[12] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter), pp. 41-42.

Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Egypt as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, 1991, p. 107.

A summary chart included in an article by Anthony H. Cordesman indicates that Egypt has a stockpile of chemical weapons. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," Stability and Instability in the Middle East, Volume III, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

See also
Dany Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," The Nonproliferation Review, 5 (Spring-Summer 1998), pp. 48-58. For further information on Egypt's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/egypt.htm.

[13] Egypt likely possesses sarin, VX, mustard, and phosgene. Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," p. 49.

Russian intelligence reports that Egypt has assimilated "techniques for the production of nerve and blister agents." Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 103[rd] Congress, First Session, February 24, 1993, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 92.

[14] "The United States believes that Egypt had developed biological warfare agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist." Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1998 Annual Report to Congress, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/reports/annual/comp98.html.

A Russian intelligence report cites Egypt as having "a program of military-applied research in the area of biological weapons." It also states that there is no evidence that weapons for military use have been developed. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 93.

"Egypt appears to have developed several natural pathogens and toxins as warfare agents and has recently taken the first steps to acquire a capability for the genetic engineering of microbial pathogens." Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," p. 56.

Cordesman cites Egypt as researching biological weapons. Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

[15] Shoham, in "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt", writes that Egypt has conducted research on anthrax, botulinum toxin, plague, cholera, tularemia, glanders, brucellosis, meliodosis, Japanese B. encephalitis, Eastern equine encephalitis, influenza, smallpox and mycotoxins. This list has been disputed and there is no other open source information available to verify the agents listed in the Shoham article.

[16] Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Ethiopia as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

[17] In a 1988 speech to the United Nations, French President, Mitterrand, claimed that France had no chemical weapons, and would produce none. Victor A. Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 123-124.

An article in The Economist suggests that France might "have destroyed [its] chemical weapons before signing the CWC." "Chemical Weapons. Just Checking," The Economist, p. 42.

[18] At the start of World War II, the French had a stockpile of mustard gas and phosgene. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 117.

Testing of chemical weapons occured at a site called B2-Namous in Algeria. Vincent Jauvert, "Quand la France Teste des armes chimiques en Algerie," Le Nouvel Observateur, (Oct. 23-29, 1997), pp. 10-22.

[19] Olivier Lepick, "French activities related to biological warfare, 1919-45," in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Mood, eds., (New York: NY: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), p. 70.

[20] Olivier Lepick, "French activities related to biological warfare, 1919-45," in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Mood, eds., (New York: NY: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), pp. 78, 82- 90.

[21] Following World War II, "West Germany unilaterally renounced the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons." With the signing of the revised Brussels Treaty in 1954 and the establishment of the Western European Union, West Germany's pledge not to manufacture NBC weapons became an international commitment subject to verification. Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective, pp. 90-91.

[22] Germany's World War II stockpile of chemical weapons included phosgene, cyanide, mustard gas, sarin, and tabun. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II: CB Weapons Today, p. 127.

The Germans also reportedly produced soman. Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947, p. 181.

[23] Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm, 2001.
Mark Wheelis, "Biological sabotage in World War I," in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Mood, eds., (New York: NY: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), p. 35.
Erhard Geissler, "Biological warfare activities in Germany, 1923-45," in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Mood, eds., (New York: NY: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), p. 91.

Germany's World War II biological weapons program was not institutionalized until the establishment of a research station at Posen in 1943. As Soviet forces moved toward the Posen facility in March 1945, work at the station ended--"without having accomplished anything very startling." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 117.

[24] Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm, 2001.
Erhard Geissler, "Biological warfare activities in Germany, 1923-45," in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Mood, eds., (New York: NY: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), pp. 106, 117, 120-121.

Plague, cholera, typhus, and yellow fever were among the agents studied by Germany's biological weapons program. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 117.

Anthrax and glanders were used offensively by Germany during World War I in a veterinary sabotage programe. Mark Wheelis, "Biological sabotage in World War I," in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Mood, eds., (New York: NY: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), p. 40-57.

