressional-Executive relations, or the conduct of American foreign policy.

   S.J. Res. 46, sponsored by Senators LIEBERMAN, WARNER, MCCAIN, and BAYH, is a far more responsible and accountable document than the one we started with 3 weeks ago. I congratulate my colleagues, especially Senators LUGAR, BIDEN, and DASCHLE, and the four sponsors of this resolution, for their efforts and leadership in getting it to this point.

   S.J. Res. 46 narrows the authorization for the use of force to all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq, and to defending our national interests against the threats posed by Iraq. It includes support for U.S. diplomatic efforts at the U.N.; a requirement that, before taking action, the President formally determines that diplomatic or other peaceful means will not be adequate in meeting our objectives;

   reference to the war powers resolution requirements; and periodic reports to Congress that include those actions described in the section of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 regarding assistance and support for Iraq upon replacement of Saddam Hussein. This resolution recognizes Congress as a coequal partner in dealing with the threat from Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

   If disarmament in Iraq requires the use of force, we need to consider carefully the implications and consequences of our actions. The future of Iraq after Saddam Hussein is also an open question. Some of my colleagues and some American analysts now speak authoritatively of Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds in Iraq, and how Iraq can be a test case for democracy in the Arab world.

   How many of us really know and understand much about Iraq, the country, the history, the people, the role in the Arab world? I approach the issue of post-Saddam Iraq and the future of democracy and stability in the Middle East with more caution, realism, and a bit more humility. While the people of the Arab world need no education from America about Saddam's record of deceit, aggression, and brutality, and while many of them may respect and desire the freedoms the American model offers, imposing democracy through force in Iraq is a roll of the dice. A democratic effort cannot be maintained without building durable Iraqi political institutions and developing a regional and international commitment to Iraq's reconstruction. No small task.

   To succeed, our commitment must extend beyond the day after to the months and years after Saddam is gone. The American people must be told of this long-term commitment, risk, and costs of this undertaking.

   We should not be seduced by the expectations of ``dancing in the streets'' after Saddam's regime has fallen, the kites, the candy, and cheering crowds we expect to greet our troops, but instead, focus on the great challenges ahead, the commitment and resources that will be needed to ensure a democratic transition in Iraq and a more stable and peaceful Middle East. We should spend more time debating the cost and extent of this commitment, the risks we may face in military engagement with Iraq, the implications of the precedent of United States military action for regime change, and the likely character and challenges of a post-Saddam Iraq. We have heard precious little from the President, his team, as well as from this Congress, with a few notable exceptions, about these most difficult and critical questions.

   We need only look to Afghanistan where the Afghan people joyously welcomed our liberation force but, months later, a fragile transition government grapples with rebuilding a fractured political culture, economy, and country.

   However, Iraq, because of its resources, geography, capabilities, history, and people, offers even more complications and greater peril and, yes, greater opportunities and greater promise. This is the vast unknown, the heavy burden that lies ahead.

   The Senate should not cast a vote in the hopes of putting Iraq behind us so we can get back to our campaigns or move on to other issues next year. The decision to possibly commit a nation to war cannot and should not ever be considered in the context of either party loyalty or campaign politics. I regret that this vote will take place under the cloud and pressure of elections next month. Some are already using the Iraq issue to gain advantage in political campaigns. It might have been

   better for our vote to have been delayed until after the elections, as it was in 1990. Authorizing the use of force against Iraq or any country for any purpose should always be weighed on its own merits, not with an eye on the politics of the vote or campaign TV spots. War is too serious, the human price too high, and the implications unforeseen.

   While I cannot predict the future, I believe that what we decide in this Chamber this week will influence America's security and role in the world for the coming decades. It will serve as the framework, both intentionally and unintentionally, for the future. It will set in motion a series of actions and events that we cannot now understand or control.

   In authorizing the use of force against Iraq, we are at the beginning of a road that has no clear end. The votes in Congress this week are votes for an intensification of engagement with Iraq and the Middle East, a world of which we know very little and whose destiny will now be directly tied to ours.

