DPRK Flag North Korea Special Collection

Engaging North Korea: Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy(1)

Overview

South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine” or engagement policy with North Korea is a tacit extension of the earlier governments National Commonwealth Unification Formula.(2) Whereas the focus of the previous South Korean governments was on containing North Korea and the ultimate goal of national reunification, the Kim Dae-jung administration’s approach emphasizes the peaceful management of the divisions on the Korean peninsula through engagement. It draws on the “neo-functionalist” paradigm, stressing that greater interaction and the flow of economic and political benefits from the South to the North will result in an eventual softening in Pyongyang’s position and promote peace and cooperation on the Korean peninsula.(3)

Key Aspects of Sunshine Policy

  • Promotion of confidence, peace, and cooperation between the two Koreas through direct social and economic interaction.
  • Resolution of political and military tensions through multilateral frameworks including the four-party talks and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).
  • Recognition of North Korea as a separate political entity and emphasis that South Korea will neither harm nor attempt to absorb the North. Belief that despite North Korea’s economic crisis, the Kim Jong-il regime is not about to collapse. Indirectly supports the Kim Jong-il regime’s survival through engagement and food and agricultural aid.
  • Belief that containment of North Korea has had negative consequences. Economic failure and political isolation have led North Korea to use its nuclear and ballistic missile programs as bargaining chips to guarantee regime survival. Containment also produced aggressive and uncooperative behavior. Emphasizes engagement and the normalization of political and economic ties between North Korea and the United States and Japan.(4)

Policy Guidelines

To achieve the goals listed above, the Kim Dae-jung administration has sought to formulate the sunshine policy by adopting seven policy guidelines. These include:

  • Revival of the stalled inter-Korean dialogue through the exchange of high-level envoys and implementation of the 1991 Basic Agreement.
  • Recognition of the importance of safeguarding national security and deterring North Korea.
  • Commitment to providing $3.2 billion (75 percent) of the total project cost of building two light-water reactors in North Korea.
  • Separation of politics from business. Simplification of legal procedures and lifting of investment ceilings on South Korean business operations in North Korea.
  • Humanitarian food and agricultural aid to North Korea to enable it tide over famine and food crisis. Encouragement of family reunions.
  • Government-level aid to North Korea to be extended on the principle of reciprocity. Given the existence of military tensions, no aid or cooperation to be extended unconditionally.
  • Expanding North-South links beyond governmental agencies by including non-profits, private sector, and other civil society organizations.(5)

Sunshine Policy: Success or Failure?

Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy has produced mixed results. At a multilateral level, Seoul has succeeded in persuading Washington and Tokyo to form a high-level Trilateral Coordination and Oversight group to coordinate their North Korea policies.(6) Persistent pressure from the Kim Dae-jung administration has also played a substantial role in pushing Japan and the United States to consider normalizing political and economic relations with North Korea.

Engagement has also had some success in restraining North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The freeze on North Korea’s nuclear program remains in place. Packing of the spent nuclear-fuel rods from the 5MW experimental reactor at Yongbyon is nearly complete.(7) Suspicions that North Korea may have violated the 1994 Agreed Framework by continuing nuclear weapons-related activities at a secret underground nuclear site at Kumchang-ri have been proven unfounded as US inspectors in May 1999 found nothing but empty tunnels.(8) Further, even in the face of an unprecedented financial crisis, Seoul has taken bold legislative and administrative steps to implement the Kim Young-sam administration’s commitment to fund 75 percent of the construction costs of the two light-water nuclear reactors at Sinpo in North Korea.(9) It has also persuaded Japan to lift the freeze on $1 billion in funding for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).(10) Tokyo froze funding for KEDO after North Korea tested a rocket that overflew Japan in August 1998.(11)

Negotiations to persuade North Korea to halt the development and export of ballistic missiles and ultimately to dismantle its ballistic missile-related infrastructure have proven to be unsuccessful so far. In missile talks with the United States, North Korea has offered to suspend ballistic missile exports in return for $1 billion in annual compensation from the United States for a period of three years. However, Pyongyang has showed no inclination to dismantle its ballistic missile-related infrastructure and adamantly insists that testing ballistic missiles is a “sovereign right.” The United States has rejected North Korea’s proposal.(12)

At a bilateral level, the sunshine policy has succeeded in expanding economic cooperation with North Korea. However, the political benefits of that cooperation are unclear. The South Korean government has increased North-South contacts by encouraging private sector investments in the North. It has also extended food and fertilizer aid to Kim Jong-il’s beleaguered regime. In fact, South Korea and other multilateral donors have pledged $600 million in food and fertilizer aid to North Korea for 1999.”(13)

In March 1998, the Kim Dae-jung government lifted investment caps on South Korean businesses in an effort to encourage private sector activity in North Korea. Simultaneously, legal regulations, that had impeded such investments in the past, were also simplified. The Hyundai group’s plan to secure exclusive rights to build and operate tourist facilities in North Korea’s Mt. Kumgang area has been the most successful venture to date.(14) Other planned Hyundai projects include operations to dismantle ships, a thermal power plant, an oil drilling operation, and the construction of a mammoth industrial estate. Riding on Hyundai’s success other South Korean conglomerates such as Samsung, Daewoo, and LG are actively seeking to make inroads into North Korea.(15)