[25] India Acknowledged its chemical warfare program in 1997 and stated that related facilities would be open for inspection. India has a sizable chemical industry which could be source of dual-use chemicals for countries of proliferation concern. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf , p. 14.

Under the CWC India has declared possession of a chemical weapons program. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/so_asia.html#india.

India has declared Category 1, 2, and 3 chemical weapons to the OPCW.

[26] India has substantial biotechnical infrastructure and expertise, some of which is being used for biological warfare defense research. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 14.

[27]"Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) States party, already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons - including blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. During the first half of 2001, Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal of having an indigenous nerve agent production capability." Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1January Through 30 June 2001," (Washington, DC: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2001),http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2002.htm.

Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMDinMETrends.pdf, 1999, pp. 38-40.
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993, p. 98.

"Iran's chemical weapons (CW) program is one of the largest in the developing world...we believe Iran's CW program continues and that it possesses a substantial stockpile of weaponized and bulk agent." Robert J. Einhorn, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, October 5, 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/001005_einhorn_sfrc.html.

"In the past Tehran has manufactured and stockpiled blister, blood and choking chemical agents, and weaponized some of these agents into artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs. It is also believed to be conducting research on nerve agents." U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 36.

For further information on Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.htm.

[28] Iran reportedly stockpiled cyanide, phosgene, and mustard gas after 1985. Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

"At present the industrial production of mustard gas and sarin has been established in Iran." Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 98.

Iran "has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents." Central Intelligence Agency, "Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 2001," (Washington, DC: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2001), http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_feb_2001.htm.

[29] "Iran probably began its offensive BW program during the Iran-Iraq war, and it may have some limited capability for BW deployment." Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1January Through 30 June 2001," (Washington, DC: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2001),http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2002.htm.

Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran: Delivery Systems, and Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Programs, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 28, 1998), http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMDinIran4-28-98.html, pp. 13-14.

In a speech to the Fifth Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva on November 19, 2001, John Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, accused Iran of operating a clandestine biological weapons program. Jenni Rissanen, Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference, BWC Review Conference Bulletin, (Acronym Institute, November 19, 2001), http://http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/revcon1.htm.

"Iran possesses overall infrastructure and expertise to support a biological warfare program. It pursues contacts with Russian entities and other sources to acquire dual-use equipment and technology and is believed to be actively pursuing offensive biological warfare capabilities. It may have small quantities of usable agent now." U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf , p. 35 .

"Iran probably has produced biological warfare agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents." U.S. State Department, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/reports/annual/comp97.html.

"Western countries have noted attempts by Iranian representatives to buy, unofficially, technology and biological materials used specifically for the production of biological weapons, in particular, mycotoxins." Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century," Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action, (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998), p. 31.

[30] Anthony Cordesmann, Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran: Delivery Systems, and Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Programs, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 28, 1998), http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMDinIran4-28-98.html.

[31] United Nations, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "Latest Six-Monthly Report," (April 16, 1998), http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres98-332.htm.

"Since the Gulf War, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure. Some of Iraq's facilities could be converted fairly quickly to production of chemical warfare agents. Following Operation Desert Fox, Iraq again instituted a rapid reconstruction effort on those facilities to include former dual-use chemical warfare-associated production facilities, destroyed by U.S. bombing. Iraq retains the expertise to resume chemical agent production within a few weeks or months, depending on the type of agent." U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, pp. 41-42.

"Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime." Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

See also
E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (September/October, 1997), p. 38.

For further information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iraq.htm and CNS's "Special Collection on the Iraq Crisis" web page at http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/index.htm.

[32] Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.
United Nations, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051," (June 10, 1997), http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres97-774.htm.

In the past Iraq produced mustard gas, sarin, tabun, and VX. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p 50.

Steve Bowman, in an April 1998 CRS Issue Brief, includes Agent 15 in the list of Iraqi chemical weapons. Steve Bowman, Iraqi Chemical & Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities, CRS Issue Brief, (Congressional Research Service, April 1998), http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/98042705_npo. html.

