



THE JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES
MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**Strengthening the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime:
Searching for Common Ground**

**Practical and Achievable
Nuclear Arms Reduction and
Disarmament**

**A Report by the
Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group**

June 28-30, 2007

Hosted by
The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

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I. Introduction

The Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group (MNSG) is a key activity of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). This small body of experienced practitioners and analysts aims to identify the basis for forging consensus or near-consensus on creative but realistic approaches to key nuclear proliferation challenges.

In response to the current proliferation predicament and the potential impact of another “failed” Nuclear Nonproliferation Review Conference in 2010, the Strategy Group has met on three occasions since the 2005 NPT Review Conference. In April 2006 the Group met in Washington, DC and considered current concerns about Article IV of the NPT and related fissile material issues. A meeting was then convened in New York in November 2006 to consider verification of and compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Reports on these meetings are available on the CNS website at: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/mnsg/index.htm>.

The June 2007 Strategy Group meeting focused on practical and achievable nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and sought to identify a narrow set of items on which some convergence of views could be found. The agenda of the meeting was specifically designed to identify possible options for consideration by policymakers from both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Given the relevance of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission’s recommendations in this regard, the Strategy Group considered how some of these recommendations, as well as other relevant proposals related to arms control and disarmament could be implemented. The Group considered questions falling under five key issue areas:

- i. **Advancing the process and objectives of nuclear disarmament in the 21st Century:** Questions addressed included whether the nuclear disarmament deals in the NPT are still relevant, or whether nuclear disarmament has come to a halt? In this regard the most pressing disarmament challenges and practical steps to address them were considered. The increased utility of nuclear weapons possession and the need to reduce the threat and number of existing nuclear weapons were also addressed. Papers presented during this session included:
 - a. [“Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Searching for Common Ground”](#) by Tariq Rauf, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria
 - b. [“Advancing the process and objectives of nuclear disarmament in the 21st century – what are the most pressing disarmament challenges?”](#) by Harald Müller, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

- c. [*“Reducing the threat and number of existing nuclear weapons: prospects for implementing the WMD Commission recommendations”*](#) by Jayantha Dhanapala, Former Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs and former Ambassador of Sri Lanka
 - d. [*“Nuclear disarmament and the NPT strengthened review process: progress so far?”*](#) by John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Southampton, UK
 - e. [*“Is there still fizz in the fizz ban?”*](#) by Paul Meyer, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Geneva
 - f. [*“How can a strong universal moratorium on nuclear testing be maintained while promoting the entry into force and full implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?”*](#) by Tibor Tóth, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, Vienna, Austria
 - g. [*“Prospects for nuclear arms control among the NPT nuclear-weapon states”*](#) by Linton Brooks, Former Under-Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security, USA
 - h. [*“Practical steps by NWS leading to nuclear disarmament: what does the future look like?”*](#) by Nikolai Sokov, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, USA
 - i. [*“Practical steps by NWS leading to nuclear disarmament: what does the future look like?”*](#) by Rüdiger Lüdeking, Federal Government Arms Control and Disarmament, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Germany
 - j. [*“Nuclear deterrence or nuclear disarmament?”*](#) by Amy Sands, Monterey Institute of International Studies, USA
 - k. [*“Getting from here to there: notes on the politics of nuclear disarmament”*](#) by Christine Wing, Center for International Cooperation, USA
 - l. [*“What progress is being made to disarm North Korea?”*](#) by Daniel Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
 - m. [*“Dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs: lessons from the past”*](#) by Jean du Preez, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- ii. **Practical steps by NWS and NNWS to implement Article VI:** The Group examined progress towards nuclear disarmament in the context of the NPT strengthened review process. It also examined prospects for negotiating an effective multilateral fissile material ban treaty, and whether the original objectives of such a treaty remain valid. Furthermore, the Group discussed the importance of a strong universal moratorium on nuclear testing until the entry into force and full implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is achieved.
- iii. **Practical steps by NWS leading to nuclear disarmament:** The Group was tasked to consider prospects for further unilateral and bilateral nuclear

arms control and disarmament agreements among NPT nuclear weapon states in a post START I, Moscow Treaty and TRIDENT replacement world. It examined practical measures to reduce non-strategic nuclear arsenals in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner, including prospects for the removal of remaining nuclear warheads from the territories of NATO non-nuclear weapon states. In addition, the Group examined whether disarmament can occur in a verifiable and transparent manner which is also sensitive to national security exigencies and proliferation dangers.