Despite the forward movement, Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy has not entirely succeeded in translating economic cooperation into improved political relations, confidence building, consistency or transparency in North Korea’s behavior. North Korea has continued with provocative acts. It’s June 1998 submarine incursion(16) was followed in August 1998 by the test of a three-stage rocket.(17) Then in June 1999, North Korean torpedo boats intruded into South Korean waters in the West Sea resulting in naval clashes and the sinking of one North Korean torpedo boat.(18)

The North-South vice-ministerial talks that opened with much fanfare in Beijing in June 1999, have collapsed over the question of family reunions. Before the talks, South Korea shipped 100,000 tons of the promised 200,000 tons of fertilizer to North Korea in anticipation that North Korean gratitude and incentives of further economic aid would produce a breakthrough in the vice-ministerial talks. That hope was belied as North Korea backtracked on its earlier commitment to allow family reunions.(19)

Critics of Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy are skeptical whether an engagement policy based on neo-functionalism can trigger the requisite behavioral changes in Pyongyang. They argue that Pyongyang is simply trying to acquire aid to prevent regime collapse. Observers also point to the political, ideological, and military nature of the North-South rivalry, which limits the overall success of the South’s engagement policy. In Europe the neo-functionalist paradigm succeeded, as there was a shared political, economic, and social interest in a market economy and liberal democracy. However, this factor is entirely absent on the Korean peninsula as Pyongyang is primarily interested in regime survival.(20)

Likewise, there are other restraints on functionalist cooperation. Being economically inferior, North Korea is afraid of being absorbed by the South. Pyongyang has therefore limited its economic and social interaction with the South fearing that pervasive South Korean influences would loosen the control of the Kim Jong-il regime over the North Korean populace.

Critics also speculate that North Korea’s civil-military divide also puts limits on engagement with the South. The military enjoys dominance in North Korea’s domestic politics. To retain his political power, Kim Jong-il has bestowed considerable economic and political privileges on the military. As supreme commander-in-chief Kim Jong-il controls the military directly, which remains relatively unaffected by the economic crisis facing the state. Because of this power structure, the military has greater influence on policy than lower-rung civilian bureaucrats who favor engagement and cooperation with Seoul.(21)

In developing a unified approach to dealing with North Korea, South Korea has also met considerable opposition from Japan and the United States. Although both Tokyo and Washington have publicly advocated engagement, domestic pressures have prevented them from engaging Pyongyang, thus hampering the overall effectiveness of Seoul’s sunshine policy.

Despite the above problems, the Kim Dae-jung administration remains committed to its sunshine policy. Seoul is confident that engagement offers the most practical means of reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula and ensuring peace, stability and cooperation. No time limits have been placed on the success of engagement and President Kim Dae-jung believes that given time and patience Pyongyang can be persuaded to undertake economic reforms, integrate itself into the global economy, negotiate arms control and military confidence building agreements, and accept the prevailing global norms of international behavior.(22)


Acknowledgements:
Gaurav Kampani with Evan Medeiros and Michael Dutra
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies


Notes

(1) “Sunshine” policy has been named after one of Aesop’s fables. According to the legend, sunshine is more effective than wind in persuading a traveler to shed his clothes. The analogy is that engagement and not containment will be more effective in inducing positive changes in North Korea’s behavior.

(2) The “National Commonwealth Unification” formula was first proposed by the Rob Tae-woo administration in September 1989. The formula stresses the principles of “independence, peace, and democracy” in achieving Korean unification. It also envisages a three-step approach to achieve Korean unification. As a first-step, North and South Korea would eliminate their hostile and confrontational relationship to achieve conciliation and cooperation. During the second or “commonwealth” phase, the two Koreas would institutionalize peaceful coexistence by attempting to build a common social, economic, and political community. Finally, in the third-stage, the two Koreas would hold common elections in accordance with a previously negotiated unified Korea constitution to set up a national assembly and executive. See, “President Roh Tae-woo’s Special Address Concerning National Unification Delivered Before the National Assembly: Presenting a Formula for Korean National Unification,” Seoul, 11 September 1989, Foreign Press Division of the Korea Overseas Information Service, Ministry of Culture and Information, Republic of Korea; “Commemorative Address by President Roh Tae-woo on the 44th National Liberation Day, Enunciating Three-Point Principles of Unification,” at the National Independence Hall, Chungchongnam-do, 15 August 1989, Foreign Press Division of the Korea Overseas Information Service.

(3) Jongchul Park, “Seoul’s Engagement Policy towards Pyongyang: Setting, Framework, and Conditions,” Korea and World Affairs, Spring 1999, p.14.

(4) Ralph A. Cossa, “The Agreed Framework/KEDO and Four-Party Talks,” Korea and World Affairs, Spring 1999, p.45; “A New Year’s Message to the Nation from President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea,” 1 January 1999, Foreign Media Division of the Korean Overseas Culture and Information Service; Yong-pyo Hong, “North Korea’s First 50 Years and the Opening of the Kim Jong-il Era,” Korea and World Affairs, Winter 1998, p.550; Address by President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea at the School of Oriental and African Studies, 4 April 1998, Foreign Media Division of the Korean Overseas Culture and Information Service.