"Agent-15 belongs to the glycollates, a large group of chemicals which also includes the chemical warfare agent BZ. The chemicals block cholinergic nerve transmission in the central and peripheral nervous system...little information is publicly known about Agent-15, except that it is closely related to BZ. The understanding of its physiological effects is based on studies with the latter agent." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Agent - 15, http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/cbw-agents/Agent-15.html.

[33] United Nations, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "Latest Six-Monthly Report" (April 16, 1998), http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres98-332.htm.
Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

"Iraq produced and weaponized significant quantities of biological warfare agents prior to Desert Storm. It admitted biological warfare effort in 1995, after four years of denial, and subsequently claimed to have destroyed all agents. No credible proof, however, has been offered. The UN believes that Baghdad has the ability to reconstitute its biological warfare capabilities within a few weeks or months, and, in the absence of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring during 1999 and 2000, may have produced some biological warfare agents." U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf , pp. 39-40.

"The United States believes that Iraq is capable of producing biological warfare agents and is probably intent on continuing its offensive BW efforts if the threat of UNSCOM inspections and long-term monitoring are removed." Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1995 Annual Report to Congress, (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/reports/complian.htm.

In a speech to the Fifth Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva on November 19, 2001, John Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, accused Iraq of operating a clandestine biological weapons program. Jenni Rissanen, Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference, BWC Review Conference Bulletin, (Acronym Institute, November 19, 2001), http://http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/revcon1.htm.

[34] Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.
Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm, 2001.
United Nations, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051" (June 10, 1997), http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres97-774.htm.

According to ACDA, Iraq produced anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, ricin, wheat cover smut, and researched Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene), hemorrhagic conjuctivitis virus, rotavirus, and camel pox. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1995 Annual Report to Congress, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/reports/complian.htm.

Iraq's biological weapons program worked with anthrax, botulinum toxin, gas gangrene, aflatoxin, trichothecene mycotoxins, wheat cover smut, and ricin. Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century," Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action, (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998), p. 27.

[35] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter), pp. 27-53.

Israel has completed extensive research into gas warfare and defense and may have some production facilities. Additionally, Israel may have stocks of bombs, rockets, and artillery. Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

The London Sunday Times reports that Israeli F-16 fighters have been equipped to carry chemical weapons and that their crews have been trained on the use of such weapons. Uzi Mahnaimi, "Israeli Jets Equipped For Chemical Warfare," London Sunday Times, October 4, 1998.

"Israel has a store of chemical weapons of its own manufacture...Israel is capable of producing toxic substances of all types, including nerve-paralyzing, blister-producing and temporarily incapacitating substances and so forth. The country has for this a highly developed chemical and petrochemical industry and skilled specialists and also stocks of source material." Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993.

In a 1974 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Almquist stated that Israel had an offensive chemical weapons capability. Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1975 Authorization Hearing, Part 5, March 7, 1974.

For further information on Israel's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israel.htm.

[36] [35] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter), pp. 27-53.

While it is unclear exactly what chemical agents Israel may produce, Dutch officials have identified that an El Al 747 that crashed in Amsterdam in 1992 was carrying a shipment of DMMP destined for Israel. DMMP is a nerve gas precursor used in the manufacture of sarin gas. Uzi Mahnaimi, "Israeli Jets Equipped For Chemical Warfare," London Sunday Times, October 4, 1998.

[37] [35] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter), pp. 27-53.

Israel has conducted research into weapons and defense and has the ability to produce biological weapons; however, there is no indication of a production effort. Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

A Russian intelligence report indicates that Israel has a biological research program of a general nature "in which elements of a military-applied purpose are present." Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 94.

The London Sunday Times reports that Israeli F-16 fighters have been equipped to carry biological weapons and that their crews have been trained on the use of such weapons. Uzi Mahnaimi, "Israeli Jets Equipped For Chemical Warfare," London Sunday Times, October 4, 1998.

[38] As part of the 1947 Peace Treaty, Italy is forbidden from possessing chemical weapons, even for deterrent purposes. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II: CB Weapons Today, p. 187.

