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1A) Yucca Mountain
r. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, I am going to talk a little this morning

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   What we are doing is following the law that was established for the disposition of this particular matter, giving the State of Nevada an opportunity for a veto, and also providing procedures for overriding that process by action of both the House and the Senate. As I have indicated, the House has acted.

   The expedited procedures under discussion are set forth in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. One of the elements of the procedures is a specific provision that states once a resolution is on the Senate calendar, it shall be in order for any Member of the Senate to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution.

   We have heard the majority leader and others suggesting the provision is outside the Senate rules and turns the rules on their head. That is simply not true. It is the law. We are following the law.

   I grant that the provision is unusual, but it is neither unique nor contrary to Senate rules. As a matter of fact, it is part of the Senate rules. The entire expedited procedure was adopted as part of the rules, and the Senate reserved its right to change the procedure. I want to quote from the statute because I think it is important every Member understand we are not setting precedent.

   The provision enacted is:

   A, as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate, and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of the Senate, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in the Senate in the case of resolutions of repository siting approval, and such provisions supersede other rules of the Senate only to the extent that they are inconsistent with other rules.

   I grant you, it sounds as if it was written by a Philadelphia lawyer, and it probably was:

   B, with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of the Senate) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate.

   What that means is, obviously, the Senate can change its own rules. It is that simple. I do not know why they did not say it that way. Nevertheless, we have to live with what we have.

   So let's be clear. What we are doing on procedure is following the rules of the Senate that were agreed to in 1982 and that have been in place under both Republican and Democratic control of this body since that time. These were not last-minute additions, something that just came up, that was slipped into the legislative conference in the wee hours of the morning. The expedited procedures included, one, the provision for any Member to move to the consideration of the resolution and, two, the provision that the procedures were adopted as an exercise of rulemaking in the Senate, and both were contained in the underlying legislation in 1982.

   The provisions were not necessarily novel. In fact, they were almost identical to those considered in the previous Congress and that passed the Senate as part of S. 2189.

   For historical information, S. 2189 passed the Senate in the 96th Congress in 1980 under Democrat leadership and was sponsored primarily by Senators Johnston of Louisiana and Jackson of Washington.

   When the Senate changed hands in the 97th Congress, the identical provision was included in S. 1662 when it was introduced by the new chairman of the Energy Committee, Senator McClure of Idaho.

   That measure was jointly referred to both the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the Committee on Environment and Public Works. Both Committees reported the legislation favorably with substitute amendments and both substitutes contained the same expedited procedures as a rulemaking of the Senate.

   This was not a surprise. The Senate was well aware of the provisions. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was debated at length in the Senate in 1982 and no one objected to the expedited procedures on the language providing that ``any Member'' could make the motion to proceed.

   So for those who are reflecting on the generalization somehow this was an arbitrary action and not thought out, I again refer to the history of this matter as it has been presented in this body. Let's put that behind us.

   It is fair everyone understood that the language was essential to any concept of a State objection, whether the State had the obligation to carry the argument and obtain an affirmative vote as the authorization committees wanted or if the administration had the burden to obtain a Joint Resolution of approval as proposed by Congressman Moakley--chairman of the House Rules Committee at that time--and eventually contained in the floor legislation.

   The language was before the Senate during debate leading to the initial passage in April of 1982, and again a final agreement was reached in December of 1982. All Members understood the heart of the process was that each House would have to vote--the House already voted; now it is our obligation--and further says: and the only way to guarantee that was an expedited process where any Senator could make the motion to proceed.

   We will have any Senator make that motion on the 9th or thereabouts but we still have not determined who that is.

   Previously, the Senate understood the majority leader or the chairman might make that motion or they may not want to carry out the mandate of the statute, so it provided explicitly in the event the majority leader or the chairman of the committee of jurisdiction did not do so, and any Senator could bring this issue before the Senate. That is obviously what will happen.

   We did it, however, with full knowledge of the Senate rules, and the Senate adopted it as an exercise in rulemaking.

   Finally, the process is not the usual way, but it is part of the rule. Second, it is not a precedent and by its terms is limited only to this resolution. Senator George Mitchell characterized in 1982 when it was adopted, it was designed to eliminate any ``dilatory or obstructionist'' provisions.

   Therefore, I hope we can end the rhetoric on this that somehow we are not following the Senate rules, that this is some novel provision of which the Senate was not aware. I hope we can focus on the substance of the joint resolution and move to its consideration as the Senate provided in 1982.

   The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, of which I have been a member, former chairman, and now ranking member, has favorably reported the resolution, and we have a good report that I suggest my colleagues read. The report filed by our chairman, Senator Bingaman, disposes of every objection raised by the State of Nevada and reflects the committee's considered recommendation. Our committee has discharged its responsibility. Now it is time for the full Senate to discharge its obligation.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.

   Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, I rise today to speak on the need to move forward with a permanent nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. Doing so is in the best interest of America's national security, economy, energy policy, public safety, and environment.

   Special interest groups and activists have capitalized on this issue--using scare tactics and doomsday scenarios to alarm the public. But as a member of the Senate Energy Committee, I have listened to both sides, reviewed the information presented by the experts, and attended the hearings. It makes sense to store our Nation's high-level nuclear waste in a single, scientifically and environmentally sound, secure, and remote location.

   Twenty years have passed since Congress called for the creation of an underground repository for the Nation's spent nuclear fuel--under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Senator MURKOWSKI has referred to the history of that act. During that time, about $7 billion from U.S. electric consumers have been invested in finding the most suitable location for this project.

   More than 45,000 metric tons of nuclear waste is currently stored at 131

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   This nuclear waste is stored above ground in facilities built for temporary storage only. Many of these storage sites are near major cities and waterways.

   Yucca Mountain represents two decades of the most comprehensive environmental and technical assessments ever conducted anywhere on the planet. The mountain is located in one of the most isolated and arid locations in the United States. Only 30 miles to the west lies Death Valley; to the north is the Department of Energy's nuclear test site where some 900 nuclear weapons have been tested.

   The repository itself would be located about 1,000 feet underground in sold rock to keep its contents safe from significant impacts, including major earthquakes. The mountain's natural geological attributes would be reinforced with man-made barriers.

   Some opponents of the repository have centered this debate on the transportation issue. They point out that there are risks involved. Of course there are risks involved--we do not live in a risk-free society. There is risk with everything we do. What is important is that the risk is acceptable in order to accomplish the objective. In this case, the risk is absolutely acceptable--because it is a risk we can control, we can manage, we can deal with.

   Shipments of nuclear material have been taking place in the United States for the past three decades and will continue, with or without Yucca Mountain.

   About 3,000 shipments of spent nuclear fuel have occurred since 1965--covering 1.7 million miles--with no injuries, no fatalities, and no environmental damage due to radioactive release. In that time, not one spent fuel container has ever been breached.

   Spent nuclear fuel, which is nonexplosive and nonflammable, is shipped in specially designed and tested multilayered steel casks. These casks have been designed to withstand extreme heat, prolonged submersion in water, and severe impacts--such as being broadsided by a 120-ton locomotive traveling at 80 miles per hour. If the Yucca Mountain repository becomes a reality, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must survey and approve all routes, and all shipments would be monitored 24 hours a day through a satellite tracking system--with the coordinated effort of local, State, and federal law enforcement agencies.

   A ``no'' vote on Yucca would be devastating for the future of nuclear power in this country. While that is the objective of the activists, we cannot afford such a catastrophic loss.

   Nuclear power accounts for 20 percent of the Nation's electric power. It powers 40 percent of our Navy's combat vessels. Experts in the fuel cell industry say that nuclear power plants are the only way to produce enough hydrogen if America is to ever become a country powered by fuel cells, instead of fossil fuels. This is all directly connected to Yucca Mountain.

   We should not forget that there will be a large financial burden if this project is rejected. The Federal Government will be in default of its obligations, and would owe utilities and contract holders as much as $100 billion. This is on top of the billions of dollars already invested in the project. Then we would be forced to begin a new process of looking at other options for a repository. If not Yucca, where? Hanford, WA, is often mentioned as a viable alternative. The fact is, or we must deal with, 45,000 metric tons of nuclear waste--and more on the way.

   The bottom line is that this problem is not going to disappear, and the world will not become any safer by deferring this problem. We either deal with this problem today--or we pass it onto future generations. That is not an acceptable option. We do have an acceptable, safe and responsible option.

   We must move forward with the Yucca Mountain repository. It is the right and responsible thing to do.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.

   Mr. ENSIGN. Madam President, we will save rebutting the comments of our colleague from Nevada for another time. We do want to talk about the Yucca Mountain project this morning, but I want to talk about the procedure in the Senate on which people have been focusing.

   In the modern history of the Senate, nobody other than the majority leader or his designee has successfully offered a motion to proceed. That being said, supporters of Yucca Mountain claim that breaking tradition would be alright because the process outlined in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is supposedly unique.

   The procedure in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is not unique, nor is it required--it is merely permitted. There are many statutes containing expedited procedures. When the Congress has determined that it is appropriate to override the traditional power of the majority leader to schedule the floor, it has drafted legislation like the War Powers Act which does so.

   The War Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1544 et seq.) states:

   Any joint resolution or bill so reported (from Committee) shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

   Unlike this War Powers provision, there is no requirement in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act that Congress take any action with regard to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act resolution. Congress in the past has used a variety of techniques to expedite privileged business, and in the case of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act did not choose to use some of the more time-sensitive techniques. Indeed, the 1982 act anticipates that a vote on the Yucca Mountain resolution might not occur--that it might be blocked. If the deadline passes, then the statute giving the State of Nevada a veto will have been carried out. That was part of the 1982 compromise.

   It is true that an expedited procedure was put into law, pursuant to the rulemaking power of the Congress, as Congress has put in law many expedited procedures. But no one other than the majority leader or his designee has ever moved successfully to go to any resolution, or bill, which has

   expedited procedures written into law. Any successful attempt to do that now would change forever the way that the Senate sets its agenda.

   The junior Senator from Alaska stated that he does ``not know that it really matters very much'' who makes the motion to proceed to the Yucca Mountain resolution.

   I say that it does matter. It matters very much. It is the Senate rules that allow any Senator to move to proceed to a matter, or to force a vote on the motion to proceed, but it is now a well-established practice that the Senate will only proceed to a matter the majority leader wishes to call up, and that the Senate has not proceeded to any matter that the majority leader has declined to call up for decades past. It is the proposed change in this practice that is a direct challenge to the role of any majority leader.