- iv. **Disarming the outlier states:** The Group considered ways to incorporate NPT non-parties into the disarmament process, progress made to disarm North Korea, and lessons to be drawn from the dismantlement of past nuclear programs. The Group also examined the potential role of the IAEA in verified dismantlement and disarmament.
- v. **The NPT and the Future of Nuclear Weapons:** The Group was tasked to examine the future of nuclear weapons and whether they would continue to serve as a deterrent in the policies of the states possessing them. The Group was also tasked to address the question of whether nuclear disarmament is a zero-sum game, and if so, whether a Nuclear Weapons Convention is the end goal.

The feature event during the June Strategy Group meeting was a public forum held at the Monterey Institute of International Studies entitled "Nuclear Nonproliferation, Regime in Crisis?" This event marked the announcement of the renaming of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in honor of Dr. James Martin, the founder of the James Martin 21st Century School at Oxford University. In addition to Dr. Martin, Strategy Group members Paul Meyer (former Canadian Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament), Jayantha Dhanapala (former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs) and Rüdiger Lüdeking (Deputy Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control) participated in a panel discussion with distinguished practitioners Linton Brooks (former Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security) and Tibor Tóth (Executive Secretary, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization). CNS Director, Dr. William Potter, moderated the discussion. Some of the key issues addressed during the public forum included the nonproliferation implications of the projected global surge in nuclear energy, prevention of nuclear terrorism, the implications of the US-India nuclear deal for the nonproliferation regime, and the prospects for improved US-Russian relations on nonproliferation and disarmament issues.

The Strategy Group also benefited from a keynote speech by one of its members, Ambassador Yungwoo Chun, the Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs. Ambassador Chun traveled to Monterey following the June Six-Party talks. He provided members with a personal exposé

on the current status of the negotiations, and insights into recent steps taken in the implementation of the February 13, 2007 agreement towards achieving a denuclearized Korean peninsula. In a dynamic Q&A period, Strategy Group members engaged Ambassador Chun on a number of issues concerning the current initiative. The discussion highlighted progress thus far, as well as problems and potential scenarios that may delay or derail the process.

Strategy Group meetings are held under “Chatham House rules,” and as such, this report does not attribute any positions to specific Strategy Group members, nor is it indicative of the level of agreement among Group members for the issues addressed therein. The report is meant to give an overview of the range of issues discussed at the meeting and highlights six key findings. The report was prepared by Jean du Preez, Director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), with the assistance of four Monterey Institute nonproliferation graduate students: Amanda Koch, Ingrid Lombardo, Giuliano Soderini, and Jessica C. Varnum. The authors bear sole responsibility for its contents and key findings.

II. Central Themes

1. The [absence of effective leadership](#), particularly on the part of the United States, but also the other nuclear weapon states, was widely pointed to as perhaps the greatest impediment to nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. Policymakers must act to create the conditions for disarmament, recognizing disarmament as a process rather than simply an unreachable end state. This means making a rhetorical commitment to disarmament, setting incremental targets, and taking steps to meet these targets.
2. Policymakers must act to create the [conditions and timeframe for disarmament](#), recognizing disarmament as a process rather than simply an unreachable end state. Verifiable agreements were also considered as key steps on the road to disarmament. A number of practical measures were identified for managing the transition to disarmament, with emphasis on how to reassure allies relying on extended nuclear deterrence for their security.
3. [Devaluation of the role of nuclear weapons](#) in the defense doctrines of the states that have them is a prerequisite to disarmament. Since it runs counter to the *status quo* and introduces a new security paradigm, innovative policy action and a willingness to abandon Cold War security mentalities would be required.
4. In framing the nuclear disarmament debate, traditional [nonproliferation and disarmament concepts may need to be reevaluated](#). Terminology used should also be carefully considered. Terms must be precisely defined and carefully applied; otherwise, as is the case with the term “weapons of mass destruction,” the terminology could have a negative impact on policymaking.
5. [Arms control measures](#), such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test ban Treaty (CTBT) and a future Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) can continue to play an important role in nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, but may need to be framed differently to be acceptable in a changing international order to key nuclear weapon states, specially the United States.
6. There is a need to re-examine [the role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty \(NPT\)](#) in implementing nonproliferation and especially disarmament measures. In this context its scope and limitations should be recognized.
7. An urgent need exists to [include the outlier states](#) in nuclear disarmament initiatives. This would require engaging these states both inside and outside the NPT context and bearing in mind lessons learned from states that have rolled back nuclear weapons programs.

