CNS Reports
NUCLEAR LEAKAGE FROM THE POST-SOVIET STATES
Dr. William C. Potter
Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Oral Presentation
Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
March 13, 1996
Thank you very much Senator Nunn and members of the committee
for the opportunity to report to you findings from my study on
"Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States." Rather
than attempt to summarize the study, I will confine my oral remarks
to three issues that I believe merit special attention. They are:
- What are the confirmed cases of proliferation significant
diversions and exports of nuclear material from the post-Soviet
states?
- What patterns of behavior may be discerned across these cases?
and
- What are the most serious nuclear threats that have not received
adequate attention to date?
Proliferation Significant Diversions and Exports
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, one can identify at least
four confirmed cases in which more than minuscule quantities of
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium have been exported
from the ex-USSR, and another three cases in which HEU or plutonium
were diverted from Russian nuclear facilities, but were seized
prior to export. An additional four cases of diversion and/or
export are of proliferation concern, but do not as clearly meet
the standard of unambiguous evidence with respect to either independent
sources to corroborate the diversion, or the size or enrichment
level of the material.
Many of the important characteristics of these 11 cases are summarized
in Appendix One of my written report. Because of time constraints,
I will now only highlight those aspects of the cases relevant
to the issue of establishing patterns of behavior with respect
to the suppliers, smugglers, and the end-users.
Luch Scientific Production Association, Podolsk (1992)
The first confirmed case involving the diversion of fissile material
from nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union occurred at
the Luch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk, a town
approximately 40 kilometers southwest of Moscow. Between late
May and early September 1992, Leonid Smirnov, a chemical engineer
and long-time employee of the plant, stole approximately 1½
kg. of weapons-grade uranium. He accumulated this quantity by
some 20-25 different diversions, taking the material in the form
of UO2 powder from the facility in glass jars and storing it on
his apartment balcony.
Smirnov had no accomplices and appears to have been motivated
by an article he read in a Russian newspaper about the fortune
to be made by selling HEU. He was apprehended at the Podolsk Railroad
Terminal on October 9, 1992, along with most of the HEU concealed
in three lead cylinders. He had planned to travel to Moscow for
the purpose of selling the nuclear material. Although Smirnov
initially confessed to having a specific customer from the Caucasus
in mind, the official investigation concluded that there was no
concrete buyer who had been contacted.
Andreeva Guba, Russia: (1993)
One of the earliest confirmed thefts of HEU occurred in late July
1993 at a storage facility of the Northern Fleet naval base at
Andreeva Guba, 40 kilometers from the Norwegian border. Two naval
servicemen were arrested in the case and accused of stealing 1.8
kilograms of HEU from two fuel assemblies. The material, which
was recovered, was enriched to approximately 36 percent uranium-235
(U-235) and used as fuel for third-generation naval reactors.
The men said they were operating under instructions from two naval
officers -- both of whom denied involvement in the theft. At the
trial of the four suspects, which concluded in November 1995,
the two naval servicemen were sentenced to prison terms of five
years and four years. The two naval officers were found not guilty
due to lack of evidence. Additional suspects associated with a
Murmansk - St. Petersburg criminal ring are still under investigation.
Sevmorput Shipyard, near Murmansk (1993)
On November 27, 1993 Captain Alexei Tikhomirov and Oleg Baranov
slipped through an unprotected gate and into the Sevmorput shipyard
near Murmansk -- one of the Russian navy's main storage facilities
for nuclear fuel. Captain Tikhomirov, a retired naval officer
whose brother Dmitry still worked at the shipyard, climbed through
one of many holes in the fence surrounding "Fuel Storage
Area 3-30," sawed through a padlock on the back door, and
pried open the door with a metal fire pole he found next to the
building. Once inside, he located the containers of fresh submarine
fuel, broke off parts of three assemblies from a VM-4-AM reactor
core, stuffed the material containing 4.5 kg of uranium (enriched
to approximately 20 percent U-235) into a bag, and retraced his
steps.
The theft was soon discovered because the perpetrators carelessly
left the back of the storage building open. The culprits, however,
were only apprehended and the material recovered from Baranov's
garage six months later when Dmitry Tikhomirov told a fellow officer
about the theft and asked for help in selling the stolen merchandise.
The parties to the crime, it appears, had not figured out a way
to dispose of the material despite having carefully planned the
operation for months prior to its execution.
In early 1994, the three defendants -- all past or present naval
officers -- were tried for the theft of naval fuel. Two received
prison sentences of three and one-half years; the third was freed.
According to the military prosecutor who investigated the case,
at the time of the theft, potatoes were guarded better than
naval fuel, despite the fact that most of the fuel was highly
enriched and some of it was weapons-grade.
Tengen Germany, (May 1994)
The first known case in which more than minuscule quantities of
HEU or plutonium were illegally exported occurred in May 1994.