   The Nuclear Waste Policy Act does not make the resolution the pending business of the Senate, even though some laws--such as the War Powers Resolution--do take away the prerogative of the majority leader by making a resolution the pending business without any motion to proceed being required. Had the Senate wished to do that in this case, it could have followed the language of the War Powers Resolution.

   If a Senator other than the majority leader feels he or she has the right to call up privileged matters without deferring to the majority leader, then the Senate will have undergone a dramatic sea change in the way it operates.

   The procedures in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act were put in place pursuant to the rulemaking power of the Senate, and they have no higher standing because they are written into law. There is no more fundamental prerogative that attaches to the majority leader than the right to set the Senate agenda.

   I hope my colleagues on this side of the aisle will think long and hard before they challenge the historic role of the majority leader. The traditions of this institution deserve to be protected.

   Madam President, in the coming days leading up to the vote, we will be laying out some of the things my colleague from Nebraska has asked. What

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   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. REID. Madam President, I was unable to listen to the full statements of the Senator from Nebraska and the Senator from Alaska, but I have been told by my staff some of the things they said.

   I have to say basically the same thing I have been saying for a long time. The American public has come to the realization that what the proponents of Yucca Mountain are saying is absolutely without foundation. For example, one of the issues they talk about is moving the nuclear waste out of the many sites where it sits now and putting it into one site. Isn't that the best thing to do?

   Of course, but we have had articles in papers all across America showing that it is a sham because you can never get rid of the waste where it is being generated. They will have to move 3,000 tons a year. They have 46,000 tons stored now. They generate 2,000 tons. When you take a spent fuel rod out of a nuclear generator, you have to put it in a cooling pond for 5 years because it is so hot and so radioactive. They only use 5 percent of the power and radioactivity in one of those rods. After 5 percent is used, they have to take it out and cool it. They can't move it for 5 years. For anyone to suggest there is going to be one place where all the waste will be; someplace in the western part of the United States is foolishness.

   This is not the Senator from Nevada talking. It is in newspapers and scientific journals all over America.

   For the first 18 or 20 years, the nuclear waste issue centered on the science of Yucca Mountain. I could lay out a picture to the Chair for the people of Michigan or any other State showing how science at Yucca Mountain is very bad. But that doesn't matter anymore because that is not the question. The question is, How are we going to get the waste to Yucca

   Mountain? You can do it three ways: highways, railroad, and barges on the water. That is all you can do. Nuclear waste will travel through 43 or 45 different States.

   There is a Web site that has been developed, Mapscience.com. Pull it up, and it shows any address in America and how near the nuclear waste will travel to your home, or to your school, or to the playground, or to your business. This site has alerted many people to the dangers of the transportation of nuclear waste. Since that site was put up 2 weeks ago, there have been over 200,000 hits. People want to find out from where the waste will go. What they find out is not good, so these people have been sending letters to their Senators and talking to their neighbors.

   The transportation of nuclear waste is wrong. My friend from Nebraska said the risk is acceptable. Acceptable to whom? The Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, when asked last week about what would happen if Yucca Mountain didn't go through right now, said ``nothing.'' There is room to store waste onsite at every reactor in America. There are power generators now that are storing nuclear waste onsite in dry-cask storage canisters. That is what a large segment of the scientific community said we should do. It is safer than trying to move it.

   To transport this is unacceptable. We are talking about 100,000 truckloads of nuclear waste, 20,000 trainloads, and thousands of barges full of nuclear waste.

   Recently, there were editorials in the Denver Post and in the St. Petersburg Times, the largest newspaper in Florida and the largest newspaper in Colorado, criticizing the program--and in places all over the country; places where the nuclear power industry has spent tens of millions of dollars in campaign contributions; there are articles describing the trips sponsored by the nuclear power industry. They take people to Las Vegas and wine and dine them so they can show them Yucca Mountain. They spend 2 hours at Yucca Mountain and several days in one of the fine hotels in Las Vegas. Congressional staff have been taken back out there on numerous occasions. Lobbying activities are intense.

   For example, for the first time in the State of Nevada, Governor Guinn said we should hire somebody to help lobby back here. You have no idea how hard it is to find somebody to help us because the nuclear power industry has bought Washington, DC.

   So I appreciate the power of the Nuclear Energy Institute. It is powerful, and I understand that. But I also understand the American people, and they now--since September 11--realize every truckload, every trainload, every barge is a target of opportunity for terrorists.

   No matter what the problems may be where these nuclear generators are located, the problems are amplified by trying to move nuclear waste. We would have, around the country, the potential not for ``a'' ``dirty'' bomb, but hundreds and thousands of ``dirty'' bombs. How are you going to transport nuclear waste safely? You cannot. We know a shoulder-fired weapon will pierce one of these containers. We know that if you leave them on site and cover them with cement, it will be very safe.

   So, Madam President, I try to be as quiet and nonresponsive as I can be when these statements are made. But today I had to respond because I think it just simply was out of line for someone to say the risk is acceptable. It is not acceptable. It is not acceptable at all.

   We are going to have, probably, sometime shortly after the Fourth of July recess, an opportunity to vote on the procedure, which violates what we do around here. The majority leader does not want this to come forward. We are going to see how people will vote on that because my friends in the minority have to understand someday they will be in the majority, I am sorry to say, and when they are in the majority, the same rules will apply to them.

   You have to be very careful who brings matters to the floor. I have the greatest respect for the junior Senator from Alaska. He is my friend. I have worked with him on many different issues. On this, we have a basic disagreement in philosophy.

   My friend, the senior Senator from Nebraska, is a fine man, certainly an American patriot. But for him to come to the floor and say the risk is acceptable is something I cannot let go without a response. It simply is wrong, and I want him to know I believe he is wrong.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, how much time remains in morning business?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Four minutes remain.

   Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, let me take that 4 minutes because I know my colleagues want to move forward with DOD authorization.

END

1B) Nonproliferation Related Amendments to the National Defense Authorization
AMENDMENT No. 4007

The Senator from Virginia [Mr. WARNER], for himself, Mr. Miller, Mr. Lott, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Allard, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Smith of New Hampshire, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Bunning, Mr. Helms, Mr. McCain, Mr. Nickles, and Mr. Hagel, proposes an amendment numbered 4007. The amendment is as follows: (Purpose: To provide an additional amount for ballistic missile defense or combating terrorism in accordance with national security priorities of the President)

On page 217, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following:

SEC. 1010. ADDITIONAL AMOUNT FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE OR COMBATING TERRORISM IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITIES OF THE PRESIDENT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--In addition to other amounts authorized to be appropriated by other provisions of this division, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2003, $814,300,000 for whichever of the following purposes the President determines that the additional amount is necessary in the national security interests of the United States:
(1) Research, development, test, and evaluation for ballistic missile defense programs of the Department of Defense.
(2) Activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism at home and abroad.

(b) OFFSET.--The total amount authorized to be appropriated under the other provisions of this division is hereby reduced by $814,300,000 to reflect the amounts that the Secretary determines unnecessary by reason of a revision of assumptions regarding inflation that are applied as a result of the midsession review of the budget conducted by the Office of Management and Budget during the spring and early summer of 2002.

(c) PRIORITY FOR ALLOCATING FUNDS.--In the expenditure of additional funds made available by a lower rate of inflation, the top priority shall be the use of such additional funds for Department of Defense activities for combating terrorism and protecting the American people at home and abroad.

AMENDMENT NO. 4133
At the appropriate place insert the following:
SEC. . RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
(a) FINDINGS.-- The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, in addition to rogue states, are known to be working to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear warheads.

(2) The largest and least secure potential source of nuclear warheads for terrorists or rogue states is Russia's arsenal of non-strategic or ``tactical'' nuclear warheads, which according to unclassified estimates numbers from 7,000 to 12,000 warheads. Security at Russian nuclear weapon storage sites is insufficient, and tactical nuclear warheads are more vulnerable to terrorist or rogue state acquisition due to their smaller size, greater portability, and greater numbers compared to Russian strategic nuclear weapons.

(3) Russia's tactical nuclear warheads were not covered by the START treaties or the recent Moscow Treaty. Russia is not legally bound to reduce its tactical nuclear stockpile and the United States has no inspection rights regarding Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal.

AMENDMENT NO. 4135 (Purpose: To prohibit the use of authorized funds for research, development, test, evaluation, procurement, or deployment of nuclear armed interceptors of a missile defense system)
On page 34, after line 23, insert the following:

SEC. 226. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR ARMED INTERCEPTORS. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be used for research, development, test, evaluation, procurement, or deployment of nuclear armed interceptors of a missile defense system.

AMENDMENT NO. 4160 (Purpose: To provide for monitoring implementation of the 1979 United States-China Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology)
On page 281, between lines 5 and 6, insert the following:
SEC. 1215. MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1979 UNITED STATES-CHINA AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

(a) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION.--The Office of Science and Technology Cooperation of the Department of State shall monitor the implementation of the 1979 United States-China Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology and its protocols (in this section referred to as the ``Agreement''), and keep a systematic account of the protocols thereto. The Office shall coordinate the activities of all agencies of the United States Government that carry out cooperative activities under the Agreement.

(b) GUIDELINES.--The Secretary of State shall ensure that all activities conducted under the Agreement and its protocols comply with applicable laws and regulations concerning the transfer of militarily sensitive and dual-use technologies.

(c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than April 1, 2004, and every two years thereafter, the Secretary of State, shall submit a report to Congress, in both classified and unclassified form, on the implementation of the Agreement and activities thereunder.
(2) REPORT ELEMENTS.--Each report under this subsection shall provide an evaluation of the benefits of the Agreement to the Chinese economy, military, and defense industrial base and shall include the following:
(A) An accounting of all activities conducted under the Agreement since the previous report, and a projection of activities to be undertaken in the next two years.
(B) An estimate of the costs to the United States to administer the Agreement within the period covered by the report. [Page: S6119] GPO's PDF
(C) An assessment of how the Agreement has influenced the policies of the People's Republic of China toward scientific and technological cooperation with the United States.
(D) An analysis of the involvement of Chinese nuclear weapons and military missile specialists in the activities of the Joint Commission.
(E) A determination of the extent to which the activities conducted under the Agreement have enhanced the military and industrial base of the People's Republic of China, and an assessment of the impact of projected activities for the next two years, including transfers of technology, on China's economic and military capabilities.
(F) Any recommendations on improving the monitoring of the activities of the Commission by the Secretaries of Defense and State.

