CNS Reports

U.S. Must Grapple With New Nuclear Status in South Asia

by Tariq Rauf

Published in DEFENSE NEWS, Inside View, September 7-13, 1998.

At the conclusion of separate nuclear negotiations with India and Pakistan, of which four rounds have already been held with the fifth coming up shortly, the United States is preparing to close a deal effectively recognizing the two countries as de facto nuclear weapon states.

This would reverse three decades of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy based on reinforcing the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which defines a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) as one which manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to 1 January 1967.

Furthermore, it would call into question the commitment to the NPT of many nonweapon states, such as Germany, Japan, which adhered to this Treaty on the premise that there would be no additional nuclear-weapon states beyond the declared five: United States, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom.

In the aftermath of India and Pakistan's nuclear tests last May, the United States imposed sanctions, as did many other states. Washington then focused on three priorities: preventing any escalation of a nuclear and missile race; minimizing damage to the NPT regime; and trying to reduce tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad, crucially differences over Kashmir.

President Bill Clinton's nuclear nonproliferation policy has been rudderless for a long time. This situation has been worsened by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency being forcibly folded into the State Department under pressure from Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.

Also, by one interpretation, legislation from October 1992 under which the United States accepted a moratorium on nuclear tests through 1996 while it sought approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed in September 1996 but not yet ratified, is no longer binding. According to this interpretation, the United States now is free to conduct nuclear tests since the Indian and Pakistani explosions.

Sen. Trent Lott, R-Miss., and his colleagues have been pushing Clinton to resume nuclear testing, while Helms indefinitely has postponed any consideration of U.S. ratification of the CTBT.

Apparently in order to salvage the sole arms control agreement of his administration, President Clinton is seeking to find the compromises required to persuade India and Pakistan to join the CTBT, as this treaty cannot enter into force without them.

In this context, four rounds of separate negotiations have been held between U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and India's Deputy Chief of the Planning Commission Jaswant Singh, and with senior Pakistan foreign ministry officials.

Washington believes that since India and Pakistan have overtly demonstrated their nuclear weapon capabilities, what has been tested cannot be untested; hence the United States must reach a deal under which India would commit to:

• Sign the CTBT banning all further nuclear detonations, a treaty India previously denounced as "discriminatory" and refused to sign.
• Not openly deploy nuclear forces in the short run, but could continue to manufacture and store nuclear weapons; the non-deployment pledge would not necessarily be permanent.
• Show restraint in the production of weapon-grade plutonium and uranium, and join in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a new treaty banning further production of nuclear material for weapons.
• Commit to not export sensitive nuclear or missile technology to other countries.

In return, the United States would lift sanctions and restrictions on technology transfers-including nuclear-and would recognize that Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon programs are driven by changed security considerations.

If India were to be anointed a nuclear-weapon state, even indirectly, it would be impossible not to do the same for Pakistan, and eventually also for Israel, as all three countries are covertly developing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, any nuclear transfers to India or Pakistan or Israel would undercut the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply.

Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's foreign minister, warned last May that a new nuclear realpolitik is being enunciated not only by the five declared nuclear-weapon states, but also by known nuclear proliferators-India, Pakistan and Israel-respectively justifying the continuing retention or proliferation of nuclear weapons.

What is needed for India and Pakistan is not recognition of their nuclear weapon capabilities but a relaxation of sanctions, non-nuclear technology transfer, conflict mediation, establishment of a risk reduction center and an activated hot-line between military leaders, signing the CTBT, joining the fissile material negotiation, and committing not to manufacture or deploy nuclear weapons and missiles while seeking their elimination.

And, finally the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states should begin multilateral discussions on nuclear weapons and disarmament at the Geneva talks.

Tariq Rauf is Director of International Organizations in Nonproliferation at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, California.

trauf@miis.edu