It involved the inadvertent discovery by German police in Tengen,
Bavaria of a vial containing 5.6 grams of nearly pure Pu-239.
The super-grade material was found in the garage of Adolf Jaekle
who was under investigation for counterfeiting.
Although the origin of the material has not been determined definitively,
there are indications that it was produced for non-weapons purposes
at the Soviet nuclear weapons laboratory Arzamas-16 (renamed Kremlev).
Samples similar to the amount seized in Tengen may have been distributed
by Arzamas-16 to dozens of nuclear research laboratories in the
former Soviet Union, as well as in Eastern Europe.
Many important questions about the Tengen case remain unresolved,
especially regarding the plutonium supply route and the intended
end-user, if any. The case, however, is significant if for no
other reason than the fact that it was not a sting operation.
Landshut, Germany (June 1994)
In June 1994 Bavarian authorities seized 800 milligrams of HEU
enriched to 87.7 percent U-235. This material was recovered in
Landshut, Bavaria. Subsequently, a German real estate dealer was
arrested as the central figure in a group accused of illegal commerce
in and possession of nuclear material. Also arrested as part of
a sting operation were five men from Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
Based upon spectrometric analyses of the HEU and its enrichment
level, the material is believed to have been produced for use
as naval reactor or research reactor fuel.
Lufthansa/Munich (August 1994)
The last of the significant German smuggling cases occurred in
Munich on August 10, 1994, when Bavarian authorities seized a
suitcase that had been unloaded from a Lufthansa flight from Moscow.
Inside the suitcase was a metal container holding 560 grams of
mixed oxides of uranium and plutonium. This seizure, the result
of a sting operation, was by far the largest quantity of weapons-usable
material (363 grams of Pu-239) recovered in the West. A Columbian
national and two Spaniards were arrested at the airport in connection
with the smuggling operation.
Last month it was reported that the Russian Foreign Intelligence
Service confirmed to German officials that the material in question
had been diverted from a research facility at Obninsk. Although
the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) disputes the report,
the Russian communiqué to Germany appears to be authentic.
Without going into the details of the case, it should be noted
that the Munich seizure was significant in demonstrating that
sizable quantities of weapons-usable material could be procured.
The demand in this instance, however, appears to have been artificially
created by German intelligence and security service officials.
Prague, Czechoslovakia (December 1994)
On December 14, 1994 Prague police, reportedly responding to an
anonymous phone tip, seized 2.72 kilograms of HEU from the back
seat of a car parked on a busy street in the Czech capital. The
HEU, enriched to 87.7 percent U-235, was in the form of uranium
dioxide (UO2) powder.
Police arrested the car's owner, Jaroslav Vagner, from the Czech
Republic, and his two companions in the car from Belarus and Ukraine.
All three had backgrounds in the nuclear industry.
The seized material -- the largest quantity of weapons-usable
nuclear contraband found outside of Russia to date -- appears
to be identical to the 800 milligrams of HEU recovered in Landshut,
Germany in June 1994. The case also resembles the Landshut seizure
in that it too appears to have been the result of a German sting
operation.
Additional Cases of Proliferation Concern
These seven seizures of nuclear material are singled out as proliferation
significant because, unlike other reported cases of nuclear diversion,
they involved more than minuscule quantities of either HEU or
plutonium and also indisputably occurred. There are at least four
more cases that are of probable proliferation concern, but which
do not as clearly meet our standard of unambiguous evidence. These
cases include: (1) the seizure of a large cache of beryllium,
including a much smaller quantity of a beryllium and HEU alloy,
in the basement of a bank in Vilnius, Lithuania in May 1993; (2)
the reported recovery in St. Petersburg in June 1994 of 3.05 kilograms
of weapons-usable HEU allegedly stolen from a nuclear facility
(most likely Electrostal) near Moscow in March of that year; (3)
the seizure of six kilograms of enriched uranium (probably 20
percent U-235) in March 1995 in Kiev, Ukraine; and (4) the diversion
in January 1995 of one plutonium pellet or button from the Machine
Building Plant at Electrostal, near Moscow.
Potentially the most serious diversion in terms of the reported
quantity and enrichment level of material involved is the St.
Petersburg case. Initial Russian press accounts, however, have
not been followed by the release of more detailed information
by other media sources or from a criminal investigation or trial,
if any took place. Nevertheless, a number of (but not all) US
government agencies believe that the theft occurred.