(3) CONSULTATION PRIOR TO SUBMISSION OF REPORTS.--The Secretary of State shall prepare the report in consultation with the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, and Energy, the Directors of the National Science Foundation and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence community. --

AMENDMENT NO. 4161
(Purpose: To require biannual reports on foreign persons who contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their delivery systems, by countries of proliferation concern)
At the end of subtitle C of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1035. BIANNUAL REPORTS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS BY COUNTRIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN.

(a) REPORTS.--Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every six months thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a report identifying each foreign person that, during the six-month period ending on the date of such report, made a material contribution to the development by a country of proliferation concern of--
(1) nuclear , biological, or chemical weapons; or
(2) ballistic or cruise missile systems.

(b) FORM OF SUBMITTAL.--
(1) A report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, whether in whole or in part, if the President determines that submittal in that form is advisable.
(2) Any portion of a report under subsection (a) that is submitted in classified form shall be accompanied by an unclassified summary of such portion.

(c) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:
(1) The term ``foreign person'' means--
(A) a natural person that is an alien;
(B) a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group that is organized under the laws of a foreign country or has its principal place of business in a foreign country;
(C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a business enterprise; and
(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).

(2) The term ``country of proliferation concern'' means any country identified by the Director of Central Intelligence as having engaged in the acquisition of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear , chemical, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions in the most current report under section 721 of the Combatting Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title VII of Public Law 104-293; 50 U.S.C. 2366), or any successor report on the acquisition by foreign countries of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction.

1C) Nulcear Nonproliferation Act of 2002
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I would like to speak for a few moments on the subject they will clear shortly, the amendment to which I referred and listed the cosponsors, to whom I am extremely gratified for their support. Senator Biden is my principal cosponsor. We hope that this bill will move along and be known as the Domenici-Biden nonproliferation amendment. This amendment supports the nonproliferation program proposed in a bipartisan Senate bill, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 2002.

Today, Senators BIDEN, LUGAR, LANDRIEU, HAGEL, BINGAMAN, MURKOWSKI, CARNAHAN, LINCOLN, and MIKULSKI are cosponsoring this amendment. The end of the Soviet Union in 1991 started a chain of events, which in the long term can lead to vastly improved global stability. Concerns about global confrontations were greatly reduced after that event. But with that event, the Soviet system of guards, guns, and a highly regimented society that had effectively controlled their weapons of mass destruction, along with the materials and expertise to create them, was significantly weakened. Even today, with Russia's economy well on the road to recovery, there's still plenty of room for concerns about the security of these Russian assets.

The tragic events of September 11 brought the United States into the world of international terrorism, a world from which we had been very sheltered. Even with the successes of the subsequent war on terrorism, there's still ample reason for concern that the forces of al-Qaida and other international terrorists are seeking other avenues to disrupt peaceful societies around he world.

In some sense, the events of September 11 set a new gruesome standard against which terrorists may measure their future successes. There should be no question that these groups would use weapons of mass destruction if they could acquire them and deliver them here or to countless other international locations. One of our strongest allies in the current war on terrorism has been the Russian Federation. Assistance from the Russians and other States of the former Soviet Union has been vital in many aspects of the conflict in Afghanistan. President Putin and President Bush have forged a strong working relationship, and the summit meeting was another measure of interest in increased cooperation. As this amendment seeks to strengthen our nonproliferation programs, it provides many options for actions to be conducted through joint partnerships between the Russian Federation and the United States that build on this increased cooperative spirit.

The Nunn-Lugar program of 1991 and the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation of 1996 provided vital support for cooperative programs to reduce the risks that weapons of mass destruction might become available to terrorists. They established a framework for cooperative progress that has served our Nation and the world very well. But despite their successes, accomplished in the face of some enormous challenges, there remain actions that should be taken to further reduce these threats.

This amendment would expand the current nonproliferation programs of the Department of Energy, most of which trace their origins to those original Nunn-Lugar and Nunn-Lugar-Domenici bills. Before I discuss this amendment, I would like to review some our progress to date.

For example, the Nuclear Materials Protection, Control and Accounting program has improved the security of at least one-third of the fissile materials in the former Soviet Union. Comprehensive upgrades have been largely completed on the Russian Navy's stocks of weapons usable materials, with work completed at 10 of their 11 storage sites. Border security is being improved through the Second Line of Defense program. I recall when I participated in the initial ribbon-cutting of this system at Moscow's main airport in 1998. Now this equipment is at over 20 sites in Russia and the Ukraine. Programs to counter ``brain drain'' have moved ahead. The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention of IPP program has shown excellent progress in recent years in the daunting task of creating commercial opportunities for weapons scientists throughout the former Soviet Union. To date, over $50 million of venture capital has been attracted on several major projects and more than 10,000 technical personnel have been engaged since the program began.

Under IPP, about 100 American businesses are working in Russia, and they've contributed over $100 million of their own funds in support of efforts in which our Government has invested about $70 million. About 400 projects are currently in progress with 100 of those in the closed nuclear cities. American businesses are sharing costs on 132 of those projects. The Nuclear Cities Initiative has one of the most challenging tasks of all the programs--to work cooperatively with the Russians to down-size their vast nuclear weapons complex. The closed nuclear cities that make up this complex have immense technical capabilities, but they have to be, at least in the past, one of the most business-unfriendly places in the world. In 1998, I visited Sarov, the Russian version of Los Alamos. It was a fascinating place where the hospitality of my hosts was most impressive. I still remember visiting their weapons museum and standing beside a 60-megaton bomb that was once destined for our shores. Despite their history, they displayed significant interest in shifting their weapons focus to commercial interests.

Today, there's been real progress in Sarov. For example, there is a signed agreement with the Russians to terminate all weapons construction work at Sarov by 2003. Many commercial ventures are now underway including an Open Computing Center, which provides employment opportunities for former weapons scientists through software development and computer modeling. The HEU deal has largely remained on track, although it's required some help from Congress to keep from derailing. That program has the goal of rendering 500 tons of weapons grade highly enriched uranium un-usable for weapons by converting it into ordinary reactor fuel. To date, 146 tons have been converted, enough for about 6,000 warheads. Despite the successes of the Nunn-Lugar and Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, there remain many actions that should be taken to further reduce these threats. This new amendment expands and strengthens many of the programs established earlier, to further reduce threats to global peace.

It addresses one of the most important realizations from September 11--that the forces of terrorism span the globe. It's now clear that our nuclear nonproliferation programs should extend far beyond the states of the former Soviet Union. This amendment expands the scope of several programs to world-wide coverage. It focuses on threats of a nuclear or radiological type, which largely fall within the expertise of the National Nuclear Security Administration. Just today, the National Research Council released their major report on ``The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism.'' They present a number of critical recommendations to address threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism. I'm very pleased that the legislative basis for most of their suggestions is in this amendment. This amendment expands programs to include the safety and security of nuclear facilities and radioactive materials around the world, wherever countries are willing to enter into cooperative arrangements for threat reduction. It recognizes that devices that disperse radioactive materials, so-called ``dirty bombs,'' can represent a real threat to modern societies. This is one of the key recommendations of the National Research Council.

Dirty bombs could be used as weapons of mass terror, property contamination, and economic disaster. We need [Page: S6059] GPO's PDF better detection systems for the presence of dirty bombs that are appropriate to the wide range of delivery systems for such a weapon, from trucks to boats to containers. And we need to be far better prepared to deal with the consequences of such an attack. The new legislation includes provisions to accelerate and expand existing programs for disposition of fissile materials. These materials, of course, represent not only a concern with dirty bombs, but also the even larger threat of use in crude nuclear weapons.

It includes a program to accelerate the conversion of highly enriched uranium into forms un-usable for weapons. It addresses one of the major concerns associated with this material that, many years ago, both the United States and the Soviet Union provided HEU to many countries as fuel for research reactors. That fuel represents a proliferation risk today. This accelerated conversion is another of the prime recommendations of the National Research Council. It authorizes new programs for global management of nuclear materials, in cooperation with other nations and with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It recognizes that modern societies use radioactive materials as essential tools in many ways, and offers assistance in providing new controls on the most dangerous of these materials. It suggests that many of the program elements involve international cooperation with the Russian Federation and with other nations. In fact, it recognizes that the global nature of the current threats requires such cooperation, and provides authorizations for the Secretary of Energy to assist the Secretary of State in offering significant help to other nations. We cannot accomplish these programs without such cooperation.

This amendment includes provisions extending the First Responder training programs, originally created under Nunn-Lugar-Domenici. These programs have already made real contributions. In fact, the training provided under this program in New York City helped mitigate the catastrophe there on September 11. That program was authorized for only 5 years in the original legislation, this bill extends that authorization for another 10 years. The amendment requires annual reports demonstrating that all our nonproliferation programs are well coordinated and integrated. The original call for this coordination was in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation. The report must disclose the extent of coordination and integration between federally funded and private activities. That is very important, because of the excellent work being done by private organizations, like the Nuclear Threat Initiative, that are providing critical assistance toward similar nonproliferation goals.