[39] The Italian chemical weapons inventory during World War II included mustard gas and phosgene. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 292.

[40] The Economist reports that Japan ended its chemical weapons program "years ago," placing it together with Britain, which ended its program in the 1950s. "Chemical Weapons. Just Checking," The Economist, p. 42.

While Japan might have ended its CW program years ago, it remains legally responsible for hundreds of thousands of chemical munitions it abandoned in China during World War II. In an article discussing the problems involved in disposing of the weapons left behind in China, a Japanese newspaper reports that "[s]ince Japan's postwar defense forces do not have chemical weapons, there is no section in the Japanese government that is completely familiar with neutralization of chemical weapons." Masato Ishizawa, "Chemical Weapons Return to Haunt Japan: Bombs Left in China Pose Dangerous Task of Removal, Disposal," The Nikkei Weekly, January 20, 1997, p. 1.

Chinese officials claim that the Japanese left over two million chemical munitions in China, while Japanese officials insist the number is closer to 700,000. "Chemical weapons," Mainichi Daily News, July 28, 1998, p.2.

For further information on Japan's abandoned chemical weapons in China, see Hongmei Deng and Peter O'Meara Evans, "Social and Environmental Aspects of Abandoned Chemial Weapons in China," The Nonproliferation Review, 4, (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 101-108.

See also
"Abandoned and Old Japanese Chemical Weapons," http://www.tcp-ip.or.jp/~e-ogawa/CWMENU.HTM.
George Wehrfritz, Hideko Takayama, and Lijia MacLeod, "In Search of Buried Poison," Newsweek 132, (July 20, 1998).

[41] Japan's World War II stockpile of chemical weapons included phosgene, chloropicrin (a lung irritant), cyanide, mustard gas, and lewisite. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II: CB Weapons Today, p. 127.

[42] Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm, 2001.
Sheldon Harris, "The Japanese biological warfare programme: an overview," in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Mood, eds., (New York: NY: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), p. 127.

Between 1937 and 1945, Japan operated a biological weapons program in occupied Manchuria. United States Army, Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), "Medical Defense Against Biological Warfare Agents Course: History of Biological Warfare," http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usamriid/bw-hist.htm.

[43] Sheldon Harris, "The Japanese biological warfare programme: an overview," in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Mood, eds., (New York: NY: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), pp. 138, 140, 142-3, 149.

[44] Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993, p. 100.
Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East ," http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMDinMETrends.pdf, 1999, p. 17.

The U.S Department of Defense has stated that Libya produced blister and nerve agents in the 1980's at Rabta; employed chemical agents against Chadian troops in 1987and; attempted to construct underground chemical agent production facility at Tarhunah. Both the Rabta and Tarhunah facilties are believed to be inactive, although chemical program not completely abandoned. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 46.

According to the CIA, following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Tripoli reestablished contacts with sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Libya still appears to have a goal of establishing an offensive CW capability and an indigenous production capability for weapons. CIA, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_feb_2001.htm.

Libya produced blister and nerve agents in the 1980s and is currently constructing an underground chemical agent production facility at Tarhunah. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.html#libya.

"Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key CW-related equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Tripoli reestablished contacts with sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals abroad...Libya still appears to have a goal of establishing an offensive CW capability and an indigenous prodiction capability for weapons." Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1January Through 30 June 2001," (Washington, DC: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2001),http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2002.htm.

For further information on Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/libya.htm.

[45] "In the early 1990s, Rabta was reportedly capable of producing the blister agent sulphur-mustard and the deadly nerve agents sarin and tabun...In March 1990, American and German intelligence sources claimed that Libya had produced approximately 30 tons of mustard gas at Rabta." Another plant was also reported to produce lewisite. Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review, 4, (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 94.

According to a Russian source, Libya has produced mustard gas, sarin, and phosgene. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 100.

[46] In a speech to the Fifth Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva on November 19, 2001, John Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, accused Libya of operating a clandestine biological weapons program. Jenni Rissanen, Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference, BWC Review Conference Bulletin, (Acronym Institute, November 19, 2001), http://http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/revcon1.htm.