III. Conference Summary Report

This Strategy Group provided a timely opportunity for a number of key individuals in the nonproliferation and disarmament arena to share ideas on how not only to frame the nuclear disarmament debate, but also to identify innovative, yet practical and achievable ideas on how to move nuclear disarmament forward. As such, the debates at the meeting offered a rich menu of ideas for future consideration by policy-makers and analysts in the field. The debates at the meeting were influenced in part by the January 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed by four senior former U.S. government officials, the speech by former British Secretary of State Margaret Beckett at the June 2007 Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference as well as the relevant recommendations by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.

This report is an attempt to capture the range of issues discussed at the Strategy group meeting, and identifies a number of central themes. It is in no way intended to reflect all the proposals made by speakers and other participants, nor does it claim to reflect any agreement among participants on the themes identified.

1. Absence of Effective Leadership

The absence of effective leadership, particularly on the part of the United States and the other nuclear weapon states, was defined by many as the greatest impediment to progress on nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.

- ***The hope was commonly expressed that elections in key states including the United States, Russia, India, the United Kingdom, and France will usher in a “new leadership wave” of individuals who place nonproliferation and disarmament higher on their states’ agendas.*** This was acknowledged to be a best case scenario, however, and some members of the Group were skeptical that new leaders would have either the ability or the interest to fundamentally change their governments’ approaches to these issues. Little public interest in nonproliferation and disarmament means these issues do not become part of campaign agendas or election promises.
- ***A new political climate on disarmament may already exist.*** A widely shared view was held that the world may be at a crossroads in terms of the political climate for disarmament. Some discussants especially pointed to the January 2007 *Wall Street Journal* op-ed (by Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn) and former UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett’s speech at the June 2007 Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference. Other participants argued, however, that these are examples of leaders pushing for disarmament after they are no longer in power and are unlikely to affect policy.

- Discussion of the need for leadership primarily focused on the nuclear weapon states, but ***a few members of the Group argued that key non-nuclear weapon states could take important leadership roles***, either alone or in coalitions such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Additionally, some argued for more forceful leadership by the UN Secretary General.
- Many felt that while the U.S. leadership is a key component, ***it would be difficult for even constructive U.S. leadership to be effective in the current global political climate***. The worry was commonly expressed that active U.S. leadership would be counterproductive, with suggestions made that the United States promote other states' activities in this area rather than aggressively taking the lead.
- It was recalled that the WMD Commission Report included a recommendation on the ***convening of a world summit on disarmament, nonproliferation, and terrorist use of WMD***. It was emphasized that there now exist an unique opportunity for policy change on nuclear weapons given the change in political leadership in key nuclear weapons states, and the important role civil society can play in this process. Some participants, however, felt that this role may be less important due to public complacency.

2. Conditions and Timeframe for Disarmament

Policymakers must act to create the conditions and timeframe for disarmament, recognizing disarmament as a process rather than simply an unreachable end state. This means making a rhetorical commitment to disarmament, setting incremental targets, and taking steps to meet these targets. While some felt that states such as the United States have reduced their arsenals, this does not represent true disarmament progress since their doctrines on the use of nuclear weapons have not fundamentally changed. Others argued that nuclear weapon states should receive more credit for these reductions in order to encourage their bureaucracies to continue the process—every reduction is a step toward zero.

- ***Many participants viewed the setting of a deadline for full disarmament as a condition essential to ultimate disarmament***. A view was held that the NATO “Big Three” (United States, United Kingdom and France) could initiated a "big bang" approach to disarmament by agreeing to a 30-year timeframe for the elimination of their arsenals subject to certain conditions. Among the less traditional big steps he proposed were: (i) a no new type agreement among the NWS, (ii) the capping of existing arsenals, and (iii) the elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, along with a number of smaller steps, including

declarations of future capping and the removal of all TNW in Europe from deployed status pending their future elimination. Most participants felt a potential deadline of 30 years should be political rather than legal, arguing that its existence would be a sufficient rhetorical commitment to prevent backsliding.