   America cannot trade a new focus on Iraq for a lesser effort in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The bloodshed between Israel and the Palestinians continues, and the danger mounts. Stability in Afghanistan is not assured. We must carry through with our commitment. Stability in this region depends on it. America's credibility is at stake, and long-term stability in central and South Asia hangs in the balance.

   We must also continue to pay close attention to North Korea where there is no guesswork about nuclear weapons. There on the Korean peninsula reside nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and 37,000 American troops. Despite setting the right course for disarmament in Iraq, the administration has yet to define an end game in Iraq or explain the extent of the American commitment if regime change is required, or describe how our actions in Iraq might affect our other many interests and commitments around the world.

   I share the hope of a better world without Saddam Hussein, but we do not really know if our intervention in Iraq will lead to democracy in either Iraq or elsewhere in the Arab world. America has continued to take on large, complicated, and expensive responsibilities that will place heavy burdens on all of us over the next generation. It may well be necessary, but Americans should understand the extent of this burden and what may be required to pay for it and support it in both American blood and trade.

   As the Congress votes on this resolution, we must understand that we have not put Iraqi issues behind us. This is just the beginning. The risks should not be understated, miscast, or misunderstood. Ours is a path of both peril and opportunity with many detours and no shortcuts.

   We in the Congress are men and women of many parts. For me, it is the present-day Senator, the former soldier, or concerned father who guides my judgment and ultimate vote? It is pieces of all, for I am pieces of all. The responsibilities of each lead me to support the Lieberman-McCain-Warner-Bayh resolution, for which I will vote.

   In the end, each of us who has the high honor of holding public office has the burden and privilege of decision and responsibilities. It is a sacred trust we share with the public. We will be held accountable for our actions, as it must be.

   Madam President, I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Connecticut is recognized for 20 minutes.

   Mr. DODD. Madam President, before he departs the floor, I commend my colleague from Nebraska. I regret--it is late in the day, and I am sure there is

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   Senator Hagel is one of the most thoughtful Members of this body. When he talks about the sum of all our parts and talks about being a father and a soldier, it is always in our interest to listen to those who have worn the military uniform into combat when we debate the issues of war and peace

   because they know more than just intellectually and theoretically what the price can be.

   I believe I should give my remarks because I have written these things out, but I can associate myself with the comments of my friend from Nebraska. He pretty much couches a lot of my thinking on how this has evolved, where we are, what we have come to this evening, the pace at which we are moving, the regrets I feel about how I wish this debate were being conducted under circumstances other than on the eve of an election in this country where already the campaign spots are running wildly one way or the other in terms of where people are. So I commend the Senator for his comments this afternoon on this subject matter.

   I come this afternoon to speak about the subject which is on the minds not only of all of us but I think millions of our constituents across the country, the possibility of going to war against Iraq.

   On Monday night, President Bush, I think, spoke for all of us. I know of no one who really disagrees at all. He described Saddam Hussein as a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction. It is that addiction that demands a strong response. We all agree on that. There is no question that Iraq possesses biological and chemical weapons and that he seeks to acquire additional weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. That is not in debate. I also agree with President Bush that Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace and must be disarmed, to quote President Bush directly. I suspect virtually every Member of this Chamber would not vary too much with those conclusions.

   How imminent that threat is, unfortunately, has been extremely difficult to assess. This is because of a troubling new trend by the intelligence agencies to not just give us information and objective analysis but, in my opinion, too often to insert themselves into policymaking. That is not their job. It is not the job of the intelligence agencies to make policy. It is their job to provide others in the executive branch and the Congress with neutral information, with facts on which we will ultimately base our policy judgments.

   This is a very troubling trend, in my view, which I believe ought to stop. If we are to go to war, it is even more important that we trust the information given by the intelligence agencies.

   Nevertheless, this week we are debating because there are profound disagreements over how, when, and with whom we should act to deal with the threat posed by Iraq.

   To have a different answer to these questions than the President should not be considered unpatriotic or partisan. Unfortunately, that is the kind of rhetoric we are hearing too often today.