The Vilnius case, discussed in more detail in my full report,
is intriguing mainly because of the possible complicity of government
authorities. At issue in the March 1995 Kiev seizure is the level
of enrichment of the six kilograms of uranium. Although the US
Department of Energy is inclined to categorize the fuel as low-enriched
uranium for power reactors, I have been told by Ukrainian nuclear
scientists that an analysis of the material by the Kiev Institute
for Nuclear Research indicated an enrichment level of 20 percent,
consistent with much naval reactor fuel. Although little has been
released about the diversion of plutonium material from Electrostal,
suspects have been apprehended, and a trial is likely to be held
later this year. The case is intriguing because the material appears
not to have been recovered and because plutonium previously had
not been known to be present at the Electrostal facility.
Patterns of Behavior
An analysis of the confirmed cases of theft and/or diversions
of HEU and plutonium reveals a number of interesting, if not statistically
significant, patterns of behavior. It is apparent, for example,
that although the number of proliferation-significant instances
of nuclear material theft remains small, the quantity of material
offered for sale has increased.
Most of the material recovered to date has been enriched uranium,
in the form of uranium dioxide powder. The preponderance of seizures
involving definite or possible fresh fuel for propulsion reactors
also is striking. None of the seizures to date provide any evidence
of having a nuclear weapons' origin.
It is difficult, based upon the available information, to make
generalizations about the suppliers of proliferation-significant
nuclear material. Nevertheless, from what is known, most appear
to have been "insiders," working at nuclear research
institutes or naval bases, or having previously worked at such
facilities. Most of the perpetrators do not appear to have had
customers in hand (other than perhaps German intelligence authorities)
at the time of the diversions. Rather, evidence suggests that
the thieves who were apprehended generally were ill-informed novices
in the business of nuclear trafficking who were disaffected with
their economic lot, looking to make a quick profit.
Most analysts believe that an "end-user market" exists
for weapons-usable nuclear material. The most likely end-users
-- those who desire the material for actual use, as opposed to
resale for a profit -- are perceived to be states with nuclear
weapons ambitions. Terrorist groups and even transnational criminal
organizations also have been identified as potential customers
for weapons-grade material, if only for extortionist purposes.
A review of those cases in which HEU and plutonium actually have
been diverted, however, does not reveal reliable evidence that
end-users were involved.
This being said, one must introduce two significant caveats. First,
one legitimately may ask, "How confident should we be that
proliferation significant exports of Soviet/NIS-origin nuclear
material have simply escaped detection?" It is known, for
example, that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran became
particularly interested in Kazakhstan's nuclear-related assets,
including those present at the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk
-- the facility that held the 600 kg. of bomb-grade HEU airlifted
to the United States in "Project Sapphire." Given the
underdeveloped state of export controls in the former Soviet Union
outside of Russia and the virtual absence of any barriers to movement
of sensitive goods and material between Russia and the other NIS
states, it is entirely possible, although not proven, that proliferation
significant nuclear material and technology already may have exited
Russia via one of a number of southern routes (e.g., through the
Caucasus or Central Asia).
The second caveat, which reinforces the first, is that while there
is no hard evidence that nuclear proliferants have illegally procured
HEU or plutonium from the ex-USSR, there is indisputable evidence
that would-be proliferants have been able to acquire key missile
system components of Russian origin. The UN Special Commission
on Iraq, for example, has documents which indicate that strategic
gyroscopes from dismantled Russian SLBMs have been shipped to
Iraq. All that remains in doubt is the number and kind of such
transactions and whether or not they were state-sanctioned. Similar
concerns exist regarding Ukrainian-Iraqi missile contacts and
contracts, and Iranian (and possibly Iraqi) missile acquisition
initiatives in Kazakhstan. Also disturbing is the readiness of
Ukrainian governmental officials to overrule their own competent
export control authorities in selling off state reserves of nuclear-related
dual use material such as zirconium. These activities caution
against attaching too much importance to the apparent lull in
reported seizures of proliferation significant nuclear material
in Europe.
New and Old Nuclear Threats
Time does not permit even a summary of all the serious nuclear
threats emanating from the former Soviet Union, many of which
are discussed admirably in the recent Harvard study on Avoiding
Nuclear Anarchy. In my closing remarks, therefore, let me
simply emphasize several significant nuclear threats that either
have not yet received adequate attention or are proving resistant
to US and Russian policy initiatives. These threats pertain to:
(1) inadequate safeguarding of fuel for propulsion reactors; (2)
large stocks of unsafeguarded highly-enriched uranium in Kazakhstan;
and (3) enormous quantities of poorly safeguarded spent fuel.
Naval Fuel
Approximately two years ago I prepared testimony for Congress
about the danger posed by the lack of attention in Russia to safeguarding
fresh fuel for propulsion reactors. This fuel, which may be enriched
up to 90 percent U-235, is used by both Russian naval vessels
and civilian ice-breakers.