- ***Relationship between the objectives of nonproliferation and disarmament.*** Discussants disagreed on the relationship between nonproliferation and disarmament. While these objectives were considered to be two sides of the same coin some felt that the nonproliferation objective has been pursued at the expense of progress on disarmament. The question was also raised whether framing the CTBT and a future FMCT as nonproliferation tools as opposed to disarmament objectives would serve to advance their implementation?
- ***Verifiable agreements are a key step on the road to disarmament.*** Participants highlighted negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as being particularly essential.
 - A cap on the production of fissile material is a necessary precondition for disarmament. Discussants acknowledged the continued deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) over the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, and considered whether alternative forums for the negotiation of an FMCT would be possible, such as through the convening of a UN General Assembly committee or under IAEA auspices. In the absence of a verifiable FMCT, the five nuclear weapon states should codify their existing voluntary moratoria into obligations.
 - The contributions of CTBT monitoring, which successfully picked up the DPRK nuclear test, should be highlighted to lawmakers in countries, such as the United States, who have not ratified the CTBT.
- ***Practical measures were identified for managing the transition to disarmament, with emphasis on how to reassure allies relying on extended nuclear deterrence for their security.*** These ideas included:
 - i. ***Nuclear weapon states should adopt policies of no new types of warheads.*** While the concept would need to be carefully defined, but there was wide support for this approach as a practicable interim disarmament step. Questions were asked as to whether “no new types” would only apply to warheads with new military capabilities or also to replacements for existing warheads.

- ii. ***A mix of negative and positive (non-nuclear) security assurances to be adopted.*** Most of the Group felt that the nuclear weapon states should adopt no first use policies as a key step toward disarmament.
- iii. ***The conventional drivers of nuclear weapons possession should be addressed, instead of focusing solely on nuclear drivers.***
- iv. ***Non-strategic weapons should be addressed.*** In this regard, a position was held that there is no such thing as a “non strategic” nuclear weapon: nuclear warheads matter, delivery systems don’t. The aggregation of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons was also emphasized - “a nuclear warhead is a nuclear warhead, numbers are less important.” But phasing out tactical weapons could be accomplished as part of a package or stand alone treaty. The question was also raised how to codify the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives between the United States and (then) Soviet Union. The view was also expressed that forward deployed NATO nuclear weapons in Europe are not the problem, but that Russian tactical weapons are since there was no transparency on their numbers, locations, and measures to secure these weapons. In response, the purpose of the tactical warheads in certain NATO states was questioned, especially since Russia is supposedly no longer a NATO target. A concrete proposal was put forward to address the tactical nuclear in Europe. To this it was suggested that Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands should request withdrawal of all non-strategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons from their territories. This would exert pressure on the United States and other NATO allies to change the NATO doctrine to rely on conventional forces for purposes of deterrence. Eastern European members of NATO and Turkey would be encouraged to accept a diminished rather than increased role for nuclear weapons in alliance security. It was also suggested that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons should be withdrawn to a central storage site—in the United States—and that Russia should reciprocate with respect to further reductions in its non-strategic nuclear weapon arsenal. It was felt that while Moscow’s response would be a measure of its goodwill, even a Russian failure to reciprocate—likely in the current political climate—would not diminish NATO’s security.
- v. ***An incremental step to encourage disarmament debate and pressure would be to follow the Brazilian proposal presented at the 2007 PrepCom,*** which calls for a comparative assessment of nuclear weapon states’ disarmament accomplishments and shortcomings to be prepared by the Secretariat.

3. Devaluation of Nuclear Weapons

Devaluation of nuclear weapons is a prerequisite to disarmament, but since it runs counter to the status quo and introduces a new security paradigm, it will require innovative policy action and a willingness to abandon Cold War security mentalities.

- ***A new security paradigm is necessary, a central element of which would be the recognition that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable security option for the world.*** It was mentioned that a new post-Cold War security paradigm is required to holistically address the three nuclear dangers—nonproliferation, existing arsenals, and nuclear terrorism. Nuclear deterrence was also not considered as an adequate foundation for long-term international security requirements. It is therefore incumbent on the United States and other nuclear weapons states to initiate a meaningful dialogue on the future of nuclear weapons, and to shift the rhetorical paradigm in a way that delegitimizes nuclear weapons and shifts commitments toward nuclear disarmament. In this regard it was mentioned that an emerging consensus exist --albeit one to which a number of nuclear weapons states appear unwilling to join--to devalue the role of nuclear weapons. Three possible near-term ways to devalue nuclear weapons were identified: accelerate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty (CTBT), undertake further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons, and conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) with verification provisions.
- ***Devaluing nuclear weapons runs counter to key alliance relationships, requiring advocates of disarmament to figure out what could replace nuclear weapons in these relationships.*** It was emphasized that since NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept defense doctrine relies on nuclear weapons as the political "glue of the alliance" (binding North America and Europe together) U.S. nuclear weapons will remain in Europe despite the lack of any clear mission for these weapons.
- ***The impact of the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program (RRW) on the devaluation of nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and disarmament.*** While a majority of participants considered the RRW program to run contrary to U.S. disarmament commitments, a view was held that since at least three existing warheads would be eliminated for every two RRWs produced, the RRW program could advance the goals of nonproliferation and disarmament. The fear that this may require the need to resume nuclear testing was raised, although the Bush administration has stated its intention not to resume testing. The question was also raised whether the RRW program could promote the entry into force of the CTBT or undermine its purpose and disarmament in general.

- ***Since disarmament is likely to be a multi-decade process, nuclear weapons will be around for longer than the current arsenals can be guaranteed as safe and reliable.*** It was argued that some sort of grand bargain should be struck in which modernization of nuclear weapon arsenals (e.g. the RRW program in the United States and the British Trident system) would be simultaneous with significant disarmament commitments, such as an FMCT and CTBT.
- ***Prestige value of nuclear weapons.*** It was suggested that a concrete step towards countering the perceived prestige value of nuclear weapons possession would be to expand the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council to include non-nuclear weapon states.

4. Reevaluating Nonproliferation and Disarmament Concepts

In framing the debate, advocates of nonproliferation and disarmament must be more conscious of the terminology they use. Terms must be precisely defined and carefully applied; otherwise, as has occurred with the term “weapons of mass destruction,” they can have a detrimental impact on policymaking.

- ***The term “WMD” has reinforced the value of nuclear weapons in the minds of many policymakers.*** By conflating nuclear weapons— which most believed to be the only true weapons of mass destruction—with chemical and biological weapons, the term “WMD” has encouraged policymakers to think of nuclear arsenals as necessary and reasonable deterrents against chemical and biological weapons. This rationale encourages nuclear weapon states to broaden the operational parameters for their nuclear arsenals beyond other nuclear weapon states to any state or entity that possesses chemical or biological capabilities. Other terms and concepts that should be considered in this regard include:
 - ***Disarmament:*** Does disarmament mean zero nuclear weapons or some form of minimum deterrence? Three major, although not exhaustive, challenges exist to the political process through which nuclear disarmament might be realized: (i) current dysfunctional debates by which its participants are in the minority and have a disproportionate influence on the agenda; (ii) encouraging but managing U.S. leadership so not to be perceived as blatantly self-serving ; and (iii) by making progress on short term/incremental opportunities without compromising long term disarmament objectives.
 - ***Non-strategic nuclear weapons:*** Does the term “non-strategic” truly reflective of the nature of these weapons, or does this term

politically complicate issues related to their existence and deployment?

- **De-alerting:** The question was raised why this issues was considered of critical importance. It was considered necessary to define the concept of de-alerting of nuclear weapons and whether the term could be used interchangeably with “reducing the operational status” of nuclear weapons?
- **No new types of nuclear weapons:** The question was raised how new types of weapons could be defined? For example, does it simply refer to warheads with new military capabilities, or does it also include replacements for existing warheads. The concept’s acceptability to the nuclear states will depend on that definition.

5. Effective arms control measures

Arms control measures, such as the CTBT and an FMCT are important components of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime, but may need to be framed differently to be acceptable in a changing international order to key nuclear weapon states, specially the United States.

- The **current U.S. administration appears to be extremely reluctant to engage in permanent arms control agreements.** The administration seems to be concerned about being locked into ABM-style agreements long after these agreements are perceived as useful or relevant. The question was raised whether it would be possible to address these concerns without compromising the usefulness of the agreements?
- **The future of START I is a major issue of concern, especially given the conflict between U.S. and Russian preferences for non-binding and binding agreements.** Two opposing views were identified on extension/replacement of START I: (i) the U.S. preference for non-binding confidence building measures and transparency measures based on the SORT model versus the Russian preference for a new legally binding treaty limiting nuclear forces. Also that emphasis should shift from reducing delivery systems to reducing warheads. The impact of new leadership in several nuclear weapons states was highlighted. But while it a change in U.S. policies could impact on the future of START I, leadership changes in the United States as result of the 2008 presidential election will occur too close to the treaty’s expiration for the a new administration to prepare adequately for negotiations. In this context it was suggested that negotiations of new agreement should be delayed. It was also stated that currently there no ways for other nuclear weapons states be involved in this process. Some participant held the view that other nuclear weapons states should be included. It was also pointed out that a formal treaty obligation for additional reductions may not matter, it is

reasonable to expect that numbers will come down. It was pointed out that the 1980's types of measures (i) provided predictability; (ii) provide crisis stability (it reduced incentives to preempt); (iii) capped expenditures on new systems; increased transparency and reduced suspicion & avoids misunderstanding; and (iv) : Improve political relationships. Of these it was felt that only the latter two are still relevant, and that increased political relationship between the United States and Russia is the strongest argument for extending START I and an underlying reason for the SORT. It was also mentioned that the new Russian military doctrine (currently under consideration) may be firmly based on nuclear deterrence and first use of nuclear weapons.

- ***Despite continued deadlock at the Conference Disarmament over the commencement of FMCT, its overall goal remains valid.*** It was considered that a cap on production of fissile material is a necessary precondition for nuclear rollback. While a moratorium on fissile material production is being observed, the absence of a formalized commitment does not present the same obligation as a treaty, lacks verification, and is vulnerable to sudden reversal. The view was also held that a “positive” result from the current stalemate in CD negotiation process is that the “spoiler states” are identifiable. A number of alternatives to negotiations in the CD were identified, including establishing an open-ended Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an FMCT under the auspices of the UN General Assembly. This would avoid the CD consensus decision making procedure, and is the most likely alternative method. Another option would be to establish ad hoc CD committees to start work on all four core CD issues simultaneously. Yet another possibility would be to commence negotiations to codify the existing moratorium on fissile material production. Such negotiations could be held under the auspices of the IAEA, and could be limited to the states possessing nuclear weapons, or alternatively to the five NPT weapon states.
- ***A universal moratorium on nuclear testing while promoting the entry into force and full implementation of the CTBT.*** It was noted that although ten Annex II states have not ratified the CTBT, the norm against nuclear testing remains strong. The CTBT is already a norm given strong support by majority of nations. Also despite its provisional status, the incomplete nature of the International Monitoring System, and dire financial shortcomings, the CTBTO was able to “flex its muscles” and prove its worth during the October 9th, 2006 North Korean nuclear test. A view was held that discussions on the entry into force of the treaty should not take place independently, but in a broader context which should include strengthened IAEA safeguards through the additional protocol, strengthened export controls and further disarmament commitments such as reductions in warhead levels.

6. The Role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

There is a need to re-examine the role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in implementing nonproliferation and disarmament measures. In this context its scope and limitations should be recognized. Several participants recalled that the strengthened review process was part of the package that included the decision to indefinitely extend the NPT. In this regard, it was emphasized that the strengthened review process was designed to garner sustained attention to nuclear disarmament beyond 1995. Discussants highlighted the need to better define yardsticks for measuring progress in disarmament and overall implementation of NPT obligations. But it is unclear what happens if the clicks on the yard sticks are not reached, and if they are considered binding, how would compliance be assessed?

- ***The NPT strengthened review process has demonstrated key institutional shortcomings, and should be revisited.*** Specifically, Iran's procedural obstructionism at the 2007 PrepCom suggests that rules defining consensus should be modified. However, participants were divided on whether voting could be introduced without further undermining the process. A code of conduct was suggested as a possible solution to the impasse. Additionally, the binding nature of disarmament yardsticks, such as the "13 practical steps" should be clarified, as must an assessment process for determining whether satisfactory progress in implementing these and other disarmament commitments are being made. It was also argued that there is an urgent "need to stem the rot now or the 2010 NPT Review Conference will meet the same fate at 2005." With that in mind, a "sunset clause" for nuclear weapons was suggested.
- ***Is the NPT the appropriate vehicle for disarmament?*** There was significant disagreement over this question, with some arguing that the treaty mostly reflects the interests of only the five nuclear weapon states and is therefore weighted against disarmament. Additionally, it was felt that the treaty obligations cannot be extended to disarm non-treaty members who possess nuclear weapons. A majority participants argued that the NPT is the only forum where the nuclear weapon states are legally bound to address disarmament, and that such discussions might not be possible in an alternate forum. While a Nuclear Weapons Convention (banning all nuclear weapons) is often suggested as an alternative to the NPT, most participants felt it was politically impossible for the foreseeable future. However, accepting the NPT as the key disarmament framework does not prevent concrete steps to implement NPT disarmament obligations occurring in bilateral and multilateral forums outside the NPT.

7. Disarming the outlier states & lessons from the past

Considerable discussions were held on how to engage the four states possessing nuclear weapons outside the NPT, and whether this be done within the NPT process or in another forum. It was also considered important that although not feasible in the short-term, engaging these states in a wider disarmament forum could open discussions on a future Nuclear Weapons Convention. In lieu of that, an incremental approach is necessary, composed of confidence-building measures, negative security assurances, no first use policies, nuclear de-alerting and pre-notification of launch agreements, and nuclear weapon free zones. The question was also raised whether to grant observer status to these states and to allow them to directly participate in the NPT process.

- ***Dealing with the North Korean threat.*** It was noted that the first and easiest phase of the agreement with North Korea is being implemented. However, the second phase of disabling and dismantling the DPRK nuclear weapons will present more obstacles. It was also emphasized that domestic politics in the DPRK, the Republic of Korea and even in the United States could become a major hurdle in moving the process forward.
- ***Lessons learned from states that rolled back nuclear weapons programs.*** It was noted that sanctions and isolation in and of themselves may slow down, but not necessarily prevent nuclear weapons programs. In this context it was mentioned that South Africa developed its program while largely isolated as a result of international sanctions. A positive lesson from the Libyan case is that a pariah state can come clean about its nuclear past, and receive significant international recognition for doing so even though it was in noncompliance in the first place. This is another important lesson to be considered in the case of Iran. It was also emphasized that roll-back of active nuclear programs and acceptable nonproliferation behavior may come at a price, even if it means negotiating directly with, and providing economic and other incentives to states such as North Korea and Iran. It was also mentioned that unilateral disarmament, coupled with transparency and cooperation with IAEA, can create positive momentum with significant political pay-offs, not only for the state concerned, but for the nonproliferation regime as a whole. In this regard it was stressed that the United Kingdom could have set a powerful example if it had decided not to renew the Trident nuclear missile platform. Another lesson identified is that threats to national security – real or perceived – can justify nuclear weapons development in especially isolated states. The clandestine nature of defense industries in these countries and use of secret “slush funds” can lead to the development of a clandestine nuclear weapons programs and delivery systems. The role cultural aversion in states’ decisions on nuclear weapons acquisition was

also discussed. Japan, South Africa, Germany, Sweden, Canada were cited as examples. In this context, the question was raised whether there is a religious aversion to nuclear weapons in Iran?

III. Conference Agenda

Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Searching for Common Ground

**Third Session:
Practical and achievable nuclear arms reduction and disarmament**

28 – 30 June 2007

Monterey, CA

Thursday, June 28

Session I: Advancing the process and objectives of nuclear disarmament in the 21st Century: Is it possible?

- Nuclear disarmament and the NPT: Are the deals still relevant, or has nuclear disarmament come to a halt? Are some states seeing increased utility in nuclear weapons possession?
- What are the most pressing disarmament challenges today and what practical steps could be taken to address them?
- Reducing the threat and number of existing nuclear weapons: Prospects for implementing the WMD Commission recommendations.

Session II: Practical steps by NWS and NNWS to implement Article VI: What is achievable?

- Nuclear disarmament and the NPT strengthened review process: Progress so far?
- Prospects for negotiating an effective multilateral fissile material ban treaty? Are the original objectives of such a treaty still valid, and if so are they achievable?
- How can a strong universal moratorium on nuclear testing be maintained while promoting the entry into force and full implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?

Friday, June 29:

Session III: Practical steps by NWS leading to nuclear disarmament: What does the future look like?

- What are the prospects for further unilateral and bilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements among NPT nuclear-weapon states in a post START I, Moscow Treaty and TRIDENT replacement world?

- What practical measures can be implemented to reduce non-strategic nuclear arsenals in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner? What are the prospects for the removal of remaining nuclear warheads from the territories of NATO non-nuclear weapons states?
- How can irreversible, transparent and accountable nuclear disarmament be advanced? Is there a process by which disarmament can occur in a verifiable and transparent manner which is sensitive to national security exigencies and proliferation dangers?

Session IV: The NPT and the Future of Nuclear Weapons

- The future of nuclear weapons: Deterrence or Disarmament?
- Is nuclear disarmament a zero-sum game? Is a Nuclear Weapons Convention the end goal?

Saturday, June 30:

Session V: Disarming the outlier states: Can it be done?

- How can NPT non-parties be incorporated into the disarmament process?
- What progress is being made to disarm North Korea?
- What lessons can be drawn from the dismantlement of past nuclear programs? What could/should the role of the IAEA be in verified dismantlement and disarmament?

Session VI: Recommendations: Setting the nuclear disarmament agenda for 2010 and beyond

Feedback from session moderators and discussion

Session VII: The Way Forward?

- In search of common ground: An overview of Strategy Group Observations and Policy Prescriptions
- Future MNSG meetings and practical ways to influence nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policies through MNSG outreach activities

IV. Participants

Ambassador Linton Brooks

Former Under-Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security, USA

Dr. Vladimir Orlov

PIR Center, Moscow and Geneva
Center for Security Policy

Ambassador Yung-woo Chun

Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade,
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Dr. Daniel Pinkston (CNS)

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Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala

Former Under-Secretary General for
Disarmament Affairs and former
Ambassador of Sri Lanka

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International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna, Austria

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Mr. Leonard Spector

Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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Professor Harald Müller

Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt

Ambassador Tibor Tóth
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Organization
Vienna, Austria

Dr. Chris Wing
Center for International Cooperation
New York, NY

Ms. Amanda Koch
Ms. Ingrid Lombardo
Mr. Giuliano Soderini
Ms. Jessica Varnum
Rapporteurs

V. Papers Presented at the Meeting

- a. ***“Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Searching for Common Ground”*** by Tariq Rauf, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria
- b. ***“Advancing the process and objectives of nuclear disarmament in the 21st century – what are the most pressing disarmament challenges?”*** by Harald Müller, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
- c. ***“Reducing the threat and number of existing nuclear weapons: prospects for implementing the WMD Commission recommendations.”*** by Jayantha Dhanapala, Former Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs and former Ambassador of Sri Lanka
- d. ***“Nuclear disarmament and the NPT strengthened review process: progress so far?”*** by John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Southampton, UK
- e. ***“Is there still fizz in the fizz ban?”*** by Paul Meyer, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Geneva
- f. ***“How can a strong universal moratorium on nuclear testing be maintained while promoting the entry into force and full implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?”*** by Tibor Tóth, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, Vienna, Austria
- g. ***“Prospects for nuclear arms control among the NPT nuclear-weapon states.”*** by Linton Brooks, Former Under-Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security, USA
- h. ***“Practical steps by NWS leading to nuclear disarmament: what does the future look like?”*** by Nikolai Sokov, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, USA
- i. ***“Practical steps by NWS leading to nuclear disarmament: what does the future look like?”*** by Rüdiger Lüdeking, Federal Government Arms Control and Disarmament, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Germany
- j. ***“Nuclear deterrence or nuclear disarmament?”*** by Amy Sands, Monterey Institute of International Studies, USA
- k. ***“Getting from here to there: notes on the politics of nuclear disarmament.”*** by Christine Wing, Center for International Cooperation, USA
- l. ***“What progress is being made to disarm North Korea?”*** by Daniel Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- m. ***“Dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs: lessons from the past.”*** by Jean du Preez, Center for Nonproliferation Studies