(5) “Lim Dong-won Speaks on ROK Policy on DPRK,” Wolgan Choson, 1 June 1999, pp.372-383; in FBIS Document FTS 19990530000176, 30 May 1999; Lee Chang-up, “Kim Calls for NK to Accept ‘Sunshine Policy,’ Korea Times (Seoul), 17 May 1999, <http://www.koreatimes.com>; “’Road Map’” for S-N Coexistence Unveiled,”Korea Times (Seoul), 7 April 1999, <http://www.koreatimes.com>; “Seoul Unveils Ways of Averting Nuke Crisis on Korean Peninsula,” Korea Times (Seoul), 8 December 1998, <http://www.koreatimes.com>.

(6) Jang-soo Seo, “Tripartite Policy Coordination Group on NK Policy to be Formed, “ JoongAng Ilbo (Seoul), 27 April 1999, <http://www.english.joongang.co.kr>.

(7) “Article Notes Sealing of Fuel Rods to End Soon,” Chungang Ilbo (Seoul), 13 March 1999; in FBIS document, FTS19990314000166, 13 March 1999.

(8) “Report on the U.S. Visit to the Site at Kumchang-ri, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” US State Department Press Release, 25 June 1999.

(9) Shin Jong-rok, “Bonds To Be Issued to Finance NK Reactors,” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 7 May 1999, <http://www.chosun.com>; Hong Un-t’aek, “Government Concessions on DPRK Light-Water Reactors Guarantee,” Seoul Tong-a Ilbo, 23 April 1999; in FBIS document FTS19990423001945, 23 April 1999.

(10) “Opening Statements by President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi at a Joint Press Conference Following Their Summit Meeting at Chong Wa Dae, Supporting Seoul’s Engagement Policy on North Korea,” Seoul 20 March 1999, Foreign Media Division of the Korean Overseas Culture and Information Service; “Japan’s Diet Endorses KEDO Financing,” Korea Times (Seoul), 3 June 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 June 1999, <http://www.lexisnexis.com>; “Japan Lifts Ban on DPRK Reactor Cost Sharing,” Yonhap (Seoul), 16 October 1998; in FBIS-EAS-98-289, 16 October 1998.

(11) Betsy Pisik, “Test Threatens Aid from Tokyo, Washington,” Washington Times, 1 September 1998, <http://www.washtimes.com>.

(12) “DPRK to Continue Development of Long-Range Missiles,” Yonhap (Seoul), 31 March 1999; in FBIS document FTS19990331000150, 31 March 1999; “DPRK on 4th DPRK-US Missile Negotiations,” Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1 April 1999, No.25; Chris Michaud, “Little Progress in US-Korea Missile Talks,” Inquisit, 2 October 1999, <http://www.inquisit.com>.

(13) “NK Missile Launch Will Lead to End of Aid: Min. Hong,” Korea Times (Seoul), 12 June 1999, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>.

(14) “Hyundai Secures 30-Year Exclusive to Mt.Kumgang,” Digital ChosunIlbo (Seoul), 13 January 1999, <http://www.chosun.com>.

(15) “Does Kim’s Meet with a Southern Tycoon Herald a Policy Change?” Korea Herald (Seoul), November 1998, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.

(16) Mary Jordan, “North Korean Vessel is Seized by S. Korea: Submarine Caught in Net Near 12-Mile Limit,” Washington Post, 23 June 1998, p.A11.

(17) “North Korea Tests Long-Range Missile,” Reuters, 1 September 1998; in Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, 1 September 1998, <http://www.nautilus.org>.

(18) Jun Kwan-woo, “Seoul May Discuss with N.K. Maritime Border in West Sea,” Korea Herald (Seoul), 19 June 1999, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>; Chon Shi-yong, “Kim Says West Sea Incident Helped Show Security Side of ‘Sunshine Policy,’” Korea Herald (Seoul), 18 June 1999, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.

(19) Shin Yong-bae, “Beijing Talks End Without Progress: South Korean Delegation Returns Today,” Korea Herald (Seoul), 2 July 1999, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>; Shin Yong-bae, “Seoul’s Call for Family Reunions Ignored by N.Korean Negotiators,” Korea Herald (Seoul), 2 July 1999, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.

(20) Park, “Seoul’s Engagement Policy towards Pyongyang: Setting, Framework, and Conditions,” pp.22-23.

(21) Yon-Sup Han, “The Kim Dae-jung Government’s Unification Policy,” Korea and World Affairs, Fall 1998, p.338.

(22) Kevin Sullivan and Mary Jordan, “S. Korea’s Kim Defends Policy Toward North,” Washington Post, 24 June 1999, p.A1; “Patience and the Sunshine Policy,” Korea Herald (Seoul), 30 June 1999, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>; “Seoul Determined to Keep ‘Sunshine’ On Track Despite N. Korea Spats,” AFP, 24 June 1999.


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