During the past year the issue has gained salience in US-Russian
deliberations over physical protection, material control, and
accountancy. The widespread publicity given the theft of fresh
fuel assemblies from the Sevmorput Shipyard near Murmansk and
Russian awareness of a similar diversion at Andreeva Guba provided
a useful impetus. Progress in upgrading safeguards at storage
sites for propulsion reactor fuel, however, has been hampered
by confused lines of authority regarding material control at these
facilities, the reluctance of Ministry of Defense and Minatom
officials to cooperate with the Russian nuclear regulatory body
Gosatomnadzor, and the failure of Russia to allocate adequate
resources for the purpose of improving physical protection. US
Navy resistance to Russian proposals for reciprocity and transparency
in safeguarding naval fuel also has hampered the provision of
Cooperative Threat Reduction funds to Russia for this purpose.
Although there are indications that this obstacle may soon be
overcome, it cannot occur too quickly given deteriorating work
conditions at many naval facilities, failure to pay servicemen
on time, and the lax physical protection and shoddy material control
and accountancy practices that continue to plague naval fuel storage
sites.
The Next Sapphire?
In November 1994 it was widely believed that with the successful
conclusion of Project Sapphire, the United States had removed
the last substantial quantity of HEU from Kazakhstan. That now
is known not to be the case. Rather, in late 1995 Kazakhstan notified
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that 205 kilograms
of HEU remained at its Semipalatinsk nuclear research site. What
is surprising and worrisome is that because Russia claims that
it owns the material, it refuses to allow Kazakhstan to accept
IAEA safeguards on the HEU, although Kazakhstan is required by
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to have all of its nuclear
facilities under safeguards. Russia also refuses to specify when
it will remove the material.
This unusual development confronts the United States with several
difficult choices. On the one hand, failure to remove or safeguard
the HEU would set a dangerous precedent in which weapons-usable
material would reside under ambiguous custody on the territory
of a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. In addition to
being imprudent, such a situation would appear to be at odds with
both Kazakhstan's and Russia's NPT commitments. On the other hand,
it may well be that the United States has more confidence in the
ability of Kazakhstan to protect HEU at Semipalatinsk than it
does in Russia's ability to protect the material if it were returned
to the Luch Scientific Production Association, which originally
had control over the material. Luch, one may recall, is where
the first significant diversion of HEU took place in 1992. The
unanticipated discovery of another cache of hundreds of kilograms
of weapons-usable material also is a useful reminder that we probably
can expect to find further large, undeclared quantities of HEU
in the non-Russian successor states.
Spent Fuel
The last nuclear threat I would like to note may be the least
obvious. Indeed, until very recently it has received practically
no attention, perhaps because of the proper emphasis that has
been given to first enhancing security for nuclear weapons and
fresh (i.e., unirradiated) HEU and plutonium. It would be a mistake,
however, to neglect the potential proliferation and terrorist
risks posed by the enormous quantities of virtually unsafeguarded
spent nuclear fuel, especially that which was never highly irradiated
or has been sitting long enough to see its radiation barrier decline
greatly.
It needs to be emphasized that this spent fuel containing so-called
"reactor grade plutonium" can be used to fabricate nuclear
weapons. Moreover, spent fuel from certain kinds of reactors may
be especially attractive to would-be proliferants with access
to reprocessing technology because of the unusually large proportion
of HEU or plutonium present. Spent naval fuel, for example, typically
will have a large HEU content, while that in fast breeder reactors
may contain significant quantities of low irradiated plutonium.
The fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan on the Caspian Sea
poses a special risk. It has been in operation since 1973 and
has produced a very large quantity of low-irradiated plutonium,
much of which remains on the plant site. Although Kazakhstani
nuclear authorities recognize the need to upgrade safeguards at
the facility and are cooperating with the US government on this
matter, a growing Iranian presence in the city highlights the
need for more rapid action. Iran, it should be noted, has sought
to establish a consulate in Aktau since 1993 and Iranian vessels
routinely call on the formerly closed nuclear city. An even greater
threat, from the perspective of Kazakhstani authorities, is posed
by Chechen terrorists. Although this particular danger may be
exaggerated, the potential damage that could be caused by terrorist
attacks on or sabotage of civilian nuclear power plants and spent
fuel storage sites is enormous and should become part of the calculus
by which physical protection threat assessments are made. Such
threats, however, currently are not reflected in the designs of
most civilian nuclear power sites in the post-Soviet states.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude my remarks by emphasizing that most nuclear
security problems are inextricably linked to the region's troubled
economic, political and social conditions. As such, they are unlikely
to be completely resolved without substantial progress toward
stabilizing the economy and renewing public trust in government
institutions and law. This is not likely to occur soon, and the
United States will thus continue to face at least some threat
of nuclear leakage from the former Soviet Union for the foreseeable
future. Unfortunately, this danger is likely to grow before it
recedes, and it is imperative for the United States to commit
resources commensurate with the threat.
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