CNS Reports

Overview:  An Assessment of the Draft Russian Military Doctrine

After several years in the works and countless revisions, the Russian Ministry of Defense has published the draft of a new military doctrine.[1]  This long-awaited document, which was promised several times since early 1997, is the first revision of the earlier document "Key Provisions of the Military Doctrine," published in November 1993.[2]

The new document bears all the hallmarks of the new assessments and attitudes that have become dominant in the wake of the Kosovo crisis in the spring and summer of 1999. Among other innovations, it provides for the enhancement of the role of nuclear weapons in Russia's security policy and revises the provisions that guide their employment in various scenarios.

There are reasons to believe that these innovations were not introduced until 1999. In a review of the unpublished draft developed in 1997, two officers of the General Staff underscored that "some 'specialists' ... attempted to introduce into the documents language that would toughen nuclear policy. These proposals were rejected by the Interagency Working Group [on the new doctrine]. This is why it was decided to keep the language of the 1993 "Key Provisions of the Military Doctrine," which concerns nuclear weapons and which has passed the test of time and was supported by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs."[3]  The 1999 document is a clear-cut revision of these provisions.

A comparison of the two documents illustrates the scale and the direction of the evolution of the Russian military's views on these issues.

The 1993 doctrine contained only a few provisions related to nuclear weapons. The central provision pertained to limitations on their use. The document postulated that the Russian Federation

will not use its nuclear weapons against any member state of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 that does not possess nuclear weapons unless (a) such a state, if it has an alliance agreement with a nuclear-weapons state, engages in an armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces and other troops, or its allies; (b) such a state acts jointly with a nuclear-weapons state in carrying out or supporting an invasion or an armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces and other troops, or its allies.

The 1999 document contains a very similar text with certain subtle, but important revisions:

The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against member states of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons that do not possess nuclear weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or a state with which it has obligations with respect to security, [if such an invasion or attack is] conducted or supported by such a non-nuclear-weapons state together with or under alliance obligations to a nuclear-weapons state.

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against itself or its allies and also in response to large-scale aggression involving conventional weapons in situations that are critical for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

The overall mission of nuclear weapons, according to the 1993 doctrine, was "the removal of the danger of a nuclear war by means of deterring [other states]  from unleashing an aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies."  The exact conditions under which nuclear weapons could be used were not clearly specified, however. The document implied that nuclear weapons were intended only for a large-scale (global) war. It also contained two warnings. First, that even a limited conflict could escalate into a global war and, second, that any use of nuclear weapons was fraught with an all-out, unrestrained nuclear exchange. This represented, in essence, deterrence of any (including limited) conflict by threat of world annihilation.

As in the 1993 doctrine, the new document provides for the first use of nuclear weapons by default, i.e., by not mentioning that Russia will not use nuclear weapons first. This has become a rather common point by now. The new doctrine makes a real contribution by better defining and broadening the range of scenarios in which nuclear weapons could be used, as well as the purposes of such use.

The overall mission of nuclear weapons remains the same: nuclear weapons are seen as "an effective means of deterring aggression." The doctrine distinguishes between three types of war:  global, regional, and local. The use of nuclear weapons is associated with the first two types. A global or regional war may start as a conventional one, but the risk is high that "deterrence fails and it becomes impossible to prevent [its] escalation." In the case the nuclear threshold is crossed, the mission of nuclear weapons is "guaranteed infliction of a predetermined damage to the aggressor under any circumstances." It is also noted that a global or a regional war can result from escalation of lower-level conflicts.

The provisions governing the use of nuclear weapons are obviously subject to interpretation, and it is possible that such vagueness is intentional. First, the failure to prevent escalation can be understood to mean that the attacking side chooses to use nuclear weapons in spite of the threat of retaliation by Russia. On the other hand, it might also mean that the aggressor would press on with the attack putting Russia on the threshold of defeat in spite of Russia's ability to use nuclear weapons.

The use of the term "predetermined damage" instead of a more conventional "unacceptable damage" suggests that the role of nuclear weapons is not limited to "central deterrence," i.e., a massive nuclear strike leading to a global catastrophe. Goals of a nuclear strike can also be more limited, especially if these weapons are used in a regional war. The (intentional) vagueness of the military doctrine with respect to the limited use of nuclear weapons is removed by an article in the leading military journal Voyennaya mysl.[4]  The authors develop an idea about using nuclear weapons for the purposes of "de-escalation" of a regional war. This concept provides for a limited nuclear strike with carefully calibrated damage to the attacker in case Russian conventional troops are unable to prevail in a conflict.

Finally, the 1999 document indicates that strategic nuclear forces will remain the backbone of Russia's nuclear capability (it should be noted, however, that Tu-22M3 bombers, officially classified as medium bombers, fall into the same category as heavy, strategic bombers). The doctrine lists among the priority areas of defense acquisition "the qualitative improvement of the strategic weapons complex," but fails to mention other classes of nuclear weapons, such as tactical nuclear weapons. This suggests that strategic delivery vehicles may be used even for limited strikes.

Overall, the draft of a new military doctrine is fully compatible with a series of exercises that were conducted by Russia in the summer and fall of 1999. Among them, the most significant was the "Zapad-99" (West-99) exercise, which simulated an attack by NATO against Kaliningrad Oblast, an isolated enclave of Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania. According to the scenario, conventional troops were able to resist the attack only for a limited period of time. After that, Russia resorted to nuclear weapons--specifically, two heavy bombers launched nuclear ALCMs against NATO targets in Europe and two others launched nuclear ALCMs against the United States. According to the scenario, the damage in conjunction with demonstrated willingness to expand the conflict if necessary made it possible to terminate the regional war.

The publication of the draft of the military doctrine is a singular event which makes 1999 the year of fundamental revision in Russia's nuclear weapons policy. The crisis in Kosovo sharply escalated a reassessment of the nuclear doctrine; the new views were first tested in a series of maneuvers, and now these views are sanctified by an official document published by the Ministry of Defense. Of course, the draft will not become the official doctrine until it is signed by the president, but there is little doubt that any changes that are introduced are likely to be minimal.

Sources:

[1] "Voennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii: Proyekt," available at http://www.redstar.ru/today_news/today_news.html.

[2] "Osnovnyye polozheniya voyennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 18 November 1993, pp. 1, 4.

[3] Anatoliy Klimenko and Aleksandr Koltuykov, "Osnovnoy dokument voyennogo stroitelstva," Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, 13 February 1998, p. 4.

[4]  V. Levshin, A. Nedelin, M. Sosnovskiy, "O primenenii yadernogo oruzhiya dlya deeskalatsii voennykh deystviy," Voennaya Mysl Vol. 3, May-June 1999, pp. 34-37.

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