With this amendment, our programs to counter threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism will be significantly strengthened and risks to the United States and our international partners greatly reduced. The amendment authorizes $15M for a new R&D and demonstration program to address nuclear or radiological (``dirty bombs'') terrorism. Includes new responsibilities in First Responders program. Includes a partnership with Russia and extends assistance to any country in dealing with either stray radioactive sources or with a dirty bomb incident. (Section 3156); Extends the expired authorization for training of First Responders. (Section 3155);

Authorizes $40 million to accelerate the ``blend-down'' of Highly Enriched Uranium. Authorizes new approaches, in addition to the HEU Deal, to increase the rate at which HEU is modified to render it incapable of weapons use. Extends an option to all nations with HEU to receive compensation in return for providing their stocks of HEU now. (Section 3158); Authorizes $5 million to extend MPC&A to the international community and develops options, working jointly with Russia, to accelerate conversion of reactors fueled with HEU. (Section 3157); Encourages the Secretary to finalize an agreement with Russia for plutonium disposition that meets specific criteria. (Section 3159A);

Authorizes $20 million for the Department to work with the international community to develop options for a global program for international safeguards, nuclear safety and proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies. Amount includes $5 million for the Department to increase nuclear safety work related to sabotage protection for nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities overseas and $10 million, led by DOE/NE, for advanced, proliferation resistant fuel cycles. (Section 3159B); Authorizes $15 million to expand programs supporting the IAEA in strengthening international nuclear safeguards. (Section 3159B);

Authorizes $5 million for assisting nations develop stronger export controls. (Section 3159C); Requires development of a comprehensive ten year plan to develop a sustainable approach to MPC&A in the Russian Federation. (Section 3159D); Requires annual report on coordination and integration of all U.S. nonproliferation activities describing programs, synergies, coordination including with private efforts, opportunities for new joint cooperative programs with foreign countries, and funding requests integrated across all federal agencies. Extends reporting requirement in FY2002 Defense Authorization Act to an annual report. (Section 3159E); and Streamlines contracting by other agencies with DOE labs for anti-terrorism work. Agencies may elect to follow the new procedures or may use standard Work For Others model. (Section 3159F).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we simply need a little time on this side to give it consideration. The chairman and I have just commenced a discussion on how we will proceed on the bill today. I would hope in due course we can indicate to the Senator that it will be accepted on both sides.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I have already sent the bill to the desk. It obviously will not be referred to committee unless and until it is cleared by the managers pursuant to the conversation we have had. I would ask that we follow the course I have just indicated. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, does the Senator have a copy of the amendment handy?

Mr. DOMENICI. Surely. I will provide it to the Senator.

Mr. LEVIN. We are pretty sure this is the one we already have.

Mr. DOMENICI. Yes, it is.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we support the amendment on this side. We have cleared it. We are willing to see it adopted by voice vote.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we now have clearance on our side. I thank the chairman. We are ready to move forward on the amendment.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be laid aside and the Domenici-Biden amendment be the pending business. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The pending amendment is laid aside. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Domenici], for himself and Mr. Biden, Mr. Lugar, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. Hagel, Mrs. Carnahan, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Bingaman, Mrs. Lincoln, and Ms. Mikulski, proposes an amendment numbered 4009. (The amendment is printed in today's RECORD under ``Text of Amendments.'')

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join today my good friend and colleague, Senator Domenici, in introducing a vital amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill to reduce the odds that terrorists or rogue states will acquire the necessary ingredients overseas for nuclear and radiological terrorism. This amendment takes important steps to expand the legal mandate for specific U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs and lays down a marker on the necessary funding levels. [Page: S6060]

We have every expectation that, before this bill emerges from conference, the additional money will indeed be made available through both the supplemental fiscal year 2002 appropriations and regular fiscal year 2003 appropriations. Senator Domenici is to be both commended and supported for drafting this amendment, and the underlying bill, S. 2545, from which it is derived.

This amendment will lead to greater levels of effort and, I believe, greater levels of achievement in U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs. For example, it authorizes $40 million to accelerate and expand current international programs to blend down highly enriched uranium (HEU) needed to make nuclear bombs, making it less likely that terrorists or rogue states will get their hands on lethal nuclear materials.

It authorizes $35 million to develop options for a global program for international safeguards and proliferation-resistant technologies to ensure that civilian nuclear reactors in other nations are not illicitly producing significant quantities of weapons-grade material or are vulnerable to terrorist assault.

This amendment also allocates $30 million in funding for a new research, development, and demonstration program to help respond to nuclear or radiological terrorism. For example, the program would fund expanded research into monitors and gauges capable of detecting nuclear and/or radiological materials, for use at border crossings and ports of entry. It will help identify and account for radioactive sources located abroad. And all of these efforts will be carried out in cooperation with Russia and the rest of the international community.

On May 8 Jose Padilla, an American citizen working with al-Qaida, was arrested on the charge of planning to attack the United States with a Radiological Dispersion Device, more commonly called a ``dirty bomb.'' Padilla is only the first person associated with a major terrorist group to have been caught plotting an attack using a radiological weapon. It would be folly to think that he will be either the last or the most competent and successful.

The fact that radiological terror is real and a threat to the nation will come as no great surprise to the Senate. On March 6 the Foreign Relations Committee held a public hearing on the twin threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism. On March 5 we held a classified briefing on the same subject, followed a month later by an even more detailed classified session for all Senators. We assembled the finest scientists from government, the nuclear weapons laboratories, public interest groups and academia to speak of the dangers of dirty bombs. Without exception they told us that there was a real possibility that terrorists could obtain radioactive material and blow it up with a conventional bomb, spreading the material for miles.

But they also agreed on the likely consequences of a radiation attack on an American city.

Despite Attorney General John Ashcroft's statement from Moscow on June 10 that a dirty bomb can ``cause mass death and injury,'' the facts are very different. The Foreign Relations Committee learned that even the worst credible radiological attack will not be catastrophic. Few, if any, Americans will die from the radiation or even experience the symptoms of radiation poisoning. Most, if not all, of the casualties will come from the conventional explosive used to spread the radioactive material.

The bottom line on casualties is: A dirty bomb won't kill very many people. But a dirty bomb could still be an economic crime of the first magnitude. We do not know how to decontaminate large buildings and large areas to the degree that the Environmental Protection Agency mandates. The levels EPA uses in the case of accidents within a laboratory are extraordinary: clean-up must be so complete that out of 1,000 people living on-site 24 hours a day for about 40 years, only 1 additional person would die of cancer. We must begin to examine the radiation protection rules in the light of homeland security in the event of an attack instead of just applying the strict environmental guidelines appropriate to peacetime.

Our witnesses estimated that if a small device, containing only a few curies of cobalt-60 or cesium-137, had been detonated in lower Manhattan on September 10, 2001, and if existing EPA rules were applied to the clean-up, more buildings would have had to be evacuated, razed, and trucked away to low-level radioactive waste dumps than were lost or damaged by the al-Qaida attack of September 11. That is more damage, more financial loss, than was caused when the Twin Towers came down, but with this difference: almost nobody would be killed. At most a few dozen people might get sick. We must do more to prepare for an attack, and also to prevent one. Fortunately, we can, in fact, make such an attack much harder to pull off and much easier to recover from.

Proper preparation for an attack will make a world of difference; we need to begin putting response plans into place and testing them rigorously, both in the field and in table-top exercises. First responders need the tools to act. You cannot see or smell radiation; it can only be detected with special instruments. Small radiation detectors are the size of a pocket pager; larger ones could easily be built into a squad car. A network of detectors in fixed locations could be erected, a few per square mile, in cities such as Washington or Wilmington at a cost of a few million dollars per city. Such sensors might provide early warning of smuggled material on the roads and information on affected areas if somebody brings radiological terror to our cities.

Avoiding panic among the American people will be an important goal of responders, and that will require education. Claims of probable mass casualties from a radiological attack do an injustice to the American people. If repeated over and over again this doom-saying will be a self-fulfilling prophecy spreading panic if an attack actually does happen. Should we be attacked by radiological terrorists, there are very simple things those who have been exposed can do to reduce their chances of being a casualty to nearly zero.

The first is to remain calm. The next is to stay near the point of exposure long enough for nuclear response crews to check for radioactive contamination. And the last, the easiest, is to put your clothes in a plastic bag and then take a good shower and shampoo. Radioactive dust washed off the body is radioactive dust no longer available to do harm to you.

We need to look to the radioactive material itself. Radioactive sources must be kept in responsible hands; but that is difficult because they are used throughout industry, for example, to take x-ray pictures of oil pipelines, and even to tell if a can of soda is properly filled. Radioactive sources are indispensable to modern medicine, where they are used to treat cancer or to perform crucial diagnostic tests. We should not eliminate these sources from our society. We can, however, provide greater protection for such sources.

Before September 11, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission focused its efforts on safety. It assumed that licensed users were responsible users. Since September 11, the Commission has begun to reevaluate its rules with the added assumption that some folks might seek licenses in order to gain access to the material as part of a plot to attack this country or its allies. We need tighter rules, and we also need a bigger Federal effort to track down and secure missing radioactive sources. The fact is that sometimes sources just go astray; they are ``orphaned,'' in the jargon of that business. There are very few places where companies can safely dispose of sources they no longer need.

The Department of Energy ``Off-Site Source Recovery Program'' is supposed to take charge of excess sources. But the administration has cut this vital program from $5.7 million in fiscal year 2001 to a paltry $2.2 million requested for fiscal year 2003. Congress should fix that. Overseas, the greatest threat is likely to come from the poorly guarded radioactive materials from the former Soviet Union. [Page: S6061] Late in 2001, two containers containing enormous amounts of radioactive strontium-90 were found by hunters in the woods of the Republic of Georgia. The sources were so hot that they melted the snow for yards around, leading the three woodsmen to cart them off to warm their tent. By the next morning all were sick with radiation poisoning, including severe burns where they had touched the containers.

Those two radioactive sources were left over from a Soviet program to build compact, powerful, and very portable electrical generators for use in remote areas. Nobody knows where all of the Soviet-produced generators wound up, but wherever they are, they are very dangerous.

Other countries, including Brazil and Mexico, have seen old sources stolen, broken into, melted down to make reinforcing bars and patio furniture, with resulting injuries and deaths to some of their citizens. The United States must work through the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure the physical protection and accountability of significant radioactive sources throughout the globe. This will require additional U.S. voluntary contributions to the IAEA and may also require additional non-proliferation assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union. After all, that is where the majority of the unaccounted for hot sources are thought to have been made.

I commend the administration for yesterday's announcement of a new joint United States-Russian program to spend $20 million this year to secure and safeguard radiological materials in the former Soviet Union. The program would focus on the radioactive power generators I mentioned earlier, as well as a dozen poorly guarded storage areas for radiological materials. Of course, the former Soviet Union is not the sole overseas repository of radioactive sources attractive to terrorists. But this program may serve as a model for future efforts.

So there is plenty for us to do to lessen the risk and the impact of radiological terrorism. The United States has begun to contribute to the IAEA's Program Against Nuclear Terrorism. Today's amendment is a good step in increasing U.S. assistance in this area.

But I worry far more about something even worse than radiological terrorism. I worry about terrorists building or stealing a real atomic bomb. Our committee learned in chilling detail, in classified session, just how easy it is to make a bomb, given only a comparatively small amount of highly enriched uranium-235. In those sessions Senators were able to see and handle a full-scale mockup, complete in almost every detail, but using inert material instead of uranium. I won't reveal the design; I don't want to give away any information that could be used against us. But building that device is easy. It could be done in a machine shop with ordinary lathes and drills and mills without any need for computer-controlled and export-controlled dual-use equipment. And it would fit in the trunk of a compact car or the back end of a pickup.