"Evidence suggests Libya is seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW agents. Such development or production would violate key provisions of the BWC. Libya has also failed to submit the data declarations stipulated in the CBMs. Evidence indicates that Libya has the expertise to produce small quantities of biological equipment for its BW program and that the Libyan Government is seeking to move its research program into a program of weaponized BW agents." Robert J. Einhorn, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, October 5, 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/001005_einhorn_sfrc.html.

The CIA reports that Libya may also be seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW agents. CIA, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000," http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_feb_2001.htm.

The Department of State reports that evidence exists to indicate that Libya has the expertise to produce small quantities of biological equipment for its BW program and that the Libyan Government is seeking to move its research program into a program of weaponized BW agents. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1998 Annual Report to Congress, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/reports/annual/comp98.html.

"There is information indicating that Libya is engaged in initial testing in the area of biological weapons." Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 100.

[47] Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Myanmar as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

[48] "North Korea has a long-standing chemical weapons program. North Korea's domestic chemical industry can produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. We believe it has a sizeable stockpile of agents and weapons." Carl W. Ford, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, "Hearing on Reducing the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," (Washington, DC), March 19, 2002.

Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Deterrence Series, Case Study 5: North Korea, (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), p. 5.

The Department of Defense reports that North Korea's chemical warfare capabilities include the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents, using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 11.

Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified North Korea as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

The DOD reports that North Korea "[p]roduces and is capable of using a wide variety of [chemical] agents." U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/ne_asia.html#north.

[49] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Deterrence Series, Case Study 5: North Korea, (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), p. 5.

"North Korea has a chemical weapons program that, according to the CIA, includes mustard and blister agents." Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, Flashpoints and Force Structure, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa97/sa97ch11.html.

[50] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Deterrence Series, Case Study 5: North Korea, p. 11-12.

In a speech to the Fifth Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva on November 19, 2001, John Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, accused North Korea of operating a clandestine biological weapons program. Jenni Rissanen, Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference, BWC Review Conference Bulletin, (Acronym Institute, November 19, 2001), http://http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/revcon1.htm.

North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960's. Furthermore, North Korea possesses infrastructure that can be used to produce biological warfare agents. North Korea may have biological weapons available for use. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 10.

North Korea "[p]ursued biological warfare research and development for many years. Possesses biotechnical infrastructure capable of supporting limited biological warfare effort." U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/ne_asia.html#north.

"North Korea is performing applied military-biological research in a whole number of universities, medical institutes, and specialized research institutes. Work is being performed in these research centers with inducersof malignant anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague and smallpox. Biological weapons are being tested on the island territories belonging to the DPRK." Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993 .

[51] The Actual Situation of North Korea's Biological and Chemical Weapons, Foresight, February 17, 2001, pp. 24-25, translated in FBIS.
South Korea Says North Has Biological, Chemical Weapons, Kyodo News Service, October 23, 1992.
North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, November 1999.
Bill Gertz, Hwang Says N. Korea Has Atomic Weapons; Pyongyang Called Off Planned Nuclear Test,The Washington Times, June 5, 1997, p. A12.
Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defence, White Paper, 2000, http://www.mnd.go.kr/mnden/emainindex.html.

"Pyongyang's resources include a rudimentary (by Western standards) biotechnical infrastructure that could support the production of infectious biological warfare agents and toxins such as anthrax, cholera, and plague." U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 10.

Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Deterrence Series, Case Study 5: North Korea, p. 12.

Russian intelligence reports that North Korea is conducting military applied research on anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague and smallpox. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 99.

[52] Pakistan has imported a number of dual-use chemicals that can be used to make chemical agents. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 28.

Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Pakistan as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

"Pakistan has the ability to transition from research and development to chemical agent production." U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/so_asia.html#india.

"[R]esearch of an applied military nature is being conducted" by Pakistan in the area of chemical weapons. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 101.

[53] Pakistan is believed to have the resources and capabilities to support a limited biological warfare research and development effort. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 28.

[54] The Department of Defense reports that Russia has acknowledged the world's largest stockpile of chemical agents of 40,000 metric tons, and has developed a new generation of chemical agents. The DOD believes that Russia still has not divulged the full extent of their chemical agent and weapon inventory. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 57.

"Russian officials do not deny research has continued but assert that it aims to develop defenses against chemical weapons...Many of the components for new binary agents developed by the former Soviet Union are not on the CWC's schedule of chemicals and have legitimate civil applications, clouding their association with chemical weapons use." Carl W. Ford, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, "Hearing on Reducing the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," (Washington, DC), March 19, 2002.

The Department of Defense reports that research into chemical weapons continues in Russia, with Russian officials asserting that it is for defensive purposes only. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/fsu.html#russia.

[55] Clifford Krauss, "U.S. Urges Russia To End Production of Nerve Gas," The New York Times, February 6, 1997.
Frank Von Hippel, "Russian whistleblower faces jail," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 49, (March, 1993), http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1993/m93/m93vonhippel.html.

Russia's chemical weapons program has reportedly developed a new class of advanced binary chemical weapons, referred to as the Novichok series. A-232 is both a unitary agent and a Novichok precursor. Dr. Vil S. Mirzayanov, "Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider's View," Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects, (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995), pp. 24-25.

[56] "Key components of the former Soviet program remain largely intact and may support a possible future mobilization capability for the production of biological agents and delivery systems. Moreover, work outside the scope of legitimate biological defense activity may be occurring now at selected facilities within Russia." Carl W. Ford, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, "Hearing on Reducing the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," (Washington, DC), March 19, 2002.

Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm, 2001.

The Department of Defense reports that some elements of large FSU biological warfare program may remain intact and could support future agent production, and that some offensive biological warfare activities may be ongoing (p. 54), with the United States continuing to receive unconfirmed reports of offensive biological warfare efforts (p. 57). U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf.

According to the DOD, some work "outside the scope of legitimate biological defense activity may be occurring" in Russia. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/index.html.

"[S]ome facilities, in addition to being engaged in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to produce BW agents." U.S. Department of State, 1998 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/reports/annual/comp98.html.

[57] The Department of Defense reports that Russia has acknowledged the world's largest stockpile of chemical agents of 40,000 metric tons, and has developed a new generation of chemical agents. The DOD believes that Russia still has not divulged the full extent of their chemical agent and weapon inventory. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 57.

[58] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Chemical weapons distribution at the Russian Storage sites," http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/sipri-bicc-cw-map.html.

[59] Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm, 2001.

[60] Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm, 2001.

"According to its declaration, Russia maintained an offensive research and development program until March 1992 that worked with anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, plague, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, typhus, and Q-fever. With respect to toxins, Russia claimed that the only natural toxin studied in its program was botulinum toxin." Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State, "Joint US/UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons," Press Release, Office of Public Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, September 14, 1992), cited in Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century," Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action, (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998), p. 29.

Russian defector Kanatjan Alibekov (Kenneth Alibek), a former deputy director of the Soviet/Russian biological warfare development program, lists the following agents as either weaponized or researched by the Soviet/Russian program: smallpox, plague, anthrax, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis, glanders, brucellosis, Marburg virus, Ebola virus, Argentinian hemorrhagic fever, Machupo virus, yellow fever, Lassa fever, Japanese encephalitis, Russian spring-summer encephalitis, tularemia, typhus, Q-fever, psittacosis, ornithosis, rinderpest virus, African swine fever virus, wheat stem rust, and rice blast. Dr. Kenneth Alibek, statement before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "Terrorism and Intelligence Operations: Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee", 105[th] Congress, Second Session, May 20, 1998, http://www.house.gov/jec/hearings/intell/alibek.htm .

[61] Lynne Duke, "Doubts Arise on Junking of Chemical Arms; S. African Panel Told Some Drugs, Formulas May Have Been Secretly Held Back," Washington Post, July 9, 1998, A24.

A government spokesman stated that South Africa's chemical weapons program has been "terminated, and that the material for offensive purposes in government storage has been destroyed." The program was shut down in 1993 and its products dumped at sea. Buchizya Mseteka, "S. Africa Says it Terminated Chemical Weapons Scheme," Reuters, June 15, 1998.

[62] Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program, INSS Occasional Paper 37, (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, February, 2001), http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp37.htm.
David Beresford, "Mandela on apartheid's poison list," The Age, June 11, 1998, http://www.theage.com.au/daily/980611/news/news18.html.
Chris Opperman, "Prosecutors Ecstatic as Basson's Buddy Talks," Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), June 27, 1997.
"SADF 'made Ecstasy for riot control,'" Business Day, June 10, 1998.
Lynne Duke, "Doubts Arise on Junking of Chemical Arms; S. African Panel Told Some Drugs, Formulas May Have Been Secretly Held Back," Washington Post, July 9, 1998, A24.
"Apartheid-Era Scientist: Mandela was Target for Poisoning," Edmonton Journal Extra, June 10, 1998.
David Beresford, "Apartheid's Lab Rats," Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), June 12, 1998.
Andrew Maykuth, "Mandela's Government Becomes Ally of Ex-Foe," Philadelphia Inquirer, June 20, 1998.

[63] Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm, 2001.
Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program, INSS Occasional Paper 37, (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, February, 2001), http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp37.htm.

A government spokesman stated that South Africa's biological weapons program has been "terminated, and that the material for offensive purposes in government storage has been destroyed." The program was shut down in 1993 and its products dumped at sea. Buchizya Mseteka, "S. Africa Says it Terminated Chemical Weapons Scheme," Reuters, June 15, 1998.

[64] Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm, 2001.
Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program, INSS Occasional Paper 37, (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, February, 2001), http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp37.htm.

In his testimony before the Reconciliation and Truth Commission, Dr. Schalk van Rensburg indicated that South Africa's biological weapons program used cholera, anthrax, botulinum toxin, and salmonella in its activities. Beresford, "Mandela on apartheid's poison list," http://www.theage.com.au/daily/980611/news/news18.html.

[65] Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified South Korea as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

Citing U.S. government sources, a 1997 article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists counts South Korea among those states suspected of having chemical weapons. E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," p. 38.

The Economist reports that South Korea is among those countries that, under the Chemical Weapons Convention, have declared possessing chemical weapons. "Chemical Weapons. Just Checking," The Economist, p. 42.

See footnote # 13. Shanker, "West underwrites Third World's chemical arms"; McCain, "Proliferation in the 1990s: implications for U.S. Policy and force planning," in Burck and Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, pp. 168-171. Also cited in Burck and Flowerree chart: Elisa Harris, "Chemical weapons proliferation: current capabilities and prospects for control," New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Delivery Capabilities in the Third World, (Landham, Md: Aspen Strategy Group, 1990), pp.70-72. Harris classifies South Korea as "seeking to acquire CW weapons or a production capability, or as suspected of possessing CW weapons."

[66] There is considerable uncertainty as to Sudan's chemical weapons status. For a well documented discussion of the debate please refer to the CNS Fact Sheet on Sudan, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs," http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/sudan.htm.

[67] In a speech to the Fifth Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva on November 19, 2001, John Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, accused Sudan of operating a clandestine biological weapons program. Jenni Rissanen, Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference, BWC Review Conference Bulletin, (Acronym Institute, November 19, 2001), http://http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/revcon1.htm.

[68] "Syria has a long-standing chemical warfare program, first developed in the 1970s...it has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and may be trying to develop advanced nerve agents as well." Carl W. Ford, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, "Hearing on Reducing the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," (Washington, DC), March 19, 2002.

The DOD reports that Syria "already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles. Additionally, Syria is trying to develop the more toxic and persistant nerve agent VX. In the future, Syria can be expected to continue to imporove its chemical agent production and storage infrastructure." U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf , p. 43.

Syria has production facilities for nerve gas and possibly other chemical agents. Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

See also
M. Zuhair Diab, "Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations," The Nonproliferation Review, 5, (Fall, 1997), pp. 104-111.

For further information on Syria's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/syria.htm.

[69] CDISS reports that Syria's chemical arsenal contains mustard gas, sarin, and VX. "Devil's Brews Briefing: Syria," Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, 1996.

"Syria has reportedly developed the capability to produce both mustard gas and nerve agents." Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, Flashpoints and Force Structure, http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa97/sa97ch11.html.

The CIA reports that Syria has a stockpile of sarin. CIA, Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/acq1997.html#Syria.

[70]"Syria is pursuing biological weapons. It has an adequate biotechnical infrastructure to support a small biological warfare program. Without significant foreign assistance, it is unlikely that Syria could advance to the manufacture of significant amounts of biological weapons for several years." Carl W. Ford, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, "Hearing on Reducing the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," (Washington, DC), March 19, 2002.

In a speech to the Fifth Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva on November 19, 2001, John Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, accused Syria of operating a clandestine biological weapons program. Jenni Rissanen, Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference, BWC Review Conference Bulletin, (Acronym Institute, November 19, 2001), http://http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/revcon1.htm.

Testifying before Congress in 1991, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks indicated that Syria had "developed an offensive BW capability." Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

"Syria's biotechnical infrastructure is capable of supporting limited agent development. However, the Syrians are not believed to have begun any major effort to put biological agents into weapons. Without significant foreign assistance, it is unlikely that Syria could manufacture significant amounts of biological weapons for several years." U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, p. 43.

In its annual report to Congress, ACDA states that "it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive biological warfare capability." Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/reports/annual/comp97.html.

[71] Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East", http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMDinMETrends.pdf.

[72] Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Taiwan as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress. Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

[73] According to a Russian intelligence report, "Taiwan does not have biological weapons...[however], it has shown signs of conducting biological research of an applied military nature." Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 104.

ACDA reports that Taiwan has been upgrading its biotechnology capabilities, but states that the "evidence indicating a BW program is not sufficient to determine if Taiwan is engaged in activities prohibited by the BWC." Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress , http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/reports/annual/comp97.html.

[74] The United Kingdom renounced its chemical weapons option in 1957 and subsequently destroyed its CW capabilities. Edward M. Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study of Proliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1994) pp. 11, 162.

"Britain decided against building her own nerve-gas factory in the mid-1950s and, having taken that decision, discarded her residual World War II chemical weapons and closed down her chemical weapons research and development program." Julian Perry Robinson, "Appendix C: United States and NATO Chemical Weapons," in Chemical Weapons and Chemical Arms Control, Matthew Meselson, ed., (New York, NY: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1978) p. 113.

[75] The United Kingdom's World War II stockpile of chemical weapons included phosgene, mustard gas, and lewisite. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II: CB Weapons Today, p. 127.

[76] Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm, 2001.
Gradon B. Carter and Graham Pearson, "British biological warfare and biological defence, 1925-45, in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Mood, eds., (New York: NY: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), p. 168.

The Office of Technology Assessment includes the United Kingdom in a list of countries that have admitted to having had "offensive [biological] weapon munition supplies or development programs in the past." U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 63.

[77] Gradon B. Carter and Graham Pearson, "British biological warfare and biological defence, 1925-45, Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Mood, eds., (New York: NY: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), pp. 182-4.

The British biological weapons program involved research on anthrax. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 118.

[78] The United States stopped production of unitary chemical munitions in 1969. "Chemical and Biological Warfare," The Military Balance 1988-1989, (London, UK: IISS, 1988), p. 244.

In November 1985, Congress passed legislation calling for the destruction of 90 percent of the total U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical agents. On May 13, 1991, the Bush administration announced that U.S. stockpiles of both binary and unitary weapons would be detroyed when the CWC entered into force. Amy E. Smithson, The U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Program: Views, Analysis, and Recommendations, (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1994), pp. 96, 99.

[79] U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, http://www.sbccom.army.mi