   Let's be honest. We are less than 30 days out from a national congressional election in this country. That is never an easy time for the Congress and the executive branch to come together on much of anything, let alone the question of war and peace.

   Some in this Chamber have said the eve of an election is in fact the best time for Members of Congress to make decisions such as these. I could not disagree more. As my good friend and colleague, Senator Byrd, has passionately reminded us every day this week, forcing a vote on this issue so close to an election will, whether we like it or not, embroil the issue in politics more than usual.

   The campaign ads running across this country speak for themselves. Forcing Congress's hand on this important matter

   does a disservice, I believe, to the American public and to this most profound and serious debate. But now we have no choice but to consider the matter and to vote on the issues of this utmost gravity, the issues of war and peace and of life and death, for those who will engage in it.

   The President has asked Congress to grant him the authority to use force against Iraq, if he deems it necessary, and Congress will provide the President with the authority to respond effectively to the threat posed by Iraq. But we will do so only after careful consideration of all of the stakes involved.

   My colleagues, Senator Byrd, Senator Kennedy, Senator Levin, and others, have done an outstanding job of highlighting their questions and concerns, reflecting the questions and concerns raised by millions of Americans across political and economic lines, across geographic lines in this country; questions and concerns regarding the use of force and the resolution the President originally sent to Congress, a number of these concerns which I think many of us share.

   Many of us believe the language of the President's original request was too far reaching, empowering the President to use all means necessary that he would determine appropriate, including force, to restore peace and stability to the region. That was an open invitation for an American military involvement in the broad context of the Middle East. And the language was far too unilateral. It did not even mention a role for the United Nations or our allies.

   Thanks to the efforts of our congressional leaders--and I commend specifically Senator Daschle and others--we now have a compromise resolution, a modified resolution, correcting many of the evident flaws in the initial resolution that was sent to us.

   The resolution now before us is limited to Iraq, and it contemplates the possibility of resolving this threat peacefully through the use of diplomacy. It also acknowledges the importance of maintaining our focus on our continuing war on terrorism as we consider what action to take in Iraq.

   Despite these changes, of course, questions do remain. First and foremost, will the President use the authority granted by Congress to go it alone? Or will he take the time to build the international coalition that the overwhelming majority of Americans believe is the better course of action to follow?

   If he chooses to go it alone, I believe that will be a terrible mistake, and I think millions of others in this country do as well. Given the geography and the politics of the region in the Middle East, I do not see how the United States could engage Iraq militarily, without the help of others, without seriously undermining our chances of success. And it would be terribly destabilizing to the entire region.

   There are many reasons for acting with international support.

   I have already commended the President for his decision to look first to the United Nations to answer these questions. On September 12, speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush enumerated Iraq's repeated failures to meet its international obligations.

   The U.N. has been a valued body for the last one-half of the 20th century. It has not always done what we wanted. It has not always acted deliberately. It has not always acted with the kind of force and direction that many of us wish it would have. But think what the world would have looked like over the last 50 years had there not been a United Nations to have a

   forum where the world gathers to try to resolve the many conflicts that confront us.

   It has not served our interests well to have national leadership ridicule this institution. We are the founders, in many ways, of the U.N. system. It was the great leaders in the post-World War II period who insisted we try to frame an international body where we might resolve disputes other than going through what we did throughout World War II. My hope would be that as dark as these clouds may seem as we debate and consider the issue of Iraq, that this may be an opportunity for the institution of the United Nations to mature into the 21st century role it must if we are going to succeed in the efforts against terrorism, the efforts against Iraq or other problems that will emerge, without any question, in the coming years.

   My hope will be that this U.N. will look at what we are doing, listen to what we are saying as one nation, and consider how important its role must be in the coming weeks and months. If there ever were a set of circumstances that justified U.N. action, I believe it is now on Iraq, without any question.

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   If the framework of international law, developed at the U.N. over the last 50 years to protect peace and security, is to stand, then the U.N. must act with leadership. It is my sincere hope that the P