Those who attended the briefing also saw a small tactical nuclear weapon, again a full-scale mockup of a real one once in the U.S. inventory. With one of those you don't need a fancy brief-case bomb; you can lift it with one hand. I am not worried about American nuclear weapons going missing, but I am very worried about the tens of thousands built by the Soviet Union. Their tactical nuclear weapons are no bigger than ours, and unless Russia's security for those weapons is a lot better than for its chemical weapons, our colleagues in the Russian Duma should be as worried as I am.

Terrorists with an improvised nuclear device or a stolen weapon could kill tens or hundreds of thousands of people, not a mere handful. A crude nuclear weapon set off at Metro Center would likely kill people near the Capitol complex. A Hiroshima-sized bomb detonated near the White House would leave the Capitol in ruins.

And, talk about a dirty bomb, a small nuclear blast at ground level would spew out hundreds or thousands of times more radioactive material than the biggest dirty bomb imaginable. That much fallout would kill Americans.

We must invest in new technologies to detect bomb-grade uranium and plutonium. That is not an easy task. Neither material is particularly radioactive, at least not compared to cesium-137, cobalt-60, strontium-90 and iridium-192, the isotopes of choice for a dirty bomb. Frankly, we do not know how to detect most bomb-grade fissile material today; certainly not if the weapon is shielded a bit, concealed in a cargo container being whisked through our ports or stashed in the hold of a freight aircraft. None of us knows how long we have to prepare for nuclear terrorism, but we know for sure that the terrorists are shaping their own plans. We, this body, must act sooner rather than later: to provide our responders the tools they need; to secure radioactive and fissile material, both here and abroad, to the greatest extent possible; and to secure our borders against smugglers who would literally flatten our cities.

The Baker-Cutler report card on Department of Energy non-proliferation programs with Russia proposed spending about $30 billion over 8 to 10 years to secure Russia's excess plutonium and bomb-grade uranium, improve security controls on its nuclear materials, and downsize its nuclear complex without leaving its weapons scientists prey to offers from rogue states or terrorists.

Senator Baker and Mr. Cutler called this ``the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today.'' In my view, they were absolutely right. Indeed, we must build on their recommendations: by adding support for programs to secure radioactive sources; and by securing any weapons-grade material in nuclear reactors around the world. This amendment Senator Domenici, I, and our fellow co-sponsors are introducing today takes some sensible steps toward these goals. For example, the new research, development, and demonstration program I mentioned earlier will help fund efforts to assist other nations in developing means for the safe disposal of radioactive materials and a proper regulatory framework for licensing control of radioactive sources.

But we all must recognize that this amendment is only a first step to address a threat of this urgency and magnitude. Today we spend $7 or $8 billion a year to guard against the unlikely event of Iran, Iraq, or North Korea putting a nuclear weapon on an intercontinental ballistic missile with a return address, and firing it at us despite the assurance of overwhelming retaliation. We need to show the same sense of urgency in combating the more immediate risk of a more anonymous nuclear weapon without that missile.

In the wake of the World Trade Center attacks, committees of the House and Senate are rightly asking whether more could have been done to detect and prevent that attack and how we can do a better job in the future. What sort of investigation will we have? How will we rebuild our people's trust in government? And what will we tell our children and grandchildren, if we fail to do everything we can to prevent terrorists from doing a hundred times more harm?

Mrs. CARNAHAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to support amendment No. 4009 to the Defense Authorization Act introduced by my colleague from New Mexico. This legislation is a significant step forward in the protection of our Nation from weapons of mass destruction. Since the end of the cold war, the United States has taken considerable steps to reduce the spread of these weapons. Senators Domenici and Lugar, along with former Senator Nunn, have been true visionaries in this field. Because of their efforts, we face less of a threat from the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy than we would have otherwise. The Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the related programs at the Department of Energy are truly ``defense by other means.''

While these far-sighted programs have been very successful, they were not designed to address some of the terrorist threats we now face. To address these shortcomings, I introduced the Global Nuclear Security Act. This legislation attacks the problem in three ways. [Page: S6062]

First, it calls on the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, to develop a plan to encourage countries to adhere to the highest security standards for all nuclear material. Second, it requires the DOE to develop a systematic approach to secure radiological materials outside the United States that could be used to create a so-called ``dirty bomb.'' Third, it directs the DOE, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, to develop plans for reducing the threat of terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants outside the United States. I was pleased to work with Senators LANDRIEU, ROBERTS, LEVIN, and WARNER to incorporate this legislation into the Defense Authorization bill.

Now, I am pleased to join Senator Domenici, and many other colleagues in supporting legislation that will build on the accomplishments of our threat reduction programs and the Global Nuclear Security Act. This amendment would broaden and extend several existing threat reduction programs. Among its many provisions, it calls for the National Nuclear Security Administration to increase research efforts to identify technologies directed at protecting us from weapons of mass destruction. It echoes my call for the NNSA to produce a plan, and to move quickly on that plan, for expanding the nuclear material protection and control program outside of the former Soviet Union, and focusing on protection and control of material that could be used to create ``dirty bombs.''

This amendment also seeks to accelerate the disposal of highly enriched uranium and plutonium found around the world through a variety of methods. Senator Domenici's amendment greatly complements the Global Nuclear Security Act. And the combination of these two pieces of legislation makes this Defense Authorization bill stronger. Not only are we authorizing the Administration to develop strategies for curbing the spread of dangerous materials, but we are mandating swift action to implement these plans.

I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from New Mexico. The amendment (No. 4009) was agreed to.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and ranking member. I believe the cross section of Senators cosponsoring the amendment indicates the broad support for it. There is nothing more important than the United States doing its utmost in this era of nonproliferation, where we do everything we can to make sure that terrorists now, and in the future, have the most difficult time getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction.

There is even a significant American effort in this amendment with reference to ``dirty'' bombs. The Senators and staff who have reviewed it think it gives America and the world a better chance of finding out where the components are before things happen, and sets up guidelines and criteria so that many different discernment points are available but not just in the United States. So after a lot of work on this amendment by many, I thank the Senate for adopting it. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I commend and congratulate Senator Domenici. He has been very active in the fight against proliferation. This gives the DOE important additional capability and authority to help us win the war against proliferation. This is a very important contribution to the nonproliferation effort. I was proud to cosponsor this amendment. Again, I commend the Senator from New Mexico.

2A) In Support of Missile Defense
Mr. KYL. Madam President, by way of introduction, my remarks will primarily be in support of an amendment that will be offered by the distinguished ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Virginia, tomorrow to restore missile defense funding that was cut in the Armed Services Committee.

   I wanted to note that this afternoon the President advised both Senator McCain and I that he would be traveling to our home State of Arizona tomorrow--specifically to the town of Show Low which is under threat of this raging wildfire we have all seen and read about--and he graciously offered to allow us to accompany him on that trip. But, obviously, the importance of this Defense authorization bill--specifically, the votes we will have tomorrow, including an effort to restore funding for the missile defense portion of the bill--requires that we remain.

   I am going to speak to the issue that will involve his visit to Arizona tomorrow, why these raging wildfires don't need to continue to devastate our country, what we can do about it, and what we need to do about it as a country at the conclusion of my remarks on the Defense bill. I will address my comments first to this bill which is before the Senate, and which we will be considering this week.

   It seems to me that there is a strange disconnect between recent developments in the world and some of the contents of the bill that we are considering.

   For example, in early May, Iran--newly dubbed by the State Department as the No. 1 terrorist nation in the

   world--conducted a successful test of its 800-plus-mile-range Shahab III missile. There are some reports that Iran is now set to begin domestic production of the Shahab III which will be able to reach Israel, as well as U.S. troops deployed in the Middle East and South Asia.

   On May 7, the Associated Press, citing an administration official, reported that Iran is continuing the development of a longer range missile, the Shahab IV, with an estimated range of 1,200 to 1,800 miles. The Shahab IV will be able to reach deep into Europe.

   That means that the fanatical mullahs in Tehran will be able to put a multitude of U.S. allies and our troops within striking distance of their missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

   We have also just witnessed one of the scariest standoffs in recent decades with India and Pakistan angrily pointing their nuclear-tipped missiles at each other.

   These developments represent a dramatic increase in the worldwide missile threat.

   You might think that the United States would therefore want to accelerate its effort to build a defense against such weapons. But the bill before us today would seriously hamper our ability to do exactly that. This is not something that the American people will stand for.

   This is why I believe that tomorrow it is incumbent upon the Members of this body to listen to their constituents, to listen to the President of the United States, to look at the events around the world, and to reconnect our policy here in the Senate to the realities of the world around us.

   This bill makes very deep and damaging cuts to the President's proposed budget for missile defense. Unless remedied, those cuts will seriously limit our ability to end our current--and let me say our unacceptable--vulnerabilities to ballistic missile attack.

   As I noted, the threat from ballistic missiles continues to grow.

   In addition to the two examples I mentioned, consider this: Today, there are nearly three dozen countries that either have or are developing ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication. That includes Iran's fellow ``axis of evil'' partners--or members, I should say--Iraq and North Korea, as well as the terrorist regimes of Syria and Libya.

   Let us take a look at some of these developments, which, unless indicated otherwise, are taken straight from the December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate on Foreign Ballistic Missiles. That is the estimate of our intelligence community about this threat.

   North Korea, despite the moratorium on flight testing that it is supposedly adhering to, continues its development of long-range missiles.

   According to press accounts and administration officials, North Korea has recently conducted rocket motor tests of these missiles.

   In fact, North Korea's Taepo Dong 2 missile, which is capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear-weapon-sized payload, may now be ready for flight testing.

   As to Iraq, despite U.N. sanctions, Baghdad has been able to maintain the infrastructure and expertise necessary to develop longer range missiles.

   Its Al-Samoud missile, with a 60 to 90-mile range, probably will be deployed soon.

   And Iraq retains a covert force of scud-variant missiles, launchers, and conventional, chemical, and biological warheads.

   Not to forget about China, the intelligence community assesses that it could begin deploying its 5,000-mile-range DF-31 missile during the first half of this decade. That means essentially any time now. China's even longer range mobile missile, the DF-41, could be deployed in the latter half of the decade.

   China also maintains a robust force of medium-range CSS-5 missiles which can reach our troops in Japan and Korea.

   Of course, China continues to add to its arsenal of short-range missiles which already number in the several hundreds and are deployed opposite Taiwan.

   According to the intelligence community--and I am quoting now--

   China's leaders calculate that conventionally armed ballistic missiles add a potent new dimension to Chinese military capabilities, and they are committed to continue fielding them at a rapid pace. Beijing's growing short-range ballistic missile force provides China with a military capability that avoids the political and practical constraints associated with the use of nuclear-armed missiles. The latest Chinese short-range ballistic missiles provide a survivable and effective conventional strike force and expand conventional ballistic missile coverage.

   Even the terrorists are getting into the act. According to a variety of news sources, some of which have quoted U.S. and Israeli officials, Iran and Syria have supplied Lebanon's Hezbollah terrorist organization with Fajr-5 missiles, which, at 40 to 50 miles, can reach deeper into Israel than any rockets Hezbollah has fired so far. One press account stated further that Hezbollah is assembling chemical warheads for these missiles.

   These developments, among others, led to the following conclusions in the December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate:

   One, short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly if armed with weapons of mass destruction, already pose a significant threat overseas to U.S. interests, military forces, and allies.

   Two, proliferation of ballistic-missile-related technologies, materials, and expertise--especially by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean entities--has enabled emerging missile states to accelerate development timelines for their missile programs.

   In other words, this is making the point that instead of having to always indigenously develop a missile capability, a country can now buy these literally readymade missiles from countries such as China, North Korea, and Russia.

   Three, most intelligence community agencies project that,

   before 2015, the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran, and possibly from Iraq, as well as from the existing ICBM forces of China and, of course, Russia.

   Four, the probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction will be used against U.S. forces or interests is higher today than during most of the cold war, and will continue to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries mature.

   After September 11, we dare not willfully remain vulnerable to these threats. But that is essentially the impact of the partisan cuts that were made to this bill when it was before the Armed Services Committee.

   Of course, there are those who suggest that the September 11 attacks demonstrated that the major threat to

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   The new types of threats we face from terrorists and the rogue regimes that support them cannot be dealt with solely through traditional deterrence. President Bush was right when he recently remarked at West Point:

   Deterrence--the promise of massive retaliation against nations--means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.

   In addition, I make this point. I do not think the majority of the Iranian or Iraqi people or Syrian people detest the United States or wish to attack us with nuclear weapons.

   If tyrants like Saddam Hussein, who dictatorially rule some of those countries, were to use a weapon of mass destruction against our ally Israel, or even against U.S. troops abroad, I am not sure the President of the United States, in those circumstances, would want to retaliate with a nuclear weapon in the middle of Baghdad, let's say, or some other Iraqi city.

   Clearly, we would rain massive retaliation upon Saddam Hussein, but we would have to think very carefully about a nuclear deterrent in a situation such as that.

   So traditional deterrence may or may not be an appropriate response to a terrorist attack. The bottom line is, we are not always dealing with rational actors. To depend on nuclear deterrence alone with a dictator like Saddam Hussein, who, remember, used chemical weapons against his own people, or a terrorist like Osama bin Laden would be to place American lives in the hands of madmen. That, itself, is mad when we have the ability to defend against such an attack.

   That alternative, of course, is to develop and deploy missile defenses. They will add to our options in terms of a crisis. Defenses against missiles will help the United States avoid being frozen into inaction by the threat of a missile attack.

   This is the threat of blackmail: A country that acquires a nuclear weapon and the ballistic missile capability to deliver it will be in a much stronger position to dictate what it wants around the world--or to prevent the United States from acting--than one that does not. It reduces our options significantly.

   Just imagine the impact on our decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein in 1991 had he been able to threaten the United States or our allies with nuclear missiles. Missile defense will also reduce the incentives for proliferation by devaluing offensive missiles. If a rogue actor views missiles as likely to be effective because of our lack of defenses, they will be developed. If, on the other hand, we have defenses, then they will obviously be less inclined to spend as much time or money trying to acquire it.

   Finally, and perhaps most important of all, in the worst case scenario, we will save American lives with missile defense.

   So we should not be fooled by the fact that the bill still authorizes several billion dollars for something called missile defense. Make no mistake that the cuts in this bill are very carefully designed to gut the administration's plans to protect the American people from missiles.

   If one had wanted to leave intact a program that looked very much like missile defense, but very surgically gutted the key components of it, one could not have done better than the language and the money that comes out of the Armed Services Committee bill.

   Allow me to describe some of the features of the President's new approach. We are very much aware that the President has decided that we need to transform our military. And the President has proposed an aggressive overhaul of not only the missile defense program but other programs from the previous administration.

   Let me describe some of the features of this transformational approach: First, a single, integrated architecture to command and control all of the various components of a missile defense system. What this does is to move us from the old concept of several unlinked systems to one overarching system composed of several integrated components or elements, as they are now called. This system removes the need for each element to do everything and, instead, distributes the basic tasks--such as launch detection, tracking, and battle management--across the entire system.

   So instead of having three or four specific components that do everything, you have several ways of attacking the problem, all linked together; therefore, they are much more effective in their overall ability to detect, track, and destroy an enemy missile.

   Secondly, multilayered defenses capable of intercepting missiles in all phases of flight, including the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases is an element of the President's transformation plan. The obvious benefits of this feature is that it will give us several shots, if necessary, to knock down a missile after it has been launched.

   The point is, we do not have very much time, when a missile has been launched against us, to make a decision to launch a counterattack. By the time we do that, the missile could well be coming down on top of us. We need the ability to have multilayered defenses which can be effective in the boost phase, as the offending missile is going up, which can try to attack it in midcourse, and, as a last resort, as it is barreling down on us at something like 17,000 miles an hour.

   But if you only rely on that last system, you are not going to get multiple shots. You are going to get one shot. And it may not always do the trick. In that case, you have lost.

   Third, the ability to deploy defenses rapidly in the event of an emergency is one of the critical components of the President's plan. To accommodate these goals and others, the administration reformed the Missile Defense Agency and gave it wide latitude to pursue innovative approaches rather than the former approach which was to have a long-term project of design and research and then development and then deployment.

   The problem is that the bill on the floor today takes dead aim at each of these worthy efforts. The system's integration and command and control accounts, the brains of the whole system, if you will, are reduced in funding by two-thirds. That is gutting the program. To cut the funding by two-thirds, literally, imagine the human body. It looks just like it did after the operation except for one thing: You have taken out the brain. It is not going to work very well. That is the first damage that was done to the President's program as a result of Armed Services Committee action.

   Programs to intercept missiles in the boost phase, particularly those employing new basing modes and technologies, are virtually wiped out. Funding for 10 THAAD test missiles, which would be deployed in an emergency, is eliminated, and the Missile Defense Agency staff is cut by two-thirds. Essentially what the bill leaves us is the old piecemeal approach, with many of the most promising technologies starved of funding and a variety of impediments created to early deployment of the President's proposed system.

   It is quite interesting that just as these cuts were being made, cuts that will wreck the Bush administration's approach to protecting the American people from missiles, the ABM Treaty lapsed into history on June 13. The bill is an attempt to revive the spirit of that treaty by those who have never accepted President Bush's decision to opt out of it. If this is the case, they are in dwindling company.

   A year ago, the anti-missile defense, pro-ABM Treaty crowd created much hubbub over how any decision to renounce the ABM Treaty would supposedly alienate our allies, cause a major rift with Russia, and spark an arms race. It was going to be a disaster. Well, as it turns out, none of those dire predictions came true. Let's have a look.

   Have we alienated our allies? As of last count, 12 of our 19 NATO allies have contributed troops to our campaign in Afghanistan, 7 countries have sent their troops into combat alongside

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   Did it cause a rift with Russia? No. Russia has just entered into a new partnership with NATO, and President Bush just signed a communique with President Putin of Russia in May, committing both sides to cooperation on a host of issues, including, of all things, missile defense.

   How about a new arms race? No, again. President Bush also signed a treaty with Russia under which both sides intend to reduce strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200. So the doomsayers were wrong. It is true that Russia and many European countries might have preferred that President Bush not renounce the ABM Treaty, but it seems these countries were not quite as wedded to this outmoded document as some of its Americans supporters.

   The ABM Treaty, as the cold war that gave birth to it, is gone. Russia and the United States, despite a number of disagreements and interests that don't always intersect, have moved beyond enmity toward a new, more cooperative relationship, and at the same time we have entered into a new

   area in international relations in which the threats to this Nation are increasingly complex and difficult to predict.

   So the President expended a great deal of energy and capital in working with our allies and Russia to terminate the cold war and its documentation in the form of the ABM Treaty, to enter into new agreements with Russia, to demonstrate we are friends, not enemies. In order to be able to pivot and address the new threats that face us, the threats from these Third World rogue powers, he proposes a national missile defense.

   Having gone to all of that trouble--and I shouldn't characterize it as trouble so much as devoting a great deal of America's prestige and commitment to this effort--we now have opponents in the Senate who would go right back to a missile defense of the kind that would be authorized by the ABM Treaty, which is to say virtually none at all. That is wrong, very wrong.

   The traditional cold-war-style deterrence is not going to deal with the threats we face today. It is time for ABM Treaty supporters who have stood in the way of missile defense for nearly 30 years to recognize this new reality. This reality was brought home with horrible abruptness on September 11. Just imagine if that day were to repeat itself but this time with a ballistic missile armed with a nuclear or chemical or biological warhead. The only responsible course of action to deal with that possibility is to proceed with the most robust program of missile defense development we can muster. That is what the President proposed.

   The Pentagon's approach to missile defense is exactly that. It is an aggressive, forward-looking plan to provide the American people with protection against ballistic missiles at the earliest possible date. Indeed, this body overwhelmingly voted to make such a plan U.S. policy in the 1999 Missile Defense Act.

   We have to fund the plan, and we can't allow those who oppose missile defense to go in and surgically remove the key components of the President's program in order to effectively defeat missile defense while at the same time arguing that they have left the program intact. It does no good to spend $5 or $6 billion on a program without a brain, on a program that can't communicate among its independent parts, and on a program that does not begin the transformational policy the President has outlined.

   I am hopeful that when we vote on the amendment of the Senator from Virginia tomorrow, which restores the funding that was proposed by the President, the Senate will overwhelmingly stand with the President and with the American people, with common sense, to be able to defend the American people against ballistic missile attack. The issue is literally that stark.

   If we support the committee action, while people can claim that they still support missile defense, the reality will be that that program cannot go forward because it has effectively been denuded by the cuts that have been made. We have to support the amendment of the Senator from Virginia.

   I wanted to talk about that tonight because I am not sure that tomorrow I will be able to engage in the debate prior to the vote. As I said, it is a vote which we must be here to cast, notwithstanding a devastating tragedy occurring in my home State.

   Since I believe it is the desire of the majority to terminate my remarks on the Defense authorization bill and the Warner amendment so that we can go into morning business for a little bit and I can discuss that subject separately, I ask unanimous consent that a Wall Street Journal editorial of June 17, 2002, be printed in the RECORD on the Defense authorization bill.

   There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   Don't Go Wobbly

   The crisis in the Indian subcontinent is currently engaging the diplomatic activity of all the great powers. Rightly so. The calamity a nuclear exchange could bring is truly dreadful to contemplate.

   We can expect that this somber fact alone will exercise an effective restraint on both sides. But we cannot assume that the nuclear deterrent effect is the same in the Cold War and post-Cold War worlds. This reflection has implications far beyond the subcontinent. It goes to the heart of our priorities since the events of Sept. 11.

   UNTOLD DAMAGE

   During most of my political lifetime the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, had massive nuclear arsenals, even a small proportion of which would have inflicted untold damage. But this knowledge imposed discipline on the aggressive expansionism of the Soviets and made for a kind of stability. There were, in fact, well-understood limits on the extent to which either side would directly challenge the other's interests. The exceptions--like the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962--only proved the rule.

   The nuclear deterrent did not prevent all war; the conflicts in South East Asia show that. But the West's possession of a credible nuclear deterrent prevented nuclear war. It also prevented conventional war in the Alliance's most vulnerable sector--Europe. The calculation behind the deterrent was not completely fail-safe. But the rules were clear, the psychology understood and each side's sticking points known.

   One cannot say the same with India and Pakistan. The conflicting claims on Kashmir are compounded by lack of experience in coping with the temptations offered by their own nuclear capabilities. President Clinton's attempt four years ago to persuade the hostile neighbors to relinquish their nuclear status was doomed to failure. The task of President Bush and his envoys now is both more complex and more realistic: to remind New Delhi and Islamabad that war, even a victorious conventional war, would in the long run damage their nations' interests more than a messy and unsatisfactory peace. The dangers of a nuclear escalation only make that more true.

   But this crisis also holds wider lessons for us. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has fundamentally changed the world in which we and our children will live. India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals have given them the power to inflict huge destruction. But neither is a rogue state. India is a democracy. Pakistan is not, but it has a ruler who has demonstrated his willingness to side with democracies against terror. Both are basically friendly to the West.

   Proliferation of WMD offers far more menacing risks when those weapons are in the hands of the West's sworn enemies. We have to assume that if those who hate us are confident that they can threaten us or our allies by this means they will do so. The threat alone could transform the West's ability to intervene in order to protect its interests or to undertake humanitarian missions. In some cases we must expect the rogue states to try to go beyond mere threat.

   It is still true that any such action would be irrational. There can be no doubt that response to the use of WMD against us would be massive--probably nuclear. Yet even this awesome prospect might not deter a fanatic who cared nothing for his own country or safety. We already see such a mentality at work in the suicide bombers. At the rate at which nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry and missile technology have been proliferating we must expect that at some point these weapons will be used.

   The is quite simply the greatest challenge of our times. We must rise to it.

   The right strategy has been clearly enunciated by President Bush. America must speedily build a ballistic missile defense system which will afford protection against missiles launched from anywhere in the globe. The president has made progress in winning the argument for this policy. He deserves the fullest cooperation from all who stand to gain from it, including Britain.

   We also have to isolate rogue states that are seeking to develop (or have developed) WMD, and eliminate the threat they pose. Sometimes this will be possible by a mixture of diplomatic sticks and carrots. Iran for example, was quite rightly classed by the president as part of the ``axis of evil.'' It has a missile program which poses a threat to

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   North Korea, on the other hand, is beyond reform. Diplomacy has little value. Indeed, North Korea has already been appeased too much. It is in the grip of a psychotic Stalinist regime whose rule is sustained by terror and bankrolled by those who buy its missiles. It is one of the few states that could launch an unprovoked nuclear strike. The regime must go, and I fear that it may not go peacefully.

   Between Iran on the one hand and North Korea on the other, the list of rogue states will be the subject of continuing revision and debate. And in each case there will be a mix of policies appropriate to achieve our goal of removing the threat which these states pose.

   That is also true of Iraq. I have detected a certain amount of wobbling about the need to remove Saddam Hussein--though not from President Bush. It is not surprising, given the hostility of many allies to this venture, that some in Washington may be having second thoughts. It is, of course, right that those who have the duty to weigh up the risks of particular courses of action should give their advice--though they would be better to direct their counsel to the president not the press. But in any case, as somebody once said, this is no time to go wobbly.

   Saddam must go. His continued survival after comprehensively losing the Gulf War had done untold damage to the West's standing in a region where the only forgivable sin is weakness. His flouting of the terms on which hostilities ceased has made a laughingstock of the international community. His appalling mistreatment of his own countrymen continues unabated. It is clear to anyone willing to face reality that the only reason Saddam took the risk of refusing to submit his activities to U.N. inspectors was that he is exerting every muscle to build WMD. We do not know exactly what stage that has reached. But to allow this process to continue because the risks of action to arrest it seem too great would be foolish in the extreme.

   COERCIVE MEASURES

   I do not claim to know the precise balance of coercive measures required now to remove Saddam: only those with access to the best intelligence can assess that. A major deployment of ground forces as well as sustained air strikes will probably be required. And it will be essential that internal groups opposed to Saddam be mobilized and assisted. No one pretends that an equivalent of the Afghan Northern Alliance is available. But I suspect that once the aura of terror surrounding the Iraqi regime is dispelled we may be astonished by the number of opponents who come forward to help finish the job.

   Finally, a warning: We should not try now to predetermine the final outcome for a post-Saddam Iraq. One of the errors in 1991 was an exaggerated fear of the possible breakup of Iraq if the measures required to topple Saddam were taken. The Kirds and Shiites have since endured years of murderous repression as a result. In great strategic questions it is possible to be too clever. We need to concentrate on what we can achieve with the instruments at hand, and then press ahead boldly with the task before us. That will be quite taxing enough.

   Mr. KYL. Madam President, that terminates my remarks on the bill. May I inquire of the Chair, is it correct that at the conclusion of my remarks the Chair was prepared to put the Senate into a period of morning business?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

   The Senate is in morning business.

2B) National Defense Authorization Debate
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I have been following the proceedings over the last day or so with increasing concern. As we said last week, we all know that this legislation has to be completed this week. I had hoped, because of the agreement we were able to reach among leadership last week, that we would table nonrelevant amendments, that we would be able to move expeditiously with amendments on those issues for which there was an interest, and that we would accommodate these amendments in a way that would allow us to move the consideration of this bill along successfully. I guess I was overly optimistic.

   Frankly, I am very disappointed, in spite of that agreement, in spite of the efforts we have made to encourage Senators to come to the floor, and in spite of the fact that we know there is so much that still needs to be done, that we are at a procedural impasse.

   I, frankly, know of no other recourse but to file cloture. That is the only way we can be absolutely certain we will complete our work before the end of this week. I have indicated that lament to the Republican leader.

   I have noted with some concern to our managers that unless we do, I see no really practical way we can complete our work and perhaps accommodate other issues and other needs legislatively before the end of this week and before the Fourth of July recess.

   Frankly, I don't know what the impasse is now. I thought we had reached an agreement on one of the amendments. At the very last minute, it appeared that in spite of that agreement there was opposition on the other side. And that precluded the opportunity to move forward on at least one of these issues.

   CLOTURE MOTION

   Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion have been presented under rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.

   The legislative clerk read as follows:

   Cloture Motion

   We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, hereby move to bring to a close the debate on S. 2514, the Defense authorization bill:
Harry Reid, Jon Corzine, Richard Durbin, Tom Harkin, Carl Levin, Mary Landrieu, Tom Carper, Ben Nelson, Ron Wyden, Daniel Akaka, Debbie Stabenow, Evan Bayh, Maria Cantwell, Herb Kohl, John Edwards, Jeff Bingaman, Joseph Lieberman.

   Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I will indicate to all colleagues that we will not leave this week until this bill has been voted on and final passage. I hope that won't be the last piece of legislative work we do. I hope we will even be able to work on a couple of the nominations. There are a number of issues on the Executive Calendar that could be addressed. But we can't do anything until we have completed our work here.

   Senators should be aware that there will be a cloture vote on Thursday morning. That will then trigger a 30-hour period within which this work must be completed so that we have a guarantee that at least before Friday afternoon the legislative time will have run out and we will have an opportunity to vote on final passage. I regret that I have to do this, but I see no other recourse.

   I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the role.

   Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield myself time under leader time to respond to the action just taken by Senator Daschle. Having been in his position, I certainly understand why he is doing that. I think it is the right thing to do in this case.

   We clearly need to move this Defense authorization bill forward, as we did the supplemental. We need to get an agreement on that and provide additional funds for defense and homeland security.

   We also need to get completion of the Defense authorization bill before we leave for the Fourth of July recess.

   How could we celebrate the freedom of the country without having done our work on the Defense bill in view of all that we are dealing with at home and abroad?

   So I think the majority leader was in his rights, and I would plan to support his cloture motion unless we can come up with some agreement that would allow us to save time by vitiating that. But I pledge my continued support to try to get this bill done in an orderly fashion at a reasonable hour, hopefully Thursday afternoon or early or late Thursday evening.

   I just want to be on record that I understand why he is doing it, and I think it is the right thing, all things considered, at this time.

   I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, in light of this development, it is safe to announce there will be no more rollcall votes for the remainder of the day.

   I yield the floor. And if no none is seeking the floor, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I will give a few remarks. If anyone needs the floor, I will be glad to yield.

   I think it is important for us to recognize, as we go forward with this new national missile defense system, that we are moving into a new era.

   We had the ABM Treaty in 1972 that was the cornerstone of a mutual assured destruction strategy between the United States and the Soviet Union. We both agreed we would not launch missiles against one another and we would not, under the treaty, explicitly build an antimissile defense system. Not one of us would, leaving each other vulnerable to one another.

   The treaty only has six or seven pages. It is in the appendix of this book that I have in the Chamber. The reason I want to share it is because a lot of people wondered why, 6 months ago, President Bush chose to get out of the treaty. And that took effect just a few days ago when the 6 months ran from the notice he gave in December.

   This treaty really kept us from defending ourselves. In the first article it says:

   Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region. .....

   We basically said we could not deploy one. It says that again in several places here.

   Article V says--and this was the conflict we were having, the problems we were having:

   Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

   Much of our new scientific development in recent years indicates that sea-based, air-based, space-based has the capacity to help us protect our homeland from missile attack.

   Earlier this afternoon I read some quotes from the vice admiral in charge of the Defense Intelligence Agency in which he said China was developing a mobile-based IBM system. China was not party to the treaty; neither was Korea, neither was Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. They were not a party to the treaty. All those countries are striving to develop a missile system.

   China, according to the intelligence report, is, in fact, developing a mobile land-based system. According to this treaty we had with the Soviet Union--a country that no longer exists--that treaty prohibited us from doing that or having a sea-based or an air-based system. This was getting really out of

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   We are moving into an age where 16 countries have a missile system. Some of those are virulent rogue nations that desire us harm. We had this treaty that kept us from preparing a defense to that.

   Some people forgot, also, that under the treaty there were some exceptions. We chose one route and the Soviet Union chose another one, which was to build a national missile defense around Moscow. They, in fact, deployed a missile defense system, under their option, around Moscow. But we were prohibited from doing that.

   President Bush took a lot of grief. You remember it. They said he was acting unilaterally. And the Socialist left in Europe went up in arms that the United States should not get out of this treaty. Some in Russia said it was a mistake, and they objected. But the truth is, I think they were just negotiating with us for a good deal.

   President Bush was steadfast. He stayed the course. The National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was consistent; she never backed off. They made clear that at this point in history the mutual assured destruction that existed between us and the Soviet Union was out of date. We now hope to have in Russia a friend, not an enemy. It was an entirely different nation. What our threat was--and we learned on September 11 just how real this was--was from rogue nations. And we ought to be able to begin to prepare as to how to defend ourselves from that.

   In 1999, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld chaired a commission to study the threat posed to the United States from ballistic missile attack. That was a bipartisan commission. And they studied the issue intensely. The commission unanimously voted that the United States was facing a threat from missile attack by other nations. They unanimously agreed that the threat was coming much quicker than had been predicted earlier, and that by the year 2005 we could be subject to missile attack from other nations.

   So that is why the Nation decided, in 1999, to go forward. It was a dramatic vote in this Senate when we voted 97 to 3, with Senator THAD COCHRAN, who spoke earlier this afternoon, being the prime proponent of the legislation. But in addition

   to Senator Cochran, one of his prime cosponsors was Senator Lieberman, the Democratic Vice Presidential candidate last year, and one of the leading senior members of the Armed Services Committee. They proposed the language that, in 1999, stated we would deploy a national missile defense system as soon as technologically feasible.

   We made that decision. We funded it. President Clinton proposed a $5.3 billion budget for national missile defense to carry out that objective.

   President Bush, during the campaign, said he believed we ought to be moving more aggressively, that the threat was more real than some thought. He wanted to step up the pace, and he did do that. He proposed an increase when he became President of about $2.5 billion over the $5.3 billion, making it a $7.7 billion national missile defense budget. That was passed by this body. We had a dispute in committee, and on a party-line vote the increase was not backed in the committee. But when we got to the floor, the full amount was affirmed on voting.

   So this year the President asked for a little bit less. He asked for a $7.6 billion or so expenditure for national missile defense. He did not ask for an increase over last year but actually asked for a small reduction as compared to last year's expenditure. But, again, that was one issue that we disputed in the Armed Services Committee, and on a straight--unfortunately, I thought--party-line vote, $800 million was taken out of the national missile defense fund.

   It was taken out in a way that General Kadish, who has managed this program with integrity and skill and determination, said would damage the program significantly.

   I don't believe we ought to allow that to stand. I believe the full Senate needs to review it and replace that money. Let's do what the President asked. Let's give him the money he requested. Let's keep this plan to build a national missile defense that will include sea-based, mobile land-based, multiple land-based, and space-based, if appropriate, capabilities that will allow us to hit the incoming missiles in their launch phase, midphase, and in the terminal phase, all of which we have the capability to do.

   The tests that have been running have been successful. We have been able to have head-to-head collision, bullet-hitting-bullet, high-over-the-ocean, smashing and destroying missiles. We are going to continue to test it under the most rigorous conditions. I believe this process we are undergoing will be successful, and we will prove that we have the capability to destroy incoming missiles even with decoys, even under the most hostile conditions. That is what we ought to do.

   The total price of it, the $7.6 billion the President asked, out of a $386 billion defense budget that we are putting up this year, is reasonable and appropriate. It represents not a step to cold war but a step to a new, positive relationship, away from mutually assured destruction, away from the hostility we had with the Soviet Union for so long, to a new open day in which we are actively engaged in the world, but a day in which we don't have rogue nations being able to intimidate us, being able to intimidate the President, being able to threaten our country with attack that would have to cause him to pause. It would have to affect our defense policy, if that were to be the case.

   I believe this will move us away from it, give us freedom to act in our just national interest. I urge the Senate to move forward with approval of our President's budget and the Warner amendment.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. CANTWELL). The Senator from Nevada.

   Mr. REID. Madam President, I know my friend from Nebraska, the distinguished Senator, is here. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Hagel, be allowed to make a statement on the underlying bill, that during that period of time there would be no amendments offered to the bill; following the statement of the Senator from Nebraska, the Senate then proceed to a period of morning business for the rest of the evening.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The Senator from Nebraska.

   Mr. HAGEL. I thank my distinguished colleague and friend, the senior Senator from Nevada.

   I rise today in support of the Warner amendment, an amendment that will restore the $814 million cut from the President's request for missile defense funding. Last December, President Bush made the decision to withdraw the United States from the constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the ABM Treaty. That treaty went out of existence on June 13. The United States is no longer constrained by cold-war-era treaty requirements.

   I supported President Bush's actions to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty, which I believe demonstrates his commitment to America's defense. The ABM Treaty was an important treaty. It defined the strategic policy of our Nation and defined the strategic nuclear policy of an era because at that time in 1972, the ABM Treaty was signed by two countries: the Soviet Union and the United States, the only two countries that had the capacity to launch all out nuclear war.

   The world has changed--the world is dynamic--since the ABM Treaty was signed, and the policy of mutually assured destruction that formed the cornerstone of our nuclear deterrent policy is gone.

   Now, as September 11 has made brutally clear, we face varied threats from terrorists, individuals, nations, organizations, and those that support them. These threats, these challenges come in many forms. Currently, 12 nations have nuclear weapons programs; 28 nations have ballistic missiles; 13 nations have biological weapons; and 16 nations have chemical weapons.

   These new realities mean we must place a greater emphasis on defense--all forms of defense. Unfortunately, the defense

   authorization bill reported out of the Senate Armed Services Committee takes a step backwards with regard to missile defense.

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   The $814 million cut will have a profound effect on U.S. efforts to continue research and important development and eventually deploy an effective missile defense system.

   In addition to the proposed cuts in research and testing, nearly 70 percent of the Missile Defense Agency's civilian jobs and related costs could be eliminated if the current legislation we are debating is enacted. These cuts would severely hamper the Missile Defense Agency's ability to conduct day-to-day business. That means tests. That means research. That means development. That means a better understanding of the integration of these new defense capabilities into our overall national security system.

   This is very important. It isn't one test. It is not one program. It is not one system. It is an integration of all these strategic balances that now become the dynamic of our national security system: Offensive weapons, now defensive capabilities to guard against not just ballistic missiles but tactical missiles, nuclear, biological, weapons that can be delivered and delivered anywhere in this country.

   We seek a broad array of research, development, and testing activities to yield a system as soon as feasible, not any system but a relevant, realistic system that in fact has the capability to defend this country and our allies. This is not one monolithic umbrella over just this country. Our deployed forces overseas, large groupings of our deployed forces all over the globe, must be protected. Our friends and allies rely on the United States. This is a large, profound, critically important project. It cannot be accomplished, defined in a year or 2 years. But in the interest of our country and its future security, it is quite clear that we need a national missile defense system.

   The Armed Services Committee's actions in the bill they reported out of committee would hamper this objective. If the current Senate version of the missile defense budget were to stand, Secretary Rumsfeld would recommend that the President veto this legislation.

   It is important to note how missile defense interconnects with our broader security and strategic policies. In February, I visited the U.S. Strategic Command in Bellevue, NB, the headquarters of our military nuclear strategy.

   At 1 o'clock tomorrow afternoon, Secretary Rumsfeld will announce that Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska will become the new headquarters for a merged SPACECOM and STRATCOM facility with new responsibilities

   to face the new challenges and threats of our day.

   Missile defense will be part of that new merged command and will bring Space Command and Strategic Command together. When I was at Offutt Air Force Base earlier this year, I was briefed on how defense policy was moving beyond the cold war nuclear triad of missiles, bombers, and submarines.

   One leg of the new triad would consist of our old nuclear capability, but it would be supplemented with both conventional military superiority and an effective missile defense system--integrating the systems. In forging this new triad, the United States could significantly reduce our nuclear arsenal, while at the same time protecting our country, our troops abroad, and our allies from limited missile threats and possible missile blackmail from rogue regimes, terrorists, and other nations.

   Today's New York Times ran a story discussing a course that this transformation could take. It described a possible new Unified Combatant Command that could ``combine the military network that warns of missile attacks with its force that can fire nuclear and nonnuclear weapons at suspected nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons sites around the world.''

   We are in the process of making this new strategic framework a reality. It is our highest responsibility--the security of this Nation, the security of our men and women around the world, whose only objective is the security of this Nation. We have a responsibility to our allies. We must recognize that the threats facing our Nation are changing, and we must restructure, reorganize, and adapt to these new dangerous threats.

   Missile defense will play a significant role in protecting our country, our allies, and our deployed forces. I might say, isn't it interesting that under President Putin, the Russians are working closely with our defense establishment to work through these new