CNS ReportsCongress Considers Relaxing HEU Export ControlsBy Scott Parrish
In the current environment of increased terrorist threats and proliferation concerns, it would seem logical to tighten further existing U.S. restrictions on commerce in HEU. Instead, however, Congress is now considering changing U.S. law to reduce restrictions on HEU exports for medical isotope production. The primary beneficiaries of the proposed legislation are producers of medical radioisotopes, who claim that conversion to LEU would be too costly and disruptive. Language inserted into the energy bill currently under discussion in a House-Senate conference committee would allow the export of HEU to medical isotope producers, even if they refuse to convert to LEU.[3] If adopted, the new law would undermine the larger objective of eliminating civilian use of HEU, and setting a precedent that legitimizes continued international commerce in HEU. Such a move would be unfortunate for both U.S. and international security. The change would also undermine recent efforts, led by Norway at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, to seek an international consensus on eliminating the civilian use of HEU.[4] CIVILIAN USES OF HEU: WORTH THE RISK? There are only three uses of HEU in the civilian nuclear sector: in research reactors, for medical isotope production, and as fuel in icebreaker power reactors. Historically, the proliferation risks posed by these civilian uses of HEU have been underestimated. HEU at civilian facilities, for example, is less well-protected than that at military or weapons production facilities, and more vulnerable to theft by terrorists. While reducing all stocks of HEU is a worthy nonproliferation goal, eliminating civilian use of HEU would address the most vulnerable and thus highest priority material. The two most widespread civilian uses of HEU are as research reactor fuel and as targets for the production of medical isotopes. While both the United States and the Soviet Union exported large quantities of HEU for these purposes in the 1950s-1970s, in the late 1970s, both countries, citing proliferation concerns, began to limit these exports. Both also took steps to begin converting research reactors and radioactive isotope production from HEU to LEU, although Russia has not yet converted any of its domestic research reactors. In 1978, the United States launched the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, which aims to develop new LEU fuels and targets to replace HEU.[5] In 1992, in order to further encourage foreign users of U.S.-origin HEU to convert their reactors and production processes, Congress adopted the Schumer Amendment, which restricts U.S. exports of HEU to facilities that meet the following conditions: 1) there is no existing alternative LEU fuel for the reactor or production process; 2) the facility has agreed to switch to LEU fuel as soon as it is available; and 3) the United States is actively developing an alternative LEU fuel suitable for the facility.[6] While U.S. exports of HEU had already declined prior to the Schumer Amendment, they subsequently fell to very low levels. [7] According to data from the U.S. NRC, in recent years there have been only a handful of HEU exports for medical isotope production.[8] As nuclear material is most vulnerable to theft during transit, reducing international commerce in HEU is an effective way to reduce proliferation risks and bolster international security. Considering current terrorist threats, civilian uses of HEU should be eliminated, unless their benefits are so great and so difficult and/or expensive to obtain by other means that they justify the increased risk of nuclear terrorism. HEU USE FOR RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION HEU continues to play a major role in the production of radioactive isotopes for medical applications. HEU targets are irradiated in a reactor, producing the fission product molybdenum-99, which has a 2.7-day half-life and decays to 6-hour half-life tecnicium-99m, which emits a gamma ray used in medical imaging.[9] There are currently four major international producers of radioisoptes using HEU to produce medical isotopes: MDS Nordion (Canada), Mallinckrodt (Netherlands), Institute National des Radioelements (Belgium), and the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa. All four have resisted efforts to convince them to convert to LEU, citing concerns about cost and disruption of production.[10] According to a 2004 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, these four producers use about 85 kg of HEU each year.[11] That is enough material to make a few improvised nuclear devices, considering that the IAEA regards 25 kg of HEU as a significant quantity, and independent experts believe that terrorists could fabricate a nuclear weapon with 40-55kg of HEU.[12] Three of these producers--those in the Netherlands, Belgium, and South Africa--either use domestically produced HEU or import it from sources outside the United States. One, Nordion, located in Canada, has continued to receive some HEU exports from the United States in recent years, even though critics have claimed it is not serious about converting its operations to LEU.[13] According to its press materials, Nordion is "the world's largest supplier of short-lived radioisotopes for medical diagnostic nuclear imaging and therapeutic applications," and generated $343 million in revenues in 2002, most of it from exports to 95 countries.[14] The company claims to provide medical isotopes for most of the 15 to 20 million nuclear medicine procedures performed around the world every year.[15] Nordion produces molybdenum-99 using Canada's more than 50-year old NRU reactor at Chalk River, using HEU targets supplied by the United States.[16] Nordion has planned for a number of years to switch to using a new pair of reactors, the MAPLE reactors, also located at Chalk River, and to construct a new processing facility for the isotopes. The NRU reactor was to have shut down years ago, but technical problems have repeatedly delayed the start-up of MAPLE. NRU is now slated to run until the end of 2005, and perhaps longer.[17] Nordion also now argues that it will take additional time to develop LEU targets, stating that the increased waste produced by the LEU targets during the production process presents a serious technical and financial challenge to conversion.[18] This posture reflects a change from earlier plans and pledges made by Nordion and Atomic Energy of Canada, LTD, which operates the reactors. As early as 1990, the companies promised to switch to the use of a new LEU target by 1998, and to "phase out HEU use by 2000."[19] Later, when it was granted a U.S. export license for HEU in 1999, Nordion pledged to submit annual progress reports on its conversion efforts, but its conversion efforts appear to have been minimal, and the company now contends that it could not convert to HEU without interrupting the supply of critically needed medical isotopes, and has said it cannot proceed with conversion unless provided with $90 million in financing to construct a new LEU-based processing facility.[20] Officials from Argonne National Lab, who are in charge of the RERTR Program efforts to develop LEU targets, do admit that it will take a few more years to implement conversion to LEU. But they also insist that it is technically feasible, and have even suggested that it could ultimately result in a more economic process, compensating for the costs of conversion.[21] EFFORTS TO REPEAL THE SCHUMER AMENDMENT While dragging its feet on conversion, Nordion also began lobbying efforts to modify the Schumer Amendment so it would no longer be required to convert. Working with Mallinckrodt, Nordion lobbied the U.S. Congress to remove the restrictions on HEU exports for medical isotope production. The company drafted an amendment to the 2003 energy bill under consideration in the U.S. House of Representatives, and persuaded Congressman Richard Burr (D-NC), who has since been elected Senator from North Carolina, to sponsor it. The amendment would lift restrictions on HEU exports for medical isotope production pending the completion of a study on the restrictions' effectiveness and economic impact.[22] Senator Christopher Bond (R-MO) sponsored a similar amendment in the Senate. The amendments, which drew substantial opposition from several nonproliferation organizations, did not pass, since the entire bill died in the U.S. Senate.[23] Nordion did not give up its efforts, however, and the 2005 version of the energy bill passed in the House on April 21, 2005 again included the language from the Burr Amendment, which would have allowed exports of HEU for medical isotope production, even if the recipient did not agree to convert to LEU.[24] This change in the law would take away any incentive for Nordion to convert to LEU, and would also ripple through the entire radioisotope industry, as other producers would also have no incentive to convert. Supporters of relaxing the restrictions have argued that the limits imposed by the Schumer Amendment are creating a crisis in medical isotope production, and they also claim that conversion is simply too costly. Opponents, including a number of scientists and nonproliferation specialists, as well as the editorial board of the New York Times, contend that smaller producers have already successfully converted to LEU, that there is no shortage of medical isotopes, and that continued HEU exports are too risky under current circumstances.[25] In the Senate, the provisions gutting the Schumer Amendment and relaxing HEU export restrictions were removed following the approval of an amendment sponsored by Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ), by a 52-46 vote on June 23, 2005.[26] The two competing versions of the bill are now being reconciled by a House-Senate conference committee. As of this writing, the conference committee had agreed to retain the language of the House version of the bill. Unless the committee reconsiders before issuing its final report, the Schumer Amendment restrictions on HEU exports for medical isotope production will be relaxed. CONCLUSIONS In an era of increased terrorist threats, when the main obstacle standing between terrorists and nuclear explosives is the difficulty of obtaining fissile material, it makes no sense to relax export controls on HEU. It is particularly short-sighted to place one company's economic interests ahead of the international interest in reducing the risk of terrorist access to HEU. While it may be reasonable to study the costs of conversion more thoroughly and consider whether additional incentives to foster conversion are needed, such a study should be done before making any changes in existing law, which is encouraging many facilities to convert to LEU, rather than after relaxing it and potentially giving terrorists easier access to HEU. The strongest reason to leave current U.S. law untouched, however, is that it appears to be working to reduce proliferation risks, and is catalyzing additional steps in that direction. Changing U.S. law on HEU exports will almost certainly make it harder for these efforts to succeed, further delaying efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. Many research reactors around the world have already converted to LEU with help from RERTR, and ongoing efforts under GTRI are securing and eliminating civilian HEU stocks in countries around the world. Against this background, a group of states is beginning to form around the idea of delegitimizing civilian use of HEU, based on the argument that its benefits do not justify the risks involved. A recent step reflecting the emergence of a broader international consensus on this issue was a working paper presented to the 2005 NPT Review Conference by Norway on behalf of itself and Iceland, Lithuania, and Sweden. This paper also enjoyed the support of many other countries, including Austria, Canada, Germany, Kyrgyzstan, Japan, and the United States. The paper endorsed as a goal "the elimination of HEU in the civilian nuclear sector as soon as technically feasible."[27] It is
likely that additional steps to follow up on this proposal will be made this
fall at either the UN General Assembly or the General Conference of the IAEA.
Changes to U.S. export control laws that appear to legitimize international
commerce in HEU would be counterproductive and undermine this emerging
international consensus. It should also be noted that, while Nordion may want to
change U.S. law to relax restrictions on HEU commerce, the Canadian government,
by supporting the NPT working paper, appears to have a very different view.
Lastly, changing U.S. law to make HEU exports easier would undercut the GTRI,
which is seeking to eliminate the civilian use of HEU. Before revoking the
Schumer Amendment, Congress should consider the impact not just on one medical
isotope producer, but on broader nonproliferation